Land Contamination Incidents: Management Responses From a Public Health Perspective. by Eagles, Emma E.
CENTRE FOR ENVIRONMENTAL STRATEGY 
UNIVERSITY OF SURREY
CHEMICAL INCIDENT RESPONSE SERVICE 
GUY’S & ST THOMAS’ HOSPITAL NHS TRUST, LONDON
LAND CONTAMINATION INCIDENTS: 
MANAGEMENT RESPONSES 
FROM A PUBLIC HEALTH PERSPECTIVE
EMMA E EAGLES 
NOVEMBER 2002
ProQuest Number: 13803802
All rights reserved
INFORMATION TO ALL USERS 
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send a com p le te  manuscript 
and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed,
a note will indicate the deletion.
uest
ProQuest 13803802
Published by ProQuest LLC(2018). Copyright of the Dissertation is held by the Author.
All rights reserved.
This work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States C ode
Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC.
ProQuest LLC.
789 East Eisenhower Parkway 
P.O. Box 1346 
Ann Arbor, Ml 48106- 1346
"XEBBi
l f 4 * r a r t
© /' ' , Avt?
i.Gai . , , iy->A)1 f ^  ■ ug.
6 ^ 7  5 \  ^ — - * * * '• .
r
i f \  V  /*■-.
v, C , *
fEf is for Earth, by Emma, aged 8.
E is for the Earth and everyone in it, 
Eagles in the Alps,
Eels in the Eastern sea,
Elephants in Ethiopia,
Everyday extinction happens. 
Environment is crucial.
Here are 8 words
The Earth and everything in it is special.
ABSTRACT
Chemical incidents, whether deliberate or accidental, have the potential to cause 
widespread harm to human and environmental health. Whilst incident prevention is 
desirable in an increasingly industrialised society, accidents can and do happen so a 
well-structured multi-agency approach to incident response is essential. The project 
has focussed on the role of public health, since limited experience combined with the 
lack of standard procedures for managing incidents has resulted in problems being 
dealt with on an ad hoc basis from a public health perspective. A framework for 
incident management is proposed and tools and guidance to support and facilitate the 
public health response to a chemical incident presented, including a scale to rapidly 
assess and communicate the potential health impact of an incident. Public health 
practitioners have welcomed this guidance, which has been demonstrated to be both 
functional and effective.
In protecting human health it is imperative that pollution streams are not diverted to 
the environment and from one environmental medium to another. In the past soil was 
frequently used as a sink for contaminants and until recently has not been granted the 
same level of protection as air or water. Land contamination presents an interesting 
challenge since establishing a relationship between soil contamination and adverse 
health effects can be both complex and expensive. As a result, resources specifically 
for managing land contamination incidents have been developed.
Although this project has focussed on the needs of public health practitioners, the 
generic framework is available for other agencies involved in incident response to 
use and refine to suit their respective needs. The advantages of all agencies using the 
same basic framework include improved communication, minimised use of jargon, 
better understanding of roles and responsibilities and ultimately a more coherent and 
effective response.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
1. Introduction
The overall objectives of the Engineering Doctorate (EngD) Programme in 
Environmental Technology are to create graduate Research Engineers “with the 
necessary background knowledge, skills and experiences to understand the 
relationship between the environment, technology and business and to apply this 
understanding to the development and promotion of corporate strategy” (University 
of Surrey/Brunei University, 2002).
In addition the course handbook states that Research Engineers need to:
• be able to plan and execute flexible, innovative research and development 
programs that respond to customer needs;
• form, work within, and where necessary, lead teams with multidisciplinary 
backgrounds;
• have expert knowledge in the field of environmental technology and be able 
to apply techniques that balance social and economic benefit against resource 
utilisation and environmental impact;
• possess a working knowledge of project management and business methods; 
and
• have excellent communication skills.
In order to demonstrate full attainment of these objectives, the final thesis is 
presented as a portfolio of the work undertaken throughout the four-year project (the 
‘Portfolio’) comprising a thesis, a series of appendices to support the work presented 
and other key documents, which demonstrate innovations and contributions to 
knowledge.
The complete contents of the Portfolio, including assignments from the EngD 
programme of courses, are listed in Appendix Q, along with a brief description where 
applicable. Volume 1 contains the main body of the thesis with supporting 
appendices presented. All salient points from the progress reports submitted at six- 
monthly intervals throughout the duration of the project (Volume 2) have been
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extracted and are provided in Volume 1. The full Portfolio is not enclosed, as it is too 
large to be submitted in its entirety. The examiners are welcome however to view 
any additional items from the Portfolio prior to the viva should they wish to do so. It 
will also be available in full for viewing at the viva examination.
The aims of this executive summary are to set the Portfolio within the context of 
‘Environmental Technology’ and to direct the reader to the evidence within the thesis 
demonstrating innovations and contributions to knowledge. To achieve these aims it 
is divided into three main sections comprising: an overview of the project, a 
summary of the contributions to knowledge and finally a setting of the final project 
outputs within the context of environmental technology.
2. Project overview
Incidents involving chemicals, whether deliberate or accidental, can have far 
reaching implications in terms of their potential human and environmental health 
impacts. While preventing incidents is the clearly the most desirable option, it has 
been recognised that in an increasingly industrialised society accidents can and do 
happen. Additionally, the devastating impact of the terrorist attacks in the United 
States in September 2001 has raised awareness of the potential for a deliberate 
release of a chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear agent and the need to be 
prepared to respond to and manage any such incident effectively.
Unsurprisingly, there is no single organisation within the UK with all the expertise 
and resources required to effectively manage a ‘chemical incident’ (defined in 
Chapter 1). As a result incident response has to be a combined, co-ordinated 
procedure between many services and organisations including the emergency 
services, the Environment Agency, the local authority and the local public health 
department. Therefore a structured approach to incident management, along with 
easily accessible resources to facilitate an effective response to any potential or 
confirmed problem, has been identified as a key need and has been the principal 
issue addressed by the project.
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In particular the project has focussed on the role of the National Health Service 
(NHS) and specifically public health practitioners in responding to chemical 
incidents since evidence shows that limited experience, combined with the lack of 
standard procedures, has resulted in the public health aspects of these problems being 
managed on an ad hoc basis. Furthermore it has been identified that lessons learned 
through managing incidents are unlikely to be reported in the wider public health 
arena since no formal mechanism or requirement to disseminate information has 
existed.
To support the public health response to chemical incidents, public health 
departments have service level agreements with one of the five Regional Service 
Provider Units (RSPUs) across the UK. The role of the RSPU is to provide the 
toxicological information needed to undertake hazard and risk assessments and to 
provide advice to assist in the protection of the health of the public.
This research project has been undertaken in collaboration with the Chemical 
Incident Response Service (CIRS) which is the RSPU based at the Medical 
Toxicology Unit, Guy’s and St Thomas’ Hospital NHS Trust in London. CIRS hold 
contracts with 21 strategic health agencies in NHS regions across England covering a 
population of around 37 million. CIRS has provided a unique environment in which 
to carry out the project, including the opportunity to spend time with public health 
practitioners to identify more precisely their resource needs and to test and explore 
proposed solutions in ‘real’ situations, thereby ensuring that the project outputs are 
both pragmatic and functional. Furthermore personal involvement in responding to 
actual chemical incidents has facilitated the collection of a significant database of 
information about how incidents have been managed, thereby facilitating 
identification of ‘best practice’ as well as areas for improvement.
Previously the information provided by CIRS has tended to be medically based and 
has not always taken into consideration the interactions that link human health with 
environmental quality (Chapter 1), including the potential for long-term 
environmental effects that could bring about an equal if not greater threat to human 
health. For example, a chemical spill onto land may migrate through to the
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groundwater and pollute the drinking water supply which, if consumed might result 
in adverse health effects.
Consequently a key aim of this research project has been to establish a better 
understanding of pollution mechanisms within the environment, including the 
importance of ensuring that pollution streams are not diverted from one 
environmental medium to another.
A particular focus of the project has been land contamination (Chapter 2) since until 
recently soil has not been granted the same level of protection as air or water. 
Additionally land contamination is considered to present an interesting challenge 
from a management viewpoint because establishing a relationship between the 
presence of contaminants in the soil and reported adverse health effects is not always 
straightforward. A review of the literature has demonstrated however that land 
contamination has the potential to impact on human health and the environment, 
hence the need to develop a framework for dealing with such problems is considered 
to be justified. Research into the management of land contamination incidents is 
therefore both essential and timely although the need to address wider concerns, 
including risk communication, is also recognised. Furthermore, the effective 
management of ‘new’ land contamination incidents can contribute to the 
development of a more sustainable society by ensuring that future generations do not 
have a legacy of contaminated land to deal with.
3. Contributions to Knowledge
A key objective of the research project has been the development of a methodology 
to support role of public health practitioners in responding to chemical incidents. 
This has been met through developing a greater understanding of incident genesis 
and evolution and subsequently preparing and disseminating resources based on 
identifying best practice and lessons learned from past incidents. Significant project 
outputs can be categorised broadly as ideas and concepts that provide the 
philosophical overarching framework, and the more practical tools and resources that 
have been created around them. These have been divided into five categories:
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1. A system for categorising chemical incidents
A scale to categorise the potential health and environmental impact of a chemical 
incident has been developed (Chapter 3) and five categories ranging from 
‘insignificant incident’ to ‘catastrophic incident’ defined and illustrated with 
examples. The aim of the ‘chemical incident impact scale’ (CHS) is to improve 
communication between the agencies involved in incident management and it is 
likely to be adopted at a national level.
Representatives from the Department of Health are currently reviewing a paper 
prepared for publication entitled “A categorisation system to communicate potential 
public health impacts of acute chemical incidents” (Appendix P).
2. A generic framework fo r  chemical incident management
An additional project output has been the development of a generic framework for 
chemical incident management (Chapter 4), which recognises that although all 
incidents are different, patterns in the way events present and evolve can be 
identified. In the framework the incident management process is broken down into 
three key phases and may be illustrated initially using an incident timeline although 
subsequently a cyclical or ‘closed-loop’ framework has been proposed as it reflects 
better the dynamic process of incident evolution. A feedback mechanism has also 
been incorporated in recognition of the importance of updating emergency plans with 
observations and improvements from past incidents.
The framework has been used in creating guidance for chemical incident 
management, including tools for planning and response and, most importantly, is 
based upon lessons learned from past incidents and through practical experience 
rather than purely theoretical ‘best practice’.
3. Tools for planning and response
It is recognised that there are limited resources specifically for public health response 
to chemical incidents and that the majority of those that have been available outline 
what should be done rather than how to actually do it (Chapter 4).
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A methodology for public health risk assessment, which considers both the health 
and environmental impacts of the incident, has been developed to reflect the needs of 
public health practitioners identified through consultation. Actions to be considered 
at each phase of the incident management process are divided into ‘general actions’ 
and ‘action to protect the health of the public’ and are presented in the form of a 
checklist. Suggested actions also reflect the seriousness of the incident measured on 
the chemical incident impact scale (CHS). A series of supplementary event specific 
checklists, such as contamination of drinking water or allotment soil, have also been 
developed.
The development of the checklist design and layout has been an iterative process and 
incorporates suggestions from end users to ensure that the information is easy to find 
and use. However the checklists should be regarded as dynamic tools that can and 
should be modified and updated to reflect both current ‘best practice’ and the 
preferences of the public health practitioners who use them.
Checklists have been published in the Chemical Incident Report, a periodical 
produced quarterly by CIRS addressing issues within the field of chemical incident 
management and which can be downloaded from the CIRS website for use in the 
field.
4. Tools for land contamination incidents
After looking generally at chemical incidents, the project focussed on those that 
resulted in land contamination (Chapter 5). Patterns identified in land contamination 
incident evolution have then been used to develop both a categorisation scheme for 
such incidents and guidance for managing future problems.
Two distinct categories of land contamination incidents have been defined -  acute 
and chronic - subsequently referred to as the ‘principal categories’. The term acute 
has been used to describe land contamination that results from a sudden one-off 
release of a chemical either directly to the soil, such as leak or spill from a tank, or 
indirectly via aerial deposition or firewater runoff. In contrast, chronic describes land 
contamination that has resulted from a continued or repeated release of chemical
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substances over a period of time. Response time has been identified as the key 
parameter that determines the effectiveness of response for acute land contamination 
incidents, whereas for chronic land contamination incidents success is more likely to 
be determined by accurately establishing the most significant exposure pathways 
between the source of contamination and sensitive receptors. Further differences 
between acute and chronic incidents are identified and discussed (Chapter 2).
Detailed consideration has shown that the CHS for acute chemical incidents (Chapter 
3) may be used to categorise acute land contamination incidents since the majority of 
these problems result from leaks and spills i.e. acute chemical incidents. However, it 
is not appropriate for categorising chronic problems and therefore a separate system 
to identify and manage these incidents is required. A categorisation system for land 
incidents has therefore been developed (Chapter 5) in addition to the generic 
management model for chronic land contamination incidents. This has provided the 
basis for a chronic land checklist. To limit the number of checklists and to minimise 
duplication of information and confusion over which tools to use, the acute chemical 
incident checklist (Chapter 4) is considered however to be acceptable for use in 
responding to acute land contamination incidents. The main exception to this is for 
acute chemical incidents involving fuel since they were considered to present an 
interesting problem in terms of potential human and environmental health impacts 
(Chapter 6). As a result a detailed study of fuel incidents has been undertaken.
5. Fuel incidents
A retrospective review of past incidents reported to CIRS has revealed that around 
one third of all land contamination incidents have resulted from acute chemical 
incidents and of these 70% have involved fuel oils or chemicals used as fuel 
additives, including petrol, diesel, kerosene and heating oil (Chapter 6). The review 
has highlighted some of the distinguishing features that make acute incidents 
involving fuel unique in terms of the management response required including the 
complexity of the problems in terms of containment, clean up and decontamination. 
Given both the frequency of these incidents and the potential impact of such events 
on the health of the public, it has been realised that there is an urgent need for 
guidance for the management of acute fuel incidents. This has been developed and is
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in the form of a checklist, which aims to integrate the actions of other agencies 
involved in managing the event as well as highlighting specific actions to protect the 
health of the public.
This work has been published in ‘Public Health Medicine’ and presented at a number 
of conferences both in the UK and internationally.
Although the project has focussed on the needs of public health practitioners, the 
generic framework and risk assessment methodology is available for other agencies 
involved in incident response to use and refine further to suit their respective needs. 
A number of advantages of all agencies using the same guidance in responding to 
incidents have been identified. These include improved communication, minimised 
use of jargon and better understanding of roles and responsibilities; ultimately 
resulting in a more coherent and structured response to chemical incidents. 
Furthermore the tools can be adapted to consider both deliberate and accidental 
releases of biological, radiological and nuclear agents in addition to chemicals.
4. Setting the Final Outputs in the Context of Environmental Technology
‘Environmental Technology’ is defined as the application of techniques that balance 
social and economic benefits against resource utilisation and environmental impact. 
Therefore the term environmental technology encompasses not only technical 
solutions to environmental problems, but also improvements in management 
processes and techniques to minimise environmental impact (Goodfellow, 2001).
Furthermore, since the ‘environmental challenge’ is driven by the views of society, 
emotive issues such as disposal of waste via landfill or incineration and releases to 
the environment from industrial processes, need to be managed effectively. When we 
think about the environment we tend to be concerned first and foremost with human 
health and in general, regulators such as the Environment Agency mirror this view. 
Indeed protection of human health and the resources on which we depend is often the 
only real concern of regulators under many legislative regimes concerned with 
environmental protection, including Integrated Pollution Prevention and Control 
(IPPC). However, human health is inextricably interlinked with wider environmental
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issues (Chapter 1) so essentially human health and environmental impacts can be 
regarded as one and the same thing. The only real difference is that human health 
impacts are in effect a subset of wider environmental impacts.
The focus of this project has been on the improvement of management systems for 
responding to chemical incidents, with the aim being to prevent future events and to 
minimise the harm to human health from those incidents that will inevitably occur. 
As a result the project has embraced the concept of environmental technology in the 
widest sense by considering the socio-economic consequences of incident 
management alongside the more obvious technological challenges associated with 
the containment and cleanup of chemicals in the environment. This has included 
acknowledging the importance of public perception and concerns with regard to 
environmental contamination.
Using an iterative methodology to identify ‘best practice’ has resulted in the 
development of dynamic tools and resources that can be adapted and refined to 
reflect most effectively the changing views and expectations of society as well as 
legislative requirements. Furthermore a systematic approach to incident 
management is more cost-effective and less wasteful in terms of resource 
consumption and additionally the overall impact on human and environmental health 
both now and in the future is reduced. As a result the contributions of this project 
provide a more sustainable solution to chemical incident management.
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1. CHEMICAL INCIDENTS, THE ENVIRONMENT AND HUMAN
HEALTH
“We do not know when or i f  there will be a chemical attack, but we know, from our 
experience in handling other crises involving chemical accidents, that preparation 
saves time and saves lives ”
- Dr Roberto Bertollini, Director, Division of Technical Support at the WHO 
Regional Office for Europe, 2002
The devastating impact and long-term consequences of the terrorist attack on the 
World Trade Centre in New York in September 2001 raised awareness 
internationally of the need to be prepared to respond effectively to an incident, which 
could potentially involve chemical, biological or nuclear agents.
Chemical incidents, whether deliberate or accidental, have the potential to cause 
widespread harm to both human health and the environment. Major catastrophes, 
such as the release of dioxins when a chemical reactor overheated in Seveso, Italy in 
1976 and the explosion at Union Carbide in Bhopal, India in 1984, which resulted in 
many thousands of human casualties, are thankfully rare. However, between October 
2000 and March 2001, the National Focus1 received 704 confirmed reports of acute 
chemical incidents. This figure is based on data provided by the four Chemical 
Incident Regional Service Provider Units (RSPUs) in England and Wales, the
1 The National Focus is a UK organisation funded by the Departments o f Health for England, 
Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland to co-ordinate work on response to chemical incidents and 
surveillance o f health effects attributable to chemicals in the environment (DoH, 1997 cited by 
Bakhshi, 1997). The main activities o f the National Focus are to improve NHS preparedness with 
respect to chemical incident management, to facilitate the response to chemical incident management 
and to advise the UK government of the potential public health impact o f chemical incidents and to 
undertake public health surveillance of the impact o f environmental chemicals (National Focus, 2002).
2 The role of the RSPUs, which are based in Birmingham, Cardiff, London and Newcastle, is to 
provide timely advice on public health, environmental, scientific, toxicological and epidemiological 
aspects o f chemical incidents to medical professionals including GPs, A&E clinicians and public 
health practitioners.
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Scottish Centre for Infection and Environmental Hazards (SCIEH), the Maritime and 
Coastguard Agency, the Ambulance Service Association (ASA) and the National 
Chemical Emergency Centre (NCEC).
Obviously preventing incidents from occurring in the first place is the most desirable 
option. However, it is important to recognise that in an increasingly industrialised 
society, accidents can and do happen. If appropriate action is not taken the potential 
to cause widespread harm to human and environmental health is high, yet the 
effective management of chemical incidents can contribute to the development of a 
more sustainable society by ensuring that future generations do not have a legacy of 
contamination to deal with. Therefore it is imperative that suitable procedures are in 
place and that plans have been tested so that incidents are correctly identified, 
appropriate actions are taken without delay and that subsequent management 
activities are effective. Yet tools and guidance to support those involved in 
responding to and managing chemical incidents are currently limited. Furthermore, 
inadequate feedback and the lack of a formal mechanism to ensure that lessons 
learned from past incidents are used in the development of guidance and procedures 
for future use, mean that valuable information is currently being lost.
To fill this information gap and the apparent need, this research project has made 
three key contributions.
The first project output is the proposal of a standard framework for the management 
of chemical incidents, which recognises that although all incidents are different, there 
are patterns in the way events evolve and can subsequently be managed. This has 
resulted in a better understanding of incident genesis and the proposed ‘incident 
timeline’ concept presented in Chapter 4 as well as a more thorough understanding of 
the key agencies that are likely to be involved in responding to an incident. Many 
agencies are involved in chemical incident response including the emergency 
services, the Environment Agency, the local authority and the local public health 
department so clearly defined roles and responsibilities and good communication are 
fundamental to achieving a successful outcome. The work in this project has 
focussed primarily on the role of the public health practitioner since limited
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experience combined with a lack of suitable guidance has resulted in chemical 
incidents being managed on an ad hoc basis from a public health perspective. In a 
recent survey of Consultants in Communicable Disease Control (CsCDC) (Lefort & 
Pye, 2002) to assess their learning needs in respect of the possible deliberate release 
of biological agents, gaps in their learning about chemical releases were highlighted 
as a ‘most urgent need’ to be addressed. Furthermore 63% of respondents identified 
‘protecting the environment’ as an area where they either do not have or want more 
readily accessible information.
As ‘hands on’ experience of public health practitioners in chemical incident 
management and environmental issues is often quite limited, public health 
departments have service level agreements with one of the five Regional Service 
Provider Units (RSPUs) across the UK. This research project has been undertaken in 
collaboration with the Chemical Incident Response Service (CIRS) which is the 
RSPU based at the Medical Toxicology Unit, Guy’s and St Thomas’ Hospital NHS 
Trust in London. CIRS hold contracts with 21 strategic health agencies in NHS 
regions across England covering a population of around 37 million. This has 
provided a unique environment in which to undertake the project work. A particular 
benefit has been the opportunity to test and explore ideas and apply them in ‘real’ 
situations, thus ensuring that project outputs are effective and functional.
The second project contribution is an improved understanding of chemical incidents 
that result in land contamination, or ‘land contamination incidents’, and the 
development of tools to support the public health response to this specific category of 
events. Research work has concentrated on land contamination incidents since these 
present an interesting challenge from a public health perspective not least because a 
causal relationship between exposure to contaminated soil and adverse health effects 
is difficult to establish. During the course of this research project, contaminated land 
has become increasingly important on the political agenda. A new legal framework 
for managing the identification, investigation and clean-up of contaminated sites that 
are considered to present a hazard or potential hazard to human health and the 
environment came into force on 1 April 2000. In addition, some of the supporting 
guidance documentation was published in March 2002 including the long-awaited
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Contaminated Land Exposure Assessment (CLEA) model to derive site-specific soil 
guideline values. There is already a significant amount of research into the 
management and remediation of land contamination that has resulted from past 
industrial use and there is probably little original work that could be added to this. 
However, much of the information is not available in a form that public health 
practitioners can use in the event of an incident to determine the adverse health 
effects that could potentially be experienced following exposure to chemically 
contaminated soil. Investigation into land contamination incidents and their 
management from a public health perspective is therefore both timely and important.
It is therefore appropriate that this research project concentrates on land 
contamination that has resulted from chemical incidents to mitigate risks to human 
health and the environment. This ties in well with the original project brief which 
suggested that little work has been done to investigate the impact on human health 
and the environment from the uncontrolled release of chemicals onto land during a 
chemical spill and the subsequent contaminant migration through the subsurface 
environment.
Much of the research work from this section of the project has been included in a 
book being published by the Stationery Office entitled ‘The Environment and Public 
Health’ (Eagles et al, 2002). The book covers all types of chemical incident, but is 
primarily intended for use in responding to minor incidents rather than catastrophic 
or disaster events. The main objective is to provide an operational tool that can be 
used in the emergency response to all types of chemical incident. The primary 
audience is expected to be public health practitioners although much of the 
information is applicable to others involved in the management of chemical 
incidents, including the emergency services and local authority environmental health 
practitioners.
The third project output is a rapid response tool to be able to measure the potential 
public health impact of a chemical incident. Five categories of incident have been 
defined in terms of the potential number of people exposed and the severity of the 
health impact. These have been used to develop an incident categorisation scale, the
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primary use of which is as a tool for communication although a number of additional 
uses have been recognised and are presented in Chapter 3.
A diagram to illustrate how each component of the project links together is presented 
in Figure 1.1.
Figure 1.1: Project components
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1.1 Definitions
For surveillance and incident management purposes, it is important that the term 
‘chemical incident’ is clearly defined in order that such incidents are easily 
identified. The National Focus define a chemical incident as, “an acute event in 
which there is or could be exposure of the public to chemical substances which 
cause, or have the potential to cause, ill health.” This is similar to the definition 
developed by the International Programme for Chemical Safety (IPCS) who use the
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term to describe “an occurrence of public health concern caused by an acute release 
of a toxic or potentially toxic agent” (IPCS, 1999). The definition used by the 
Chemical Incident Response Service (CIRS) differs slightly, and describes a 
chemical incident as “an unforeseen event leading to acute exposure of two or more 
individuals to any non-radioactive substance resulting in illness or a potentially toxic 
threat to health” (O’Sullivan & Hill, 1991).
Interestingly all of the chemical incident definitions take into account the health 
impact of the event but none acknowledge the potential environmental implications, 
yet it is unlikely that an event that results in negative health consequences would 
give rise to negligible environmental damage. The Environment Agency does not 
appear to have a formal definition for a chemical incident or ‘pollution incident’ but 
defines four pollution incident categories. These take into consideration the impact 
on water quality, aquatic ecosystems, abstraction points, amenity value, 
agriculture/commerce and man, so human health effects are considered as one aspect 
among others.
The limited integration of environmental considerations into the chemical incident 
definitions is reflected in current procedures for the response and management of 
such incidents, which are discussed in Chapter 2. The relationship between human 
health and the quality of the environment will be explored more fully in the next 
section.
Whatever the differences or shortcomings of the definitions, there is little 
disagreement that the impact of a chemical incident, whether accidental or deliberate, 
can be minimised through effective planning and training of those who may be 
involved in responding to such an event. A meeting of IPCS held in Copenhagen in 
early 2002 recognised the importance of “international cooperation and close 
collaboration, planning and integration across a host of different sectors and experts. 
This allows a fast and efficient response in emergencies, and it also strengthens 
public services overall” (Coleman, 2002) and in particular highlighted the need for a 
common alert and response system for chemical incidents. In light of this, work
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towards an international scale that will quickly identify the severity of an incident 
has been undertaken as part of this research project and is presented in Chapter 3.
It is also necessary when considering the impact on human health to define exactly 
what is meant by ‘health’. The World Health Organisation (WHO) defined health as 
“a complete state of physical, mental and social well-being, and not merely the 
absence of disease” (WHO, 1948 cited by Steinemann, 2000) thus explicitly 
incorporating many aspects of human welfare (BMA, 1999). This means that when 
considering the consequences of a chemical incident or other environmental 
pollution incident on human health, more than physical harm should be considered. 
Indeed experience suggests that the psychological impact of being exposed to 
potentially toxic chemicals can have a much longer lasting impact than the 
immediate adverse health effects. To reflect this ‘public health’ has been defined as 
"the science and art o f preventing disease, prolonging life and promoting health 
through organised efforts o f society" (FPHM, 2002). It is concerned primarily with 
health and disease in populations. Throughout this project, where reference is made 
to ‘public health’ it will refer to the function of those practitioners working in this 
field. The chief responsibilities of those working in public health are monitoring the 
health of a population, the identification of its health needs, the fostering of policies 
that promote health and the evaluation of health services (FPHM, 2002).
Finally it is important to establish a definition for ‘the environment’. It is defined in 
the UK Strategy on Sustainable Development as “external conditions or surroundings 
in which people, plants and animals live, which tend to influence their development 
and behaviour” (DoE, 1994 cited by BMA, 1999). This includes social, cultural and 
economic conditions that contribute to ‘quality of life’ as well as physical conditions, 
such as the quality of air, land and water.
It is important also that pollution streams are not diverted from one environmental 
medium to another, possibly more sensitive, medium. Although air, land (soil) and 
water are inextricably interlinked until recently soil has not been granted the same 
level of protection as air or water. For example comprehensive European Community 
policies have existed for air and water for many years, but this is not the situation for
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soil. There are a number of reasons why this may be. Firstly soil is perceived to be 
dirty - we often refer to it as ‘dirt’ - so contamination may be less obvious than 
contaminated air or water that may have a strange taste or odour. Secondly human 
interaction with soil is less frequent than with the other environmental media. 
Contaminants do not disperse as far or as quickly in soil as they do through air and 
water so any adverse health effects may be very localised and also exposure may 
occur several years after the initial pollution incident. Nevertheless, it is now 
believed that soil pollution should be given the same priority as pollution of air or 
water (RCEP, 1996; Sims et al, 1997); Senesi et al (1999) describe soils as the most 
important environmental compartment functioning as a sink for trace elements 
released by human activities. These issues will be covered in more detail in Chapter 
2 .
The remainder of this chapter is dedicated to looking at the interrelationships that 
exist between humans and the environment and considering the advantages of 
addressing the impacts of a chemical or other pollution incident simultaneously.
1.2 The Environment and Human Health
Human health is increasingly recognised as being strongly influenced by 
environmental components e.g. clean air and water (Cirone & Duncan, 2000), 
although the link between exposure to environmental pollutants and the subsequent 
human health impact is often not clear (Ehrmann & Stinson, 1994). This can create 
difficulty in environmental decision-making as regulation and mitigation of 
environmental problems is frequently based on the need to prove the likelihood of an 
adverse health effect and the underlying cause-effect relationship (Laws & Sagar, 
1994). Nevertheless in 1972 the United Nations (UN) recognised “the link between 
environmental destruction and human welfare” (Zaidi, 1994) although it is 
acknowledged that the nature of environmental hazards and threats varies 
considerably from country to country. They include problems driven by poverty, for 
example, inadequate supply of water and waterborne disease, as well as natural 
disasters, such as earthquakes and volcanoes. Many effects are trans-boundary and
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cannot be regulated at a local or even national level (BMA, 1999) and hence require 
international collaboration if they are to be effectively controlled.
In the UK, since the Clean Air Acts of 1956 and 1968, the environmental debate has 
widened to include many pollutants and potential health hazards (DoE & DoH, 
1996). More recently the UK Government’s Sustainable Development Strategy, 
published in 1994, made it clear that health considerations are one of the primary 
concerns for environmental protection and consequently sustainable development 
policy. Furthermore in 1996 the environment was included as a key area for 
consultation within the Health of the Nation strategy “the central plank of 
government policy on health in England, which forms the main context for planning 
in the NHS into the next millennium” (National Audit Office, 1996).
The general population often identifies health, education and employment as key 
areas of concern. They do not, however, place such importance on the environment, 
even though recognition of the impact that anthropogenic activity has on the 
environment has become an increasingly important concern of populations and 
governments throughout the world. Bumingham and Thrush (2001) carried out a 
study among groups in disadvantaged communities to look at attitudes to the 
environment. Findings in their report ‘Rainforests are a long way from here’, 
suggested that people were concerned about their own surroundings, but they felt 
distanced from wider environmental issues and the way they are debated. “Our study 
suggests that cleaning up buildings, derelict sites and streets would considerably 
improve the quality of life in these areas. Long-term solutions to problems in the 
local environment require policy makers to take a joined-up approach to 
environmental, social and economic policies that recognises the way they all affect 
each other.” (Bumigham, 2002).
Steinemann (2000) suggests that by showing how changes in the environment affect 
human health, support for the effort to protect and promote environmental quality 
can be generated. This alludes to the suggestion that humans are essentially 
anthropocentric and that all efforts to protect the environment are merely an attempt
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to protect human health... “we are agents of consumption living in a world of 
consumerism and consumption of resources” (Banner, 1998).
Cirone and Duncan (2000) have also proposed an approach for integrating people 
and ecological entities into risk assessment. They suggest that if lines of evidence 
linking human and ecological endpoints were examined in a holistic process, there 
would be opportunities to identify the harm to society from actions which may seem 
in the best interest of humans but not necessarily beneficial to biological integrity. As 
human beings we seem to have a notion of obligation to be ‘nice’ and protective 
towards other species and the environment and follow the ‘precautionary principle’ 
in decision making much of the time. But in the words of Kermit the Frog, “...it 
seems to me that if you wait until the frogs and toads have croaked their last to take 
some action, you’ve missed the point...’’(Riger, 1993). Sadly we are not as proactive 
as we could be in taking pre-emptive steps to protect the environment. We often miss 
the point, which presents a fundamental stumbling block in working towards a 
sustainable future.
Regardless of the motive or driving force behind raising environmental awareness, it 
is clear that there is no single solution to complex environment and health problems 
and this substantiates the need to develop integrated approaches that pool 
information, expertise and common resources (Green et al, 2000).
Perhaps the most logical way forward is to integrate health and environmental policy 
more closely, to develop a more joined-up approach for assessing health and 
environmental risk and to consider human health and the environment 
simultaneously as part of a fully integrated system. Yet it would seem that the inter­
relationships, though not always fully understood, are not currently addressed and 
that there has been little or no attempt to look for cumulative, synergistic or 
antagonistic responses (Cirone & Duncan, 2000). This argument has been presented 
in a number of journal publications, including Environmental Impact Assessment 
Review, which presented a series of papers in a special issue in 1994 entitled 
“Human Health and the Environment: Unanswered Questions, Unquestioned 
Answers”. The aim was “to bring together the insights of environmental and health
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care professionals .. .to help each group understand how the other thinks about risk 
...and how better health risk assessment can enhance decision making about 
environmental risk” (Susskind & Hill (eds.), 1994).
In the next section, current approaches to assessing the environmental and human 
health impact of industrial processes and incidents will be discussed. Particular 
attention will be given to Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) and Health 
Impact Assessment (HIA). Although not directly applicable to the assessment and 
management of chemical incidents, the integration of EIA and HIA approaches has 
been more widely discussed in the published literature so offers the clearest and most 
persuasive arguments with regard to why the two fields should be integrated. 
Furthermore there are number of similarities pertaining to the type of information 
used in carrying out an assessment for EIA, HIA and chemical incident response and 
management.
1.2.1 Environmental Impact Assessment
There are many definitions for Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) but 
essentially it is a systematic process in which the environmental consequences of a 
proposed project are collected and examined in advance. Its purpose is to aid 
decision-making by allowing a number of alternative proposals to be considered.
In the UK, EIA was initially an ad hoc process carried out by local-planning 
authorities and developers (Glasson et al, 1995) but in 1985 an EC directive 
introduced a uniform system for undertaking EIAs across member states. The 
directive (85/337) makes an EIA mandatory for ‘Annex 1’ projects, which includes 
oil refineries, power stations and chemical installations.
An environmental baseline is established - a description of the present state of the 
environment prior to any development - and then the likely impacts of the proposed 
project are identified and summarised in a checklist or matrix. Impacts considered 
typically include soil and geology, flora and fauna, water quality, air quality, 
employment and traffic. Subsequently an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) is
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prepared. In principle this process is not dissimilar to that carried out following a 
chemical incident although there is currently no formal methodology to guide the 
post-incident assessment.
Steinemann (2000) examined the use of EIA for combining the environment and 
health and investigates to what extent health impacts are currently analysed in EIAs. 
The report builds on previous studies that have also studied the gaps between EIA 
and human health including a book published by the British Medical Association 
(BMA) in 1999. In general these confirmed the general lack of attention to human 
health impacts in EIAs as well as revealing inconsistent and unclear definitions.
Steinemanns report discusses the results of an empirical study of 42 EIAs undertaken 
in the US. It concludes that health impacts are generally not mentioned and where 
they have been considered, the focus is on single cause, single effect and single 
generation effects rather than cumulative impacts or inter-generational effects. 
Similar conclusions can be drawn from the review of 39 Environmental Impact 
Statements commissioned by the BMA to examine reporting of impacts on human 
health; human health issues received adequate coverage in only 28% of the 
statements (BMA, 1999). Steinemann suggests that two of the reasons for the lack of 
attention to human health risks are the analytical complexity (multiple causes and 
multiple effects, lag time between causes and effects, uncertain mechanisms, 
individual susceptibilities etc.) and the lack of clear procedures or methodologies for 
assessing health implications. The BMA echoes these observations but also adds that 
legislation fails to make human health impact assessment an explicit requirement and 
is therefore perceived to be less important.
1.2.2 Health Impact Assessment
Within the literature HIA is described as a methodology that enables the 
identification, prediction and evaluation of the likely changes in health risk (both 
positive and negative) of a policy, programme, plan or development on a defined 
population. The impacts considered could be direct or indirect, immediate or delayed 
and should take into account physical, mental and social impacts (BMA, 1999).
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Whereas EIA must always be prospective and carried out as part of the project 
proposal to identify all potential impacts, a HIA could be carried out before, during 
or after a proposal has been accepted. The three types of HIA are described as (Ison, 
2000):
Prospective - conducted before the implementation of a proposal and involving the 
assessment of potential health impacts, which creates the opportunity to make 
changes.
Retrospective - conducted after the implementation of a proposal and involving 
assessment of apparent health impacts associated with the proposal, which can be 
used to provide information for similar situations in the future.
Concurrent - conducted during the implementation of a proposal and involving 
assessment of health impacts as they are recognised so action can be taken to 
mitigate any negative effects and minimise harm as required.
There is no definitive methodology for HIA although several toolkits are being 
developed (Barnes & Scott-Samuel, 2000). However, in general the ‘environmental’ 
component of the HIA process includes an assessment of health risks through the 
evaluation of hazards and risks, an understanding of the impact of environmental 
contamination on human health (toxicology), consideration of exposure standard and 
the quantification of health risks. This is analogous to the process undertaken to 
assess the health impact following a chemical incident.
HIA does not exist as a separate or parallel procedure but as a component of EIA, 
which is ideal as it supports and encourages an integrated approach to health and the 
environment. However as outlined above, adequate emphasis is not always placed on 
assessing the health impact of many projects. Steinemann (2000) makes a number of 
suggestions for improving human health impact assessment within EIA, which 
include addressing sources of health impacts, rather than just symptoms, 
incorporating qualitative information into health risk assessments and promoting 
collaboration between environmental and public health professionals.
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These suggestions will be bome in mind in developing an integrated tool and 
guidance for the management of chemical incidents, presented in Chapter 4.
1.2.3 Integrated Assessment Approaches
“ Worldwide, mechanisms for fully integrated action on environmental and health 
issues are quite limited. In the UK, fo r  example, it has been found that while 
legislation gives scope for coverage o f human health issues, this is not regarded as a 
priority by most public authorities ” - British Medical Association (1999), p33.
The interaction between humans and the environment is complex and involves many 
aspects of our living, working and recreational activities (Green et al, 2000). So 
combining human health and environmental concerns in the same risk assessment 
process requires a diverse range of objectives to be considered and incorporated in 
the decision-making methodology (Figure 1.2).
Figure 1.2: Key inputs to environment and health decision-making 
(Source: Green et al, 2000)
This presents a challenge because, as highlighted earlier in this chapter, people do 
not have a common value system or knowledge base with respect to ecological and 
environmental issues (Cirone & Duncan, 2000). There may also be limited 
understanding of human physiology and toxicology for example. Although many 
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the risks associated with various chemicals and industrial processes, this information 
has not always been peer reviewed and so may be inaccurate or misleading or 
perhaps require careful interpretation (Eagles et al, 2002).
In traditional risk assessment processes, such as Environmental Impact Assessment, 
considerable emphasis is placed on acquiring quantitative data that could be regarded 
as scientifically rigorous. However, it should be borne in mind that often in assessing 
health and environmental impacts, qualitative information is more readily obtainable 
and as useful, if not more so, than quantitative data. For example, in living close to a 
landfill site where there may be odour issues, a diary from local residents may 
provide more compelling evidence to support concerns of potential harm to human 
health than routine monitoring of emissions from the site. This is not to suggest that 
quantitative data is not important, but that the use of qualitative information in the 
decision-making process should not be overlooked or dismissed as either biased or 
unreliable.
Regardless of the decision-making methodology used, any system that aims to 
combine the assessment of both health and environmental impacts needs to be 
transparent and the basis of the decision, as well as any areas of uncertainty, should 
be communicated clearly to stakeholders, including the public. Green et al (2000), 
who summarise a meeting held at the Institute for Environment and Health at the 
University of Leicester in 1999, draw similar conclusions. They discuss the 
importance of integrated strategies to protect environmental quality and human 
health and suggest that harmonising risk assessment procedures and improving 
stakeholder involvement is the most effective way that this can be achieved.
Since an unquestionable link between human health and the quality of the 
environment has been established, risk assessment methodologies developed as part 
of this research project should aim to employ more integrated approaches in order to 
minimise harm to human health and the environment and to prevent diversion of the 
impact from one to the other.
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2. MANAGING LAND CONTAMINATION
Although the link between the quality of the environment and human health has been 
recognised for centuries, it is only fairly recently that soil has been identified as an 
important exposure route to potentially toxic substances. To substantiate this a press 
release in April 2002 saw the launch of a soil protection policy from the European 
Commission, which sets out the steps to achieve more complete protection of soils in 
the future (European Commission, 2002). The Communication is in response to 
‘concerns about the degradation of soils in the EU’, and because ‘soil is a vital and 
largely non-renewable resource and has not been the subject of comprehensive EU 
action so far’. It describes the functions and policy-relevant features of soil, the main 
threats to it and relevant current EU policy. The Communication acknowledges that 
man's interaction with soil has been both beneficial and negative over many centuries 
but that soils are coming under increasing threat from human activities. It also 
highlights other soil problems linked to industrial sites. The press release also states 
that the Commission will establish with Member States a complete picture of the 
extent of soil contamination throughout the European Union so that best practice and 
remedial techniques can be identified and put into practice. Currently the European 
Environment Agency estimates that there are between 300,000 and 1.5 million 
contaminated sites in Europe.
This chapter looks at soil and in particular land contamination that has resulted either 
from past industrial use or through direct or indirect contamination following a 
chemical incident. Legislation and guidelines for the management of land 
contamination in the UK are presented, followed by a discussion of the roles and 
responsibilities of statutory bodies. Particular focus is on the public health 
management of land contamination as we continue to explore the inter-relationships 
between environmental hazards and human health.
2.1 The UK Perspective
Land contamination is a widespread problem in the UK (Bell & Ball, 1995). Much 
results from past industrial activity and often sites have been abandoned and left
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derelict for many years. A lack of legislative control gave rise to poorly managed 
waste disposal activity in the past, including the indiscriminate placement of 
industrial fill which has resulted many old industrial sites containing a heterogeneous 
mix of ground or ‘made ground’ (Finney & Dye, 1998) and mixtures of chemicals 
that are potentially hazardous to human and environmental health. Previously 
published estimates of the amount of land in the UK affected by contamination vary 
widely from 50,000 to 300,000 hectares, amounting to around 100,000 sites although 
the Environmental Agency estimates that between 5,000 and 20,000 may be a 
problem (Environment Agency, 2002).
In addition ‘new’ contamination of soil may result from industrial processes, such as 
the dumping of waste or effluent discharge, or chemical incidents, including leaks, 
spills, fires, explosions etc. Chemical incidents may give rise to direct contamination 
of the soil, such as a leak of fuel from an underground storage tank, or indirect 
contamination, such as runoff of contaminated surface water or deposition of 
particulates from a fire.
The dispersion of contaminants released to the environment is controlled by a 
complex set of processes that include various forms of transport and cross-media 
uptake (Asante-Duah, 1998). Soil, as well as being a ‘sink’ for contaminants, often 
provides a pathway to the other environmental media -  air and water including 
surface water and groundwater (Figure 2.1) - and hence may also be regarded as a 
‘source’ of contamination.
Whilst soil or land may be contaminated directly, there will always be the potential 
for secondary (indirect) contamination, and for another environmental medium to be 
affected if the source is not contained and mitigated in an appropriate and timely 
manner. An example of secondary contamination is presented in Box 2.1. There is 
also potential for food contamination if crops are grown in contaminated soil, as 
some plants are able to absorb and accumulate significant amounts of chemicals from 
the soil through their root systems. For example leafy vegetables are well known as 
cadmium accumulators (Mortvedt & Beaton, 1996).
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Figure 2.1: Links between air, land and water.
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Box 2.1: Secondary contamination of a UK beach (Goodfellow et al, 2001)
The land immediately behind a beach used by naturists and for line fishing and offshore 
commercial fishing for crab and lobster, was the site of a former gasworks. In April 1997 a 
local resident reported that there were reduced numbers of fishing bait on the beach and the 
fisherman also noticed a sulphurous smell and visible signs of oil whilst digging for bait. The 
information was passed on to the Environment Agency, who carried out sampling of 
sediment and seawater. Visual observation of the area showed the existence of patches of 
oily film on the sea, a phenolic smell, and sightings of pieces of “blue billy” (ferric 
ferrocyanide). An investigation was initiated, including further sampling.
A report was produced in January 1998, which concluded that the beach was affected by 
pollution and the most likely source was the former gasworks. A very high concentration of 
polyaromatic hydrocarbons (PAHs) (75 550 mg/kg) was reported in one sediment sample, 
and also a high concentration of cyanide (1 g/1) in seepage water. Subsequently a detailed 
environmental investigation of the beach including sediment, seepage and seawater sampling 
was conducted, the results of which were used to determine whether there was risk to the 
health of the public and if the beach should be closed to public access. Contaminants 
identified included ammonia, benzo(a)pyrene, phenol, cyanide, arsenic, manganese, and 
iron. Analytical results were compared with contaminated land and drinking water standards. 
It was concluded that the beach was contaminated, but at the concentrations found it was 
decided that the contamination did not pose a risk to the health of the beach users and no 
action was taken to close the beach.
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Land contamination can result from a point or non-point source. Point sources refer 
to discrete, localised discharges of contaminants into the environment and include 
emissions from an industrial chimneystack, a leak of fuel from an underground 
storage tank or discharge of effluent to a river. Usually the contaminant is 
identifiable and can often be measured. Non-point or diffuse sources are releases of 
contaminants into the environment over a wider area. Examples include traffic 
emissions and contamination with radon gas in homes built on granite. The majority 
of land contamination incidents result from point sources of contamination.
Sources of contamination that can affect all environmental media fall into one of two 
categories:
natural sources: many pollutants within the environment have natural as 
well as anthropogenic sources. For example, the geology in different areas of 
the country will influence the background level of certain chemicals in the 
soil. For example, arsenic and radon levels in soil in Cornwall are very high 
compared to other parts of the United Kingdom.
anthropogenic sources: an anthropogenic (or man-made) source is used to 
describe any process or facility that has the potential to release chemicals that 
could result in contamination of environmental media, for example a factory, 
a farm or a landfill site. Anthropogenic sources of contamination can broadly 
be divided into three subgroups:
• historical legacies
• planned emissions from industry (regulated by the Environment
Agency or Local Authority)
• unplanned emissions i.e. accidental releases
Many industrial processes have the potential to give rise to environmental 
contamination. As a result the Department of the Environment (now the Department 
for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs -  DEFRA) prepared around 50 Industry 
Profiles, which provide information on the processes, materials and wastes 
associated with individual industries including information on the potential 
contaminants. Similar information, which identifies potential land contaminants from
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a number of industrial processes, is contained within ‘Potential Contaminants for the 
Assessment of Land - CLR8’ published jointly by DEFRA and the Environment 
Agency (DEFRA, 2002) and the Pollution Prevention and Control (PPC) Technical 
Guidance Notes developed by the Environment Agency, the Scottish Environmental 
Protection Agency and the Northern Ireland Environment and Heritage Service. 
Some examples of processes and potential contaminants are highlighted in Table 2.1.
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Table 2.1: Sources of Land Contamination (adapted from Harrison, 1994)
Source Example Likely contaminants could include:
Derelict 
industrial sites
Gas works Phenols, Tars, Cyanides, Arsenic, Cadmium
Electrical industries Copper, Lead, Zinc, PCBs, Solvents
Tanneries Chromium
Scrapyards Metals, PCBs, Hydrocarbons
Atmospheric
fallout
Fossil fuel combustion Oxides and acid radicals of S and N
Vehicle exhaust Lead, Polyaromatic Hydrocarbons (PAHs)
Metal smelting operations Arsenic, Cadmium, Copper, Chromium, Nickel, 
Lead, Antimony, Zinc
Chemical industries Organic micropollutants, Mercury
Waste disposal by 
incineration
Dioxins, Furans
Waste disposal Farm manure Arsenic and Copper in pig and poultry manure
Sewage sludges Rich in heavy metal and organic pollutants - 
PAHs and PCBs
Composts from domestic 
waste
Metals
Mine wastes Coal mines - S04 etc.,
Metalliferous mines - Cadmium, Copper, Lead, 
Zinc, Barium, Uranium
Seepage of leachate from 
landfills
Ammonia, Organic compounds
Ash from fossil fuel 
combustion
Heavy metals
Incidental 
accumulation of 
contaminants
Corrosion of metal in 
contact with the soil
Zinc from galvanised metal, Copper and Lead 
from roofing, scrapyards etc.
Leakage from 
underground storage 
tanks
Petrol, Chlorinated solvents
Sports and leisure 
activities
Lead from gun shot and fishing weights 
Lead, Cadmium, Nickel and Mercury from 
discarded batteries
Hydrocarbons from spilt petrol and lubricating 
oil
Chemicals used 
in treatment 
processes 
e.g. agriculture
Herbicides 2,4-D, 2,4,5-T containing Dioxins, Boron and 
Arsenic compounds
Insecticides Chlorinated hydrocarbons
Fungicides Copper, Zinc, Mercury, organic molecules
Acaricides Tar Oil
Fertilisers Cadmium and Uranium impurities in phosphates
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2.2 Chemical Incidents and Land Contamination
The previous section highlighted that the UK has a legacy of land contamination 
problems as a result of past industrial activity and that ‘new’ land contamination may 
result from chemical incidents. Chemical incidents that may result in land 
contamination include leaks, spills, fires, explosions etc and could involve one or 
more chemicals.
2.2.1 Definitions
The problem with the definitions for ‘chemical incident’ highlighted in Chapter 1 
when referring to land contamination incidents, and in particular historic problems, is 
that it is questionable whether old industrial sites that are contaminated due to the 
nature of past activity on the site can be described as ‘chemical incidents’ according 
to current definitions. For example, long-standing and historical contamination such 
as Love Canal (See Box 2.2) (Johnson & Covello (eds.), 1987; Jackson, 1996) can 
hardly be described as ‘an acute release’ or ‘an unforeseen event’.
Box 2.2: Love Canal (Woodey & Euripidou, 2001)
In 1896 William Love began digging a canal (3,000 feet long, 80 to 100 feet wide and 15 to 
40 feet deep) to serve as a water power conduit connecting Lake Ontario and Lake Erie. It 
was never completed. However the Hooker Chemical Company, located west of the canal, 
used the site as a dumping ground for the chemical by-products of its manufacturing 
processes. More than 40,000 tonnes of chemical waste as well as municipal wastes were 
dumped. Once the canal was filled the company placed a thick clay cap over the site having 
already lined the bottom of the site with clay. The land was then sold to the local education 
board in 1953 for $1.00.
In the mid 1950s a school and later a housing estate were built on top of the waste dump. In 
the early 1970s the site was found to be leaking. Residents complained of respiratory 
problems and skin irritations and reported chemical sludges leaking into their basements 
giving off noxious fumes. Children reported falling knee deep into smelly tar pools. Samples 
of soil and water taken from the area of the old waste dump were heavily contaminated with 
a number of chemicals. After a great deal of pressure from local action groups, in 1978 the 
government declared a State of Emergency and many residents were evacuated.
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Such problems may occur as a consequence of the fact that knowledge of the toxic 
effects of the chemicals used in industrial processes in the past was insufficient at the 
time. An example that illustrates this argument is the case of Cambridge Water 
Company versus Eastern Counties Leather pic (Refer to Box 2.3).
Box 2.3: Cambridge Water Company versus Eastern Counties Leather pic.
During the 1970s perchloroethene (PCE), a cleaning solvent used in the tanning process 
carried out by Eastern Counties Leather, had seeped into the ground beneath the concrete 
floor of the tannery as a result of regular small spillages when the drums were tipped into 
cleaning tanks (ENDS, 1993). It was later discovered that the PCE had migrated through the 
subsurface and entered the aquifer underlying the site. In 1983 PCE contamination was 
identified in a water supply borehole used by Cambridge Water two kilometres from the site.
' -v- . :
Cambridge Water brought a civil claim against Eastern Counties Leather. The court ruled in 
favour of Eastern Counties Leather considering that the seepage of PCE below the concrete 
floor would not have been reasonably foreseeable by a supervisor at the time nor would it 
have been foreseeable that detectable quantities of PCE would have been found in the water 
supply borehole (ENDS, 1993).
An old site may also present a risk to the health of the public if a redevelopment 
opportunity requires extensive excavation. This may lead to contaminated areas 
being exposed or new pathways between the contaminant source and sensitive 
receptors (the person, product or part of the environment that will potentially be 
affected by the chemical contamination) being created. Also, children gaining 
unauthorised access to a derelict industrial site may potentially be exposed to a 
cocktail of chemicals, which could result in acute, or chronic, adverse health effects. 
Hence, historic land contamination may present an acute hazard to health. This is 
illustrated in Case Study 1, Appendix A.
So although it may not obvious at first glance, the public health impact of a land 
contamination incident may be significant, whether it has resulted from past land use 
or a more recent event and could result in acute or chronic adverse health effects. 
Familiarity with the nature and type of land contamination incidents reported to 
CIRS suggested that although incidents present themselves in many different ways, 
some similarities and patterns could be identified. It was therefore proposed that
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simple definitions for land contamination incidents should be developed based on 
key observations associated with the incident type and likely contaminants.
By using clearer definitions to categorise land contamination incidents, problems can 
be more easily identified and the most appropriate response and management actions 
that should be taken in order to minimise the impact of the events determined.
2.2.2 Incident Review
The most appropriate way to gain a better understanding of the causes and ‘types’ of 
land contamination incidents, in order to develop working definitions, was to analyse 
past incidents. After searching though electronic databases and journals it became 
apparent that few reports of chemical incidents that had resulted in land 
contamination had been published. Some information about incidents reported to the 
Environment Agency was available on their website. This is summarised below. In 
addition a review of incidents reported to CIRS was undertaken.
Information about land incidents is collected and reported to the Environment 
Agency separately from land contamination incidents to CIRS and this represents a 
weakness in both systems. It is not possible to correlate CIRS incidents with 
Environment Agency incidents since there is not a mechanism in place for the two 
organisations to share information unless they both become independently involved 
in responding to the same incident.
2.2.2.1 Data from the Environment Agency
The majority of pollution incidents are reported to the Environment Agency by 
members of the public through the Environment Agency’s 24 hour a day pollution 
hotline.
In 2001 there were almost 34,000 substantiated pollution incidents and in total, land 
contamination was found at 10,016 of these. The majority of incidents resulted from 
containment or control failures (leaks or spills). Of the land incidents reported, 22 
had a major impact on the environment and 484 incidents had a significant impact.
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The four pollution categories are defined and discussed in more detail in Chapter 3. 
Figure 2.2 highlights the sources of these land contamination incidents. The ‘Other’ 
category, which accounts for over 50% of the land incidents reported to the 
Environment Agency, includes ‘contaminated land’ and ‘domestic/residential’ 
although in 60% of cases (34% overall), the source of contamination was not 
identified.
Figure 2.2: Land incidents reported to the Environment Agency in 2001 by ‘Source’
2.2.2.2 Data from CIRS
At CIRS incident details are recorded on paper (incident report forms) and filed 
chronologically. Some of the information from the incident report form is entered 
into a database because the National Focus requires the data for the national 
surveillance of chemical incidents. The CIRS database contains electronic 
information about all of the incidents reported to CIRS since 1996. For each incident 
this includes a record of the chemical involved, the number of people exposed and 
the number of people actually affected in addition to a summary of the incident 
circumstances.
A database search revealed that it was almost impossible to search accurately for and 
identify certain types of incident, for example those that have resulted in land 
contamination. This is mainly because the way in which incidents are categorised is 
not consistent. Each incident is described by a single category and it is very much at
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the discretion of the person responsible for data input at the time to determine how 
each incident is categorised. Also there is the possibility that an incident could be 
described by more than one of the current incident types.
For many incidents, the category is obvious such as ‘fire’ or ‘explosion’ and often 
the incident category describes what actually happened or the ‘event’. However, for 
other incidents the ‘event’ may not always be obvious or the contamination may be 
the result of more than one event. These incidents are more difficult to categorise and 
are often classified according to the environmental medium affected such as ‘land’, 
‘water’, ‘air’ or ‘food’. Consequently it makes it almost impossible to identify all 
incidents that have affected a specific medium.
Also as a consequence of research projects based at CIRS looking specifically at air, 
land and water incidents, an additional system for categorising incidents was 
implemented with an option to specify if there was a release to air, soil, water or 
drinking water. Unfortunately this system does not appear to have worked very well, 
as a number of incidents that should be indicated as lying in one of the above 
categories are not and yet incidents that do not fall into any of the categories are.
Figure 2.3 indicates the number of land contamination incidents and Figure 2.4 the 
type of land contamination incidents reported to the Chemical Incident Response 
Service (CIRS) between February 1996 and September 2001. Figure 2.3 highlights 
an increase in the number of incidents reported to CIRS over the six-year period. It is 
important to consider whether these figures represent an actual increase in the 
number of incidents occurring or simply an increase in the number reported. The 
latter is the most likely explanation because of improved reporting procedures over 
the time period and the provision of more specialised training, which could have 
resulted in a heightened awareness of the potential for environmental contamination 
to result in adverse health effects. If this is the case then the need to ensure that 
appropriate management procedures are in place to be able to manage these problems 
effectively becomes more apparent.
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Figure 2.3: Land contamination incidents reported to CIRS.
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Figure 2.4 indicates that around half of the incidents reported are categorised as land; 
otherwise incidents are either categorised according to the ‘event’ which caused the 
incident, for example a leak or spill, or the environmental medium that affected the 
soil, for example dust or particles from the air. In addition, a number of the incidents 
that have been categorised as water have been a direct result of a land contamination 
problem. For example, organic chemicals in soil (such as those that may result from 
a fuel leak) may be able to contaminate drinking water by penetrating or permeating 
through the pipe material. (Refer to Case Studies in Appendix N). A number of 
requests for information were also received.
Figure 2.4: Incidents that resulted in land contamination categorised by ‘type’.
Transport 
Spill
Other
Not
W ater Air pjre
W a ste Information
known
M alicious
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
2-12
These different ways of categorising land contamination incidents substantiate the 
concept that land (or soil) is both a sink and a source for contaminants and that the 
three environmental media -  air, land and water - are inextricably interlinked.
In addition to the more general review of incidents, a detailed review of land 
contamination incidents reported to CIRS in 1999 was undertaken. This year was 
selected because the same person had been responsible for data input throughout the 
whole year so the quality of information was likely to be relatively consistent. 
Groundwater contamination was also included in addition to land contamination as it 
was considered that in order for groundwater to become contaminated, it was highly 
likely that land must have been contaminated in the first place and vice versa.
Once all of the land incidents had been identified, the following details were 
recorded:
• Circumstances
• Chemical involved
• Type (National Focus definition)
• Event (CIRS definition)
The reason that two schemes for categorising incidents exist is that the CIRS 
database was established with definitions for ‘event’ prior to the requirement to 
report chemical incident details to the National Focus. Consequently an extra field 
had to be added to facilitate collection of the specific surveillance data required. 
These definitions are listed in Appendix B.
A search was carried out on the incident ‘type’ and ‘event’ fields of the database, 
with ‘land’ entered as the search criterion.
• 18 incidents were highlighted with land as the incident type (CIRS 
definition).
• 15 incidents were highlighted with land as the event (National Focus 
definition).
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The thorough search through paper copies of incidents revealed that there had been a 
total of 55 incidents that had resulted in land contamination in 1999. However, this 
total includes all of the incidents that were categorised as ‘land’ for example 
concerns about adverse health effects from waste disposal sites. Tables 2.2 and 2.3 
show how the land contamination incidents in 1999 were categorised. Interestingly 
the information in Table 2.2 does not tally with those highlighted in Figure 2.3 (page 
2-12). This can be explained by the disparity in the way incidents are currently 
categorised and the fact that duplicate entries exist in the database (these were 
identified in the more detailed search).
Table 2.2: Land contamination incidents Table 2.3: Land contamination incidents 
categorised by ‘type’ categorised by ‘event’
Focus category
Contaminated land 3
Deposit 4
Explosion 1
Land 15
Leak 6
Other 12
Spill 8
Spill/Leak 6
TOTAL 55
CIRS category
Air 1
Explosion 1
Info 7
Land 18
Leak 7
Other 2
Spill 9
Waste 3
Water 7
TOTAL 55
An area for further investigation is the disparity between the categorisation of 
incidents according to the different definitions for ‘type’ and ‘event’. The audit of 
land incidents reported in 1999 highlighted a number of examples where the entries 
in these two fields were different. Variation appears where analogous category 
definitions do not exist in both schemes; for example, requests for information are 
categorised by CIRS as ‘Info’ whereas the Focus definitions require selection of a 
specific event. Although there is similarity for some categories, overall this 
represents a weakness in the reporting system. Therefore it is questioned why there 
needs to be two categories and whether it would be possible to combine the fields
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into one system with very clear definitions which is likely to improve the quality of 
the data used for surveillance.
Since incidents vary greatly in terms of complexity, the level of CIRS input required 
for their management differs. The quality and detail of the information recorded 
about an incident reflects this disparity and completion of incident report forms is 
inconsistent. Although minimal information may be sufficient for surveillance 
purposes, an in-depth investigation may require more details. Therefore, it is 
 suggested that a more comprehensive incident report form should be developed_____
Finally, incident reporting procedures currently used within CIRS are very much 
focused on the requirements of the National Focus for their surveillance purposes. 
This means that a significant amount of detail is potentially being lost, in particular 
environmental information such as details of sampling strategies, any remedial action 
taken and what influenced the decision.
This project aims to provide the building blocks to ameliorate these weaknesses, to 
improve incident reporting and response based on ‘best practice’ from past incidents.
2.2.3 Land Incident Categories
Following consideration of the circumstances of the incidents reported to CIRS, it is 
proposed that land contamination incidents can broadly be divided into two 
categories - acute incidents and chronic or persistent problems. These incident 
categories are based on the source of the problem and do not reflect the human health 
effects that result from exposure to chemically contaminated soil or the impact on the 
environment, but can be helpful in identifying the most appropriate management 
actions that will ensure an effective and timely response and thus, hopefully, reduce 
the potential for adverse health effects.
The definitions proposed suggest that land contamination that results from a sudden, 
one-off release of a chemical either directly to the soil, such as leak or spill from a 
tank, or indirectly via aerial deposition or firewater runoff should be referred to as an
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acute incident. In contrast, the term chronic problem should be used to describe land 
contamination that is considered to have resulted from a continued or repeated 
release of chemical substances over a period of time, typically in smaller doses than 
with acute incidents. The environmental effect in an acute incident results almost 
invariably from a single identifiable cause, whereas the environmental effect of a 
chronic incident typically is a function of accumulation. This taxonomy is outlined in 
Table 2.4 and is also presented in ‘Land contamination -  acute versus chronic 
problems’, which has been submitted to Land Contamination and Reclamation. A 
copy of the abstract is included in Appendix P.
Table 2.4: Taxonomy for chemical incidents that result in land contamination.
Acute Chronic
Definition • Contamination is due to a 
sudden, specific, identifiable 
cause
• Often one-off event
• Identifiable source of  
contamination
• Contamination likely to be a 
result of accumulation over a 
prolonged period of time
• Frequently continuous event
• Origin and cause of 
contamination may not be 
identifiable
Examples • Fire water run-off into surface 
water
• Petrol spill onto land
• Poorly contained waste 
disposal facility
• Former industrial site
If these definitions are used to categorise the land contamination incidents reported 
in 1999, then it can be determined that there were 29 acute and 26 chronic problems 
(Table 2.5). It should be emphasised that this categorisation of acute and chronic land 
contamination incidents refers to the source of contamination. This should not be 
confused with the acute and chronic health and environmental effects that may result 
from exposure and refers to the receptor part of the source-pathway-receptor linkage, 
which is described more thoroughly in the next section. The inconsistency in units 
used to report the amount of chemical released can be noted which highlights a 
disparity in the reporting of incidents, an issue which will be discussed in greater 
detail subsequently.
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Reflection of the incidents summarised in Table 2.5 exposes further differences 
between acute and chronic land contamination incidents. A synopsis of some of these 
is presented in Table 2.6.
A comprehensive retrospective review of all land contamination incidents reported to 
CIRS between February 1996 and September 2001 is presented in Chapter 5.
Table 2.6: Differences between acute and chronic land contamination incidents
Aspect Acute Chronic More
information
Potential
environmental
impact
Usually acute impact; potential 
for chronic impact if  incident not 
managed effectively.
Usually chronic impact unless 
material on-site is disturbed e.g. 
sinking o f boreholes
Potential 
health impact
Acute exposure: acute or chronic 
effects
Acute or chronic exposure: acute 
or chronic effects
Response time
Kev factor in effective response Less important as contamination 
is likely to have been present for 
some time
Subsection
2.2.3
Source-
Pathway-
Receptor
Once hazard is contained, 
establishing S-P-R used to guide 
subsequent management options
Accurately establishing S-P-R is 
kev factor in provision of  
effective response
Subsection
2.2.3
Information
available
Likely to be quite limited -  
incident type and location
Land use and chemical 
contaminant usually known; 
detailed site report may be 
available
Subsection
2.2.3
Risk
communication
Provision of information to 
minimise exposure
Consideration o f perceived 
impacts as important as actual 
impacts
Subsection 
2.2.3 & 
Appendix 
C2
Legislation
Policy on land contamination is 
to prevent the creation o f new 
contamination; there are a range 
of regimes aimed at achieving 
this
Part IIA of the Environmental 
Protection Act 1990 makes 
provision for the identification 
and remediation o f sites that 
present a significant risk to 
human health and/or controlled 
waters
Section 2.3
Roles and 
responsibilities 
of key agencies
Emergency services involved in 
initial response; local 
authority/Environment Agency 
take lead in incident 
investigation
Local authority/Environment 
Agency usually take lead role
Section 2.4
Tools and 
Guidance
Limited information available New guidance recently released Section 2.5
Exposure
standards
No land specific acute exposure 
standards currently available
New soil guideline values 
(SGVs) derived using CLEA 
model available for small 
number of contaminants
Section 2.5
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Response Time
As highlighted in Table 2.6, in managing acute incidents, response time is the most 
important factor. Once an incident has ‘started’ the management options available 
will be conditioned by circumstances specific to the incident. All subsequent efforts, 
including the remedial action taken, will be determined by how effective the 
emergency response has been (Iakovou et al, 1996). This has been illustrated in 
Figure 2.5.
Figure 2.5: Event evolution 
(Thames Water, 2001)
Incident
Management
Options
Golden hour: the time period 
following notification when 
decisions taken will have the 
greatest influence over the 
outcome
‘Golden hour’
TimeEvent 
start recognition
Event
The graph indicates that there is a start point and then a time lapse before the event is 
recognised and reported. The number o f incident management options available will 
begin to decrease as soon as the event starts. Hence a shorter time lapse between 
event start and event recognition usually means that there will be a wider range of 
containment/remedial options available.
Hasty decisions made during emergency response can exacerbate the long-term soil 
and groundwater problems (Toups & Goultry, 1995), which highlights the need for 
appropriate well tested response procedures that are readily accessible.
Response time is less important when responding to a chronic land contamination 
incident since contamination is likely to have been present for some time. Therefore
2-19
the number of options available for remediation is already limited and as a result the 
‘golden hour’ - the time period following notification when decisions taken will have 
the greatest influence over the outcome - is likely to be longer. The concept of 
looking at how incidents are managed along a timescale (see Figure 2.5) from when 
the incident is identified - “event start” - to when the incident is declared over - 
“event close” - has been developed further as part of the scheme proposed in Chapter 
4.
Source-Pathway-Receptor linkage
The key factor that determines the effectiveness of response to a chronic land 
contamination incident is likely to be the accurate identification of all potential 
sources of contamination and any sensitive receptors and establishing whether any 
exposure pathways exists between the two. The source-pathway-receptor linkage, 
illustrated in Figure 2.6, forms the basis for carrying out a risk assessment following 
any chemical incident (acute or chronic) and is not exclusive to land contamination. 
Information is collected about the nature and source of contamination and sensitive 
receptors are identified. Then it is necessary to determine whether a link, referred to 
as a migration pathway or ‘exposure pathway’, exists between the two. An exposure 
pathway could be direct contact with the contaminant, such as inhalation of smoke 
from a plume or ingestion of contaminated drinking water or indirect contact such as, 
the ingestion of vegetables grown in contaminated soil. In all cases it is essential that 
all potential exposure pathways be considered. It is often considered that unless there 
is an exposure pathway between receptors and a contaminant source, the presence of 
a chemical hazard does not present a risk. This is described in more detail in Section 
2.3.
Goodfellow (2001) illustrated how the model could be used as a tool in managing
chemical incidents (Figure 3, Appendix C3); the idea has since been adapted for use
in a combined emergency response plan for chemical, biological, radiological and
nuclear (CBRN) incidents that is being developed in London. CBRN incidents can be
acute or chronic, accidental or deliberate, and result in adverse health and
/
environmental impacts. More information about the CBRN project is presented in
2-20
Appendix D and the use of the source-pathway-receptor model in developing tools 
for responding to chemical incidents is explored in Chapter 4.
Figure 2.6: Source-Pathway-Receptor linkage 
(adapted from Richards et al, 1996)
r ^
Contaminant/ Resource/
Source ------- ► Pathway ------- ► Receptor
Hazard Identification
Characterise the 
contaminant:
• nature of hazard
• location/amount
• concentration
Exposure Assessment
Characterise the 
exposure pathway:
• direct
• indirect
• none
Risk Characterisation
Assess the significance 
of the risk:
• significant
• not significant
• none
Information available
One of the important differences in acute and chronic land contamination incidents is 
the quantity of information that is likely to be available when the incident is 
recognised as having a potential impact on human and environmental health and the 
appropriate organisations contacted. For example, notification of an acute incident 
may simply consist of the type of incident and the land use or location, such as ‘fire 
in a warehouse’ or ‘leak of chemical from tanker overturned on the motorway’. The 
chemical substance involved may not have been identified and it is unlikely that 
detailed information about the site and surrounding area will be available. In 
contrast, information that is almost always going to be available when a chronic 
incident is reported is the land use and the chemical contaminant. In some situations 
notification of a chronic problem may include a detailed site assessment containing a 
detailed site history, a list of known contaminants and results from an environmental 
sampling programme as well as information about the underlying geology and 
hydrogeology.
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Risk communication
In all chemical incidents it is imperative that risk is communicated and managed 
effectively to ensure that members of the public are aware of any dangers and also to 
minimise any inappropriate media attention. This is true for both acute incidents, 
where information on preventing or minimising exposure through shelter or 
evacuation or advising residents not to drink potentially contaminated water is 
provided, and chronic problems, where communicating the potential risk to local 
residents is of paramount importance (see discussion below). Actual and perceived 
risks associated with chronic exposure to contaminants may need to be addressed.
Furthermore when a contaminated site is to be reclaimed and redeveloped a number 
of interested groups become involved. These include developers, financial backers, 
consultants, local authorities and the local community. The perceptions and concerns 
of these stakeholders will differ (Caimey, 1995). These concerns should be 
recognised and dealt with in order to minimise conflict and ensure the development 
is completed on time and within budget.
Whilst many concerns will be site specific, a number of generic anxieties can be 
identified. It seems rational to suspect that the determination that land is 
contaminated will have an effect on the value of adjacent property. The question of 
who is responsible financially for cleaning up any contamination found on the 
adjacent land may also need to be addressed. In addition there is the issue of health 
effects resulting from exposure to the chemicals present in the soil. A direct link 
between exposure to contaminated soil and human health effects is often difficult to 
establish and many of the examples that do exist have not been quantified. A 
number of reasons for this are suggested in the literature (see Abrahams, 2001; 
Oliver, 1997; Thornton, 1993). However, perception of the potential hazards 
associated with a chemical or chemicals can provoke a great deal of anxiety. This is 
further amplified by speculation and rumours when appropriate information is not 
available. In addition, adverse media attention can have a deleterious effect on an 
already sensitive situation. Therefore the health and environmental impact of a 
potentially contaminated site cannot be considered in isolation; stakeholder 
perception and involvement is paramount to the successful completion of a
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redevelopment project and indeed the management of any chronic land 
contamination incident.
The effective communication of risks to human health and the environment from 
exposure to contaminated soil is of growing importance. Gaining the trust of the 
general public in order to be considered a reliable provider of information should be 
a fundamental aim. Clear and appropriate information should be provided and made 
available to all of the key stakeholders, including local residents. It is therefore 
suggested that risk management strategies need to be built into the statutory 
consultation process. Nevertheless, merely making information available is not the 
solution. It must be communicated effectively and there must be a provision for 
feedback. There should be a dynamic consultation process whereby local residents 
are able to request further information, voice concerns and be satisfied with the 
response.
2.3 Legislation
One of the key distinctions between acute and chronic land contamination incidents 
highlighted in Table 2.6 is the legislative approach to such issues in the UK. 
Therefore, in this section the way in which land contamination problems are 
currently regarded from a legislative viewpoint will be explored. The discussion is 
followed by a summary of the roles and responsibilities of regulatory agencies and 
statutory bodies. The section concludes with a review of the tools and guidance 
currently available for managing both the health and environmental impact of 
chronic land contamination problems.
2.3.1 Chronic/Historic Land Contamination
There is increasing demand to develop former industrial sites for residential housing 
and new industry as this has the two-fold advantage of reducing the burden on 
rapidly diminishing land resources whilst at the same time improving the quality of 
the local environment. This also meets one of the objectives of the government’s 
sustainable development strategy in which land use, and in particular the re-use of
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previously developed land, is one of fifteen headline indicators. Figure 2.7 indicates 
that the percentage of new housing in England provided on previously developed 
land and through conversions of existing buildings has increased in recent years.
Figure 2.7: Percentage of new homes built on previously developed land
65 ■
New homes60 -
I
45 -
40 -
35 -
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Source: Department for Transport, Local Includes conversions which are
Government and the Regions estimated to add 3 percentage points
However, when previously used land is redeveloped it is important that any lingering 
contamination on the site does not present a continuing threat to human and 
environmental health.
Consequently land contamination can be viewed from two policy perspectives 
(Vegter, 2001):
• Environmental problems: polluted sites that endanger human health or ecological 
safety;
• Spatial planning problems: derelict land that does not cause any immediate risk 
but which must be treated if the land is to be developed for housing or other 
‘sensitive’ use, such as school or nursery or allotments.
For many years local authority officers have regulated the process of planning and 
redevelopment. During this time many contaminated sites have been developed and 
although controls will have been imposed via the town and country planning 
development control system (Braithwaite, 2000a), there have been instances where 
developments were granted planning permission and allowed to proceed with no
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recognition of the presence of potentially harmful contaminants in the ground (Peters 
& Blake, 1999).
This unsatisfactory situation was recognised under the Environmental Protection Act 
1990 where it was proposed that all local authorities should compile a register of all 
land known to have been used for contaminating activities -  Section 143 (Peters & 
Blake, 1999). However, in 1993 the proposals that would have implemented Section 
143 were withdrawn because it was considered that (Lane & Peto, 1995):
• registers based on potential contamination would not discriminate sufficiently 
between clean land and contaminated land
• there was no means for deregistering land once it had been cleaned up
• registration did not tackle remediation of the land or the persons liable for the 
remediation and
• registration of land that had been used for certain contaminative purposes 
might discourage the development of Brownfield1 land, causing land values 
to fall and increasing the pressure on the development of Greenfield2 land.
In light of this a government policy review of the arrangements for controlling 
contaminated land and meeting the costs of remediation was instigated. As part of 
the process a consultation document, ‘Paying for our Past’ (DoE, 1994a), was issued. 
The outcome of the policy review and conclusions from the consultation paper was 
the ‘Framework for Contaminated Land’ (DoE, 1994b).
Section 57 of the Environment Act 1995 created a new legal framework for 
managing the identification, investigation and remediation of contaminated sites that 
are considered to present a hazard or potential hazard to human health and/or the 
environment. The provisions which came into force on 1 April 2000, were inserted
1 Defined as ‘previously developed land which is that which is or was occupied by a permanent 
structure and associated fixed surface infrastructure’ (Environment Agency, 2002)
2 Defined as ‘land that has not previously been developed; its current uses are usually for agriculture, 
forestry, recreation or nature conservation’. Greenfield land in some circumstances may also be 
contaminated land (Environment Agency, 2002).
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into the Environmental Protection Act 1990 under Part IIA, and for this reason are 
frequently referred to as Part IIA. The regime is intended to be complementary to the 
planning regime and other regulatory regimes, for example Waste Management 
Licensing and Integrated Pollution Prevention and Control (IPPC) permits. Where 
these can be used to deal with contamination, then Part IIA will not generally apply 
(Crowcroft, 2000). However, this would appear sometimes to ignore the potential 
contamination of land adjacent to former industrial sites that has been or is to be 
redeveloped. An example is presented in Case Study 2, Appendix A.
Part IIA places a statutory duty on local authorities to identify land that is 
contaminated in their area to prioritise areas of greatest concern and to co-ordinate 
the implementation of remedial action if required. Within 15 months of the 
Contaminated Land Regulations coming into force (in June 2001), each local 
authority had to prepare a written strategy detailing how they proposed to do this. 
The strategies also contain detailed information about the local area such as past and 
current land use, an overview of the geology and hydrogeology and the identification 
of water systems including aquifers used for drinking water abstraction.
Following an initial investigation by the local authority a site may be designated a 
‘special site’ by the local authority. The types of contamination and conditions that 
distinguish special sites are detailed in the legislation. The Environment Agency is 
responsible for the assessment, monitoring and regulation of special sites (see 
below).
2.3.1.1 Defining Contaminated Land
One of the main difficulties in seeking to identify ‘contaminated land’ is that 
contamination refers simply to the presence of a foreign substance in the soil, which 
does not necessarily lead to harm or damage (Bell & Ball, 1995). Taking this into 
consideration, land could be contaminated but pose no threat to human or 
environmental health. Part IIA of the Environmental Protection Act 1990 however, 
defines contaminated land as “land which appears to the local authority in whose 
area it is situated to be in such a condition, by reason of substances in, on or under 
the land that significant harm is being caused or there is the significant possibility of
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such harm being caused; or pollution of controlled waters is being, or is likely to be, 
caused” (DETR, 2000). This legal definition of ‘contaminated land’ is fairly new and 
was created by the Environment Act 1995. Prior to this time it was accepted that 
contamination should ‘be regarded as a general concept rather than as something 
capable of exact definition and measurement’ (Finney & Dye, 1998).
Contaminated land, as defined under Part IIA can only be regarded as a subset of the 
wider legacy of land affected by contamination (Environment Agency, 2002). As a 
result ‘land affected by contamination’ has been defined and includes Part IIA land, 
land which has not been formally determined by the local authority as contaminated 
but where contamination exists and also land where there is contamination but a 
significant pollution linkage has not been established. There are further definitions 
for Brownfield land, Derelict land and Greenfield land. All of these definitions are 
different but not mutually exclusive as illustrated in Figure 2.8 and could be used to 
describe the same piece of land (Environment Agency, 2002). It is difficult to 
estimate how many contaminated sites there are in the UK and the extent to which 
they are contaminated because of the inconsistent use of these terms and definitions.
Figure 2.8: The relationship between derelict land, contaminated land and land
affected by contamination
(Source: The Environment Agency, 2002)
Land affected by 
contamination
Contaminated 
land that is also 
derelict
Contaminated 
Land (Part IIA)
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The proposed definition for ‘chronic land contamination’ developed in Section 2.2.3 
might be considered to exacerbate this problem. However, it is used to describe the 
presence of contaminants in soil above ‘background’ levels as a result of a continued 
or repeated release of chemical substances over a period of time and is therefore 
synonymous with the Environment Agency’s definition for ‘land affected by 
contamination’. In particular the definition for chronic land contamination 
incorporates low levels of contamination that may or may not present an actual 
hazard to human or environmental health but nevertheless trigger concern amongst 
local residents. Thus the definition provides a good foundation on which to base a 
management response that can take into consideration perceived as well as actual 
risk to human and environmental health. This idea is developed further in Chapter 4.
2.3.1.2 Is it ‘contaminated land’?
The basis of the ‘contaminated land’ definition is complex and it incorporates the 
concept of risk assessment procedures and considerations (Peters & Blake, 2000). 
Land is only legally contaminated if an exposure pathway can be established 
between a source of contamination and a sensitive receptor (Clifton et al, 1999) so 
the definition does not address the potential adverse reaction that may be generated 
by local residents or other stakeholders if a site is found to contain elevated levels of 
chemicals that are not considered to present a hazard, i.e. significant harm or the 
possibility of significant harm. This could create problems from an incident 
management perspective as stakeholder involvement and co-operation is key to 
effective response and management.
In order to determine whether a site is ‘contaminated land’, a risk assessment based 
on the source-pathway-receptor model (Figure 2.7, Section 2.2.3) is undertaken. The 
relationship between a contaminant source, an exposure pathway and a receptor is 
referred to in Part IIA as a “pollutant linkage”. Once a pollutant linkage has been 
established, the local authority must determine if it is significant; i.e. as a result of 
that pollutant linkage, is significant harm (or the significant possibility of significant 
harm) being caused?
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The following are situations where harm may be regarded as “significant” according 
to the statutory guidance (Peters & Blake, 2000):
• death, disease, serious injury, genetic mutation, birth defects or the 
impairment of reproductive functions in humans
• other irreversible harm to the ecological system
• substantial damage to, or failure of buildings
• disease or other physical damage or death of livestock or crops
• the pollution of controlled waters (including groundwater, inland 
water and estuaries)
A literature review was carried out to identify whether any links between exposure to 
contaminants in the soil and chronic or acute toxic effect, serious injury or death to 
humans had been published. Results are presented in Appendix E. It was concluded 
that whilst direct links between soil quality and human health are often difficult to 
establish and many of the examples that do exist have not been quantified, some 
relationships between exposure to elevated levels of trace elements in soil and 
adverse health effects in humans have been recognised. For example it was mining 
waste containing cadmium and zinc that had been dumped in the river and 
subsequently used for drinking water and the irrigation of crops that caused itai itai 
disease in Japan shortly after the end of the Second World War. Soil samples 
collected were found to contain an average of 6 parts per million cadmium and this 
increased to 125 parts per million in the rice (Keller, 1992; CIRS, 1999).
However, Smith (1991) (cited by Beckett (1993)) provides a very thought provoking 
quote ....
“It should also be recognised that some o f the possible effects o f exposure o f 
humans to chemicals are so intangible, when set against the variations in 
human well-being, that it will never, except in a few  unfortunate cases, be
possible to demonstrate a cause and effect relationship between exposure to a
contaminated site and current, or more probably future, ill health...to ask to 
be shown a site where exposure to a particular level o f contamination has 
caused harm is rarely a sensible question to ask. We do not generally have 
the tools, or the time, to be able to answer it. ”
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Nevertheless, should a significant pollutant linkage be established, remedial action 
would be required. Risks can be mitigated by removing or isolating the 
contamination (hazard) / source, breaking or intercepting the exposure pathway(s) or 
isolating receptors i.e. evacuation of the local exposed or potentially exposed 
population if there are human health risks. The latter is however only considered 
feasible in an emergency or in an acute land contamination incident and then only as 
a temporary measure. Evacuation essentially leads to more dereliction - the problem 
that was supposed to be being solved (Vegter, 2001). In land contamination 
incidents, residents are only likely to be evacuated if there is considered to be an 
explosion hazard (refer to Appendix N) or if there is considered to be a significant 
risk to human health. The Love Canal case presented previously provides an extreme 
example of this kind of event and a further more recent example from the UK is 
illustrated in Box 2.4.
Box 2.4: Weston Quarries chemical incident (Staples. 2000)
Two quarries acquired in 1917 were used for the disposal of slurry and other more varied 
waste including drums of chemicals, building rubble and other solid waste. Once infilling 
was complete (1970’s), the quarries were capped with a thin layer of ash and soil and horses 
now graze on the land. Since 1993, an investigation into the nature and extent of 
contamination on the site has been undertaken. This has involved a full desktop study 
followed by routine sampling. Investigations revealed the presence of many substances 
including hexachlorobutadiene (HCBD) in a number of borehole samples. The effects of
HCBD on humans at low levels of exposure via inhalation are unknown.
r > ■: . ' U NU ' ; • .
Subsequent indoor air quality measurements in houses adjacent to the quarries revealed the 
presence of HCBD at concentrations ranging from 2 to 8 parts per billion (ppb), with one 
house having an exceedingly high concentration of lOOOppb. Over two hundred properties in 
the village have now been tested and HCBD has been detected in twenty-one households, 
affecting more than seventy adults and children. Most have relocated to alternative 
accommodation to reduce exposure, but a few continue to reside in their properties.
In the UK the level of remediation undertaken on a particular site is based on a 
‘suitable for use’ approach. This means that risks to human health and the 
environment are assessed based on the current land use and any remedial action
2-30
undertaken should ensure that those risks are mitigated. It is considered that risks 
from contaminated land can be satisfactorily assessed only in the context of specific 
uses of the land (whether current or proposed), and that any attempt to guess what 
might be needed at some time in the future for other uses is likely to result either in 
premature work (thereby distorting social, economic and environmental priorities) or 
in unnecessary work (thereby wasting resources) (DETR, 2000). Nevertheless, the 
cost of remediation is often an overriding factor in decisions made (Vegter, 2001). 
The ‘suitable for use’ criteria are also applied when local authorities are evaluating 
potential remediation strategies.
Vegter (2001) indicates that current practice favours the source-oriented approach to 
remediation, which might involve removal of the contaminated soil from the site for 
disposal or treatment (ex situ), or degrading the chemical on site (in situ) although 
many approaches focus on the removal of the pathway, such as capping sites and 
covering with clean material or putting in barriers. Some approaches lead to more 
certainty than others; some take less time but are more expensive. For example, 
whilst eliminating the exposure pathway by inserting a barrier between the source of 
contamination and receptors is a fairly straightforward containment method and may 
be effective initially, there is no certainty of the integrity of the barrier in the long 
term; the barrier may perhaps become damaged or chemicals beneath it may continue 
to migrate downwards and laterally and lead to widespread contamination. A wider 
discussion of some of the options available for the clean up of contaminated land is 
presented in Appendix C3.
2.3.2 Acute Land Contamination
The draft circular on contaminated land states that the first priority for the 
Government’s policy on land contamination is to prevent the creation of new 
contamination and there are a range of regimes aimed at achieving this including 
Pollution Prevention and Control (PPC) which is discussed briefly below. Other 
regimes that may apply in some acute land contamination incidents are summarised 
in Table 2.8.
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The reason for including more detail on IPPC than the other regulatory regimes is 
that health agencies are statutory consultees for IPPC applications, which presents a 
new set of challenges for public health practitioners with regard to understanding 
industrial processes and environmental issues. Indeed, IPPC goes further towards 
integrating the assessment of health and environmental impacts within the same 
process than previous regulatory systems.
2.3.2.1 Pollution Prevention and Control (PPC) (Lodge, 2000; Eagles et al, 2002)
One of the aims behind the Environmental Protection Act (EPA) 1990 was to 
introduce an integrated system of pollution control to consider the potential impact 
on all three environmental media both when deciding on the most appropriate 
industrial processes to use and for setting discharge consents. Its purpose is to 
prevent the diversion of pollution streams from one environmental medium to 
another possibly more sensitive medium. For example, by installing a flue gas 
desulphurisation unit on a power station to prevent emissions of sulphur to the 
atmosphere, liquid discharges and solid sulphur containing waste are created. 
Integrated Pollution Control (IPC) provided a system which allowed the impact of all 
potential discharges across all three environmental to be considered and required the 
‘most polluting’ industries, defined by the pollutants produced and the size of the 
operation, to apply for a permit that specified the permitted emissions.
In October 1996 the European Commission published a Directive on Integrated 
Pollution Prevention & Control (LPPC) to come into effect on 31st October 1999. 
Member States had to introduce a regulatory system to ensure that particular 
industries take action to achieve "an integrated approach to pollution control” in 
order to secure "a high level o f protection for the environment as a whole" when 
considering both ‘routine’ and ‘accidental’ releases. The definition of pollution in the 
Directive includes releases to air, land or water "which may be harmful to human 
health". The IPPC Directive has been introduced into England and Wales through the 
Pollution Prevention and Control (PPC) Regulations 2000, which came into effect on 
1 August 2000. Essentially the aims of the regime are to reduce pollution, recover as 
much waste as possible, dispose of residual waste in ways least damaging to the
2-33
environment, promote efficient energy use, avoid accidents and limit their 
consequences should they occur and return the site to a satisfactory state after use.
The regulations require that certain bodies, including health agencies, must receive a 
copy of each application, and that the public have an opportunity to comment. Health 
agencies have 28 days to make representations, which should include an analysis of 
the potential health impacts. In particular, health agencies are required to advise on 
any particular local health problems that they perceive to be relevant, consider the 
likely impact of releases on human health (both acute and chronic), identify priority 
substances for control, from both routine and potential accidental releases and 
comment on any additive pollution from other processes in the area that could 
potentially give rise to adverse health effects among the local population.
2.4 The Role of Regulatory Agencies and Statutory Bodies
In the previous Section, attention is drawn to the difference in approach between 
historical contamination and recent contamination from a legislative viewpoint. The 
fact that risk-based methodologies for contaminated land management and 
remediation are restricted to historic contamination and that new pollution due to 
negligence is considered differently is highlighted. In response to this Vetgter (2001) 
claims “this distinction is a political choice and does not imply that the science o f  
risk assessment, and hence similar management systems, cannot be applied for  
pollution caused by recent ,<activities Whilst this may be true, the way in which 
acute problems present and are subsequently managed is fundamentally different. In 
particular the roles and responsibilities of key organisations involved in responding 
to and managing the incidents is not necessarily the same and in many cases is not 
clearly defined. This can result in confusion and unnecessary duplication of tasks 
between the different organisations.
The prime objectives of any service or organisation responding to an emergency are:
• to save lives;
• prevent escalation of the disaster;
• relieve suffering; protect property and the environment;
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• aid criminal investigation and judicial, public, technical or other inquiries;
• notify the public, encourage self help and recovery and to restore normality 
as soon as possible
(Barry & Japp, 1997)
Therefore considering the wide ranging nature of these objectives, it is hardly 
surprising that there is no single organisation within the UK with all the expertise 
and resources required in the event of a major incident and that any response to an 
emergency must be a combined and co-ordinated procedure between all services and 
organisations involved (Barry & Japp, 1997). However, how and to whom an 
incident is reported will vary. The next section outlines typical response patterns with 
regard to the agencies involved in incident management and highlights the 
differences between response to acute and chronic land events.
2.4.1 Emergency Services
In an acute land contamination incident the immediate or emergency response 
usually involves the emergency services and in most cases the fire service will take a 
lead role. A wider discussion of the role of the fire service in responding to a 
chemical incident is presented in Appendix F. Once the problem has been contained, 
advice can be sought on the most appropriate method for decontamination. 
Responsibility for leading the clean-up operation is then passed to the Environment 
Agency (or other regulatory body) although fire service equipment and other 
resources may be used.
When dealing with acute incidents that involve hazardous materials, frequently 
referred to as HAZMATS, the primary aim is to remove the risk of explosion and 
prevent pollution of controlled waters. Most UK fire services have acquired 
appropriate equipment for responding to such events including ‘Grab Packs’ (which 
contain putty for sealing leaks, absorbent pads, a clay mat etc.) in addition to 
dedicated environmental protection units. The equipment carried on dedicated units 
is agreed between the fire service and the Environment Agency at a local level. This 
is principally because the nature of incidents is likely to vary. For example if the area
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is heavily industrialised then there is greater potential for a chemical spill than in the 
countryside although it could be argued that agricultural chemicals, such as fertilisers 
and pesticides, stored and used in large quantities present an equally significant 
hazard.
Alternatively, in some circumstances where there is no urgent threat to the health of 
the public and no emergency per se, such as a leak of petrol onto land close to a 
river, the Environment Agency may request the assistance of the fire service to deal 
with immediate containment of the problem. In this situation the fire service take on 
the role of contractors to the Environment Agency.
In contrast the Emergency Services are rarely involved in responding to chronic land 
contamination problems as they seldom present an acute threat to health. The main 
exception to this is the treatment of exposed workers who have become ill after 
working on contaminated sites with inadequate personal protective equipment (PPE). 
The Ambulance Service may be called upon to treat casualties and transport those 
exposed to Accident and Emergency departments for further treatment.
2.4.2 Local Authority
In general environmental health practitioners (EHPs) in local authorities are 
concerned with assessing, controlling and managing those aspects of the natural and 
built environment that can affect human health. EHPs attempt to control these factors 
by using legislation and other methods such as education or persuasion (Fairman et 
al, 2001).
There is often confusion over the role of EHPs in acute chemical incidents and much 
of this arises from the lack of a specific duty for local authorities (Fairman et al, 
2001). In spite of this, local authorities will frequently play a key role in responding 
to and managing chemical incidents and may take responsibility for risk 
communication, environmental sampling and analysis, and clean up of the affected 
area. In contrast, for chronic land contamination problems the role of the local 
authority is clearly defined in legislation.
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Local authorities have the primary regulatory role under Part IIA of the 
Environmental Protection Act 1990, which reflects their existing functions under the 
statutory nuisance regime, and also complements their role as planning authorities 
(DETR, 2000). The role of local authorities under Part IIA is to inspect their areas 
and identify contaminated land, to determine whether any particular site is 
contaminated land and finally to act as the enforcing authority for all contaminated 
land that is not designated as a Special Site.
As the enforcing authority, the local authority has four main tasks:
• to establish who should bear responsibility for the remediation of the land
• to decide what remediation is required, make sure that this work is 
undertaken and if necessary serve a remediation notice
• where a remediation notice is served, determine who should bear what 
proportion of the liability for meeting the costs of the work and
• to record certain information about the regulatory action on a public register.
In addition, building regulators and building control have responsibility to ‘sign o ff 
the remediation work if it is undertaken as part of a redevelopment project.
2.4.3 Environment Agency
The Environment Agency has an important role to play in conserving the land both 
in seeking to prevent pollution and also in helping to make land safe when it has 
become contaminated. It has a number of regulatory responsibilities, including IPPC. 
In addition, Part IIA of the Environmental Protection Act 1990 provides for certain 
land to be classified as a Special Site (as defined in the Contaminated Land 
(England) Regulations [2000]). Land cannot be designated as a Special Site unless 
the local authority has first identified it as contaminated land (Environment Agency, 
2000). In these situations the Environment Agency takes over from the local 
authority as the enforcing authority.
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There are three main groups of cases that may be designated as Special Sites (DETR, 
2000):
water pollution cases where the contaminated land is affecting controlled waters 
and their quality. For example, wholesomeness of drinking water, surface water 
classification criteria or major aquifers.
industrial cases where contaminated land which is, or has been, used as a site for
industrial activities either poses special remediation problems or is subject to
regulation under other national systems. Examples are waste acid tar lagoons, oil
refining, explosives, IPC sites, IPPC installations and nuclear sites.
defence cases where contaminated land involves Ministry of Defence estate. This
includes any contaminated land at current military, naval, air force bases and other
properties.
2.4.4 Health Service
According to the British Medical Association (BMA), the medical profession has an 
important role to play in exploring risks to human health from the environment so 
that hazards can be controlled, diminished or eliminated (BMA, 1999) and that 
doctors should “play an active part in managing the environment in the interests o f  
public health” (BMA, 1991).
To minimise the impact of an acute chemical incident on human and environmental 
health, an effective and timely response from the health service is imperative. This is 
in contrast to an epidemiological investigation, such as confirming a link (or 
otherwise) between an adverse health effect and a specific industrial process which is 
a much more long-term undertaking. The impact of an incident on the health of the 
public may not be immediately apparent and delayed or long-term (chronic) health 
effects may result from an exposure. Therefore, surveillance and monitoring of 
sensitive receptors, both human and environmental, which have been exposed or 
potentially exposed to the chemical(s) is crucial. Yet the health service contribution 
as an integral part of the emergency response team is only slowly being recognised 
(Bakhshi, 1997) and there is limited guidance available to those working in public 
health to assist in managing these incidents.
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The National Health Service (NHS) is currently going through a fundamental change 
process in terms of structure and service delivery. As a result, established 
arrangements for co-ordinating the NHS response to emergencies and managing the 
public health consequences of such events are no longer appropriate or viable 
(Donegan, 2002). Until April 2002, it was the responsibility of health authorities to 
co-ordinate the health aspects of the response to chemical incidents (also referred to 
as non-infectious environmental hazards -  NIEHs). This included the protection of 
the health of, and provision of care to, those who have been or may be exposed to a 
chemical hazard (NHSME, 1993), for example providing advice to the local 
authority if there was a contaminated site where there were valid concerns with 
regard to the health of the public. However, at the time of writing (September 2002) 
all health authority functions and responsibilities are being transferred to either 
primary care trusts (PCTs) or to strategic health authorities (SHAs).
On 24th September 2002 guidance on the role of PCTs in planning for, and 
responding to, major incidents was published (NHSE, 2002). This is intended to 
replace the chapter covering the role of the health authority in ‘Planning for major 
incidents: the NHS guidance’ and reflect the responsibilities outlined in ‘Shifting the 
Balance of Power: The Next Steps’ (Box 2.5).
Box 2.5: Shifting the balance of power
http: //www .doh.gov. uk/ shi ftingtheb al anc e/index. htm
Shifting the Balance o f Power is the programme of change brought about to empower 
frontline staff and patients in the NHS. It is part of the implementation of the NHS Plan and 
has already led to the establishment of new structures. That is only one step and the main 
objective will be to foster a new culture in the NHS at all levels, which puts the patient first. 
The main feature of change has been giving locally based primary care trusts the role of 
running the NHS and improving health in their areas. This has meant abolishing the previous 
health authorities and creating new ones that serve larger areas and have a more strategic 
role. The Department of Health is also refocusing to reflect these changes, including the 
abolition of its regional offices.
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The three main roles of PCTs, highlighted in the report, are to improve the health of 
the community, secure provision of high quality services and integrate health and 
social care locally. From an emergency planning and incident response perspective, 
this includes assessing the impact on health and health services of every potential 
major incident, initiating and supporting the public health response to the incident 
where appropriate and arranging follow up if necessary of persons affected or 
exposed to risk.
It is intended that SHAs will lead the strategic development of the local health 
service and manage the performance of the PCTs and NHS trusts within a specified 
geographical area. They will also be responsible for the creation of a strategic 
framework for the development of services across the full range of local NHS 
organisations, and the continued support to local organisations to secure 
improvement to the NHS. Regional Directors of Public Health (RDPHs) will be 
accountable for ensuring that there are appropriate high quality health protection 
arrangements (covering infectious diseases and other risks to health including 
NIEHs) in place in all locations in their region. In addition they will be accountable 
for managing and coordinating the health aspects of the Government’s response to 
emergencies and disasters (DoH, 2002).
Furthermore, on 10th January 2002, the Chief Medical Officer's report 'Getting 
Ahead of the Curve: A strategy for combating infectious diseases' was published. 
The report was written following September 11 and the subsequent anthrax 
outbreaks in the US when the need for integrated responses to CBRN incidents 
became apparent. The main recommendation of the report was to combine the 
existing functions of the Public Health Laboratory Service (PHLS), National 
Radiological Protection Board (NRPB), Centre for Applied Microbiology and 
Research (CMR) and the National Focus for Chemical Incidents and to bring 
together into one agency key professions working in health protection, which 
includes Consultants in Communicable Disease Control (CCDCs), Health 
Emergency Planning Advisors (HEPAs) and Infection Control Nurses. The aim of 
the new ‘Health Protection Agency’, which will be launched in April 2003, is to
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provide ‘an integrated approach to protecting the public against infectious diseases 
and chemical and radiological hazards’ (DoH, 2002).
The launch of the Health Protection Agency in April 2003 provides the opportunity 
to reconsider and to substantiate the role of public health practitioners in responding 
to chemical incidents and to ensure that appropriate tools and guidance are in place 
for a more integrated approach to the management of these events in the future. Yet a 
British Medical Journal editorial on major chemical incidents published in 1991 
observed that health professionals are more used to disaster planning for major 
trauma than for mass chemical exposure (Baxter, 1991). Whilst incidents that lead to 
mass chemical exposure such as Bhopal (Pershagen, 2001; Gunnell, 1993;) are rare, 
they have the potential to produce serious adverse health effects in large numbers of 
people. However, more important from a public health viewpoint are the numerous 
less serious incidents (Pershagen, 2001). Evidence suggests that few public health 
practitioners have been trained in managing such events or have access to the 
resources required for identification, investigation, mitigation or prevention of health 
effects in humans that can arise from chemical incidents (Hill & O’Sullivan, 1992). 
This reference is from a report written ten years ago and yet experience over the past 
four years has shown that although a number of improvements have been made, in 
the overall scheme of things little has changed.
2.4.4.1 Public health and land contamination
It is important to appreciate that under the Contaminated Land Regulations, local 
authorities and the Environment Agency, not public health practitioners, have 
regulatory control over contaminated land. Therefore in general the potential role of 
the health service in land contamination incident management is poorly understood 
by other agencies involved.
This was reflected in responses to a short questionnaire survey, conducted as part of 
this project, posted to local authority officers involved in managing land 
contamination incidents. Responses revealed that little consideration had been given 
to the role or potential role that public health may play in responding to and 
managing these issues. The aim of the questionnaire, a copy of which has been
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provided in Appendix G, was to determine the extent to which local authorities had 
discussed their strategies for identifying and managing the contaminated land with 
the local health agencies. The survey was sent to around 300 local authority 
environmental health departments across the UK shortly after the implementation of 
the Contaminated Land Regulations in April 2000. The covering letter sent with the 
questionnaire requested that the person with responsibility for managing 
contaminated land issues within the local authority should complete it. Only 30 
questionnaires were returned giving a response rate of 10%. Whilst this is low and 
may not be considered a representative set of responses there was an even 
geographical spread and the data collected provides some indication of the current 
situation. In addition to the postal questionnaires, short interviews and discussions 
with a number of local authority officers who are directly involved in contaminated 
land management were held.
i
In order to gain an idea of the level of experience that the respondent had in 
managing land contamination incidents, the first question requested information 
about the number of incidents that they had personally been involved in. Results 
presented in Figure 2.9 indicated that while experience varied widely the majority of 
respondents had managed less than 10 incidents.
A series of questions was included to determine whether the local authority had 
consulted the health authority with regard to the new contaminated land legislation 
and the preparation of the area inspection strategy. Results highlighted that only 5% 
of respondents had been involved in limited consultation but that also 80% had not 
consulted with public health colleagues at all. Follow-up interviews revealed that 
generally the reason for lack of consultation with public health was that the role of 
public health practitioners was poorly understood, although in some cases there was 
a view that public health practitioners do not have a role in managing land 
contamination incidents.
3 At the time o f the survey the majority o f public health practitioners were based in Health Authorities.
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Figure 2.9: Number of land contamination incidents that respondents had been
involved in managing
No response
1-3
10+
n=30
7-9
Yet the health and environmental consequences of a land contamination incident 
cannot be considered in isolation, as stakeholder perception o f the risks and their 
involvement in the decision-making process is paramount to an effective response. 
‘Contaminated land’ is very strictly defined within the legislation, which requires a 
significant pollutant linkage to be established before land is legally regarded as 
contaminated. Nevertheless a site that is not found to be ‘contaminated land’ (as 
defined by the legislation) may be perceived by local residents to present a hazard to 
their health. Consequently, whilst a definitive link between the presence of chemical 
contaminants in the soil and any reported adverse health effects may be difficult to 
establish, it is imperative that all potential exposure pathways are investigated and 
the potential for harm to result from exposure eliminated. This requires the 
involvement of public health practitioners who are often trusted by the public to 
provide appropriate and unbiased information whilst at the same time able to 
maintain good working relationships with other key agencies (and industry) involved 
in managing and investigating the incident.
“Public health practitioners are seen as prominent members o f  the community and 
as the healers and guardians o f  the health o f  individuals. They are also among those 
who are seen as the most trusted sources o f  information on risks, including chemical
risks” (Hu, 1996).
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In light o f this, it is suggested that public health practitioners should be considered to 
have a central role in providing an effective and timely response to land 
contamination incidents. Interestingly this view was supported by a number of 
respondents to the questionnaire. 40% thought it would be a good idea for public 
health practitioners to have specific guidance on managing the public health impact 
o f land contamination incidents (Figure 2.10). In particular the need for a risk 
assessment tool to consider the impact of an incident on the health of the public was 
raised, which should include site investigation, toxicology and sampling.
As a result a review of the resources available for the assessment of land 
contamination was undertaken. The next section aims to outline some o f the tools 
and guidance that are currently available, recognise any limitations and identify 
apparent needs.
n=30
Figure 2.10: Would it be useful if health authorities had guidance specifically on the 
public health management of land contamination?
No response
Don't know
2.5 Tools and Guidance
Until recently, the lack of official guidance and procedures for managing land 
contamination problems has resulted in many environmental consultants developing 
their own risk-based methodologies for assessing contaminated land. These are not 
available in the public domain and are not often published extensively in the 
literature. Hence it is difficult to be able to list a comprehensive guide to the tools
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that exist and are currently in use in the UK to assess and manage either acute or 
historic (chronic) land contamination incidents (land contamination incidents).
Until March 2002, which saw the long awaited introduction of the CLEA 
(Contaminated Land Exposure Assessment) model, there were no UK models for 
site-specific public health risk assessment. CLEA is a human exposure assessment 
tool. Associated with it is a series of guidance documents aimed at improving the 
management of land contamination that has resulted from past industrial land use and 
is considered to present a potential hazard to human health and/or the wider 
environment. Research to develop a scientific framework for assessing the risks to 
human health from land contamination was initiated by the Department of the 
Environment (now DEFRA) in response to a House of Commons Select Committee 
on the Environment report. The launch of the CLEA model and supporting guidance 
documentation had been delayed by several years because of the level of consultation 
required.
Prior to the introduction of CLEA, the Environment Agency in collaboration with 
external consultants carried out an evaluation of some of the tools and models that 
are available for use in the UK for land contamination risk assessment (Butler & 
Petts, 2000). They identified that a number of qualitative and quantitative methods 
for assessing the risks posed to human health following exposure to contaminated 
soil have been developed worldwide. The risk assessment models evaluated were 
Risk*Assistant and RBCA from the US and RISC-HUMAN from the Netherlands. 
These are all computer-based tools.
RISK* ASSIST ANT is a model used to predict local exposures. It incorporates data 
on chemical concentrations in the environment and enables the user to consider a 
range of possible exposure cases. It also includes sensitivity analysis capabilities to 
test the impact of different assumptions on exposures and risks (Hampshire Research 
Institute, 1999).
The RBCA (Risk-based corrective action) model integrates assessment of the site or 
affected area, selection of the most appropriate remedial action and monitoring with
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risk and exposure assessment practices recommended by the US EPA. It is both 
detailed and prescriptive providing a consistent process that can be used to make 
decisions regarding a given site that are protective of both human health and the 
environment. The process is implemented in a tiered approach with subsequent levels 
requiring more complex data and analysis thus allowing rapid decisions to be made 
as necessary with further investigation undertaken as required (ASTM, 1996).
RISC HUMAN (Risk Identification of Soil Contamination) is a model for 
determining human exposure to soil contaminants using expertise on the presence 
and behaviour of contaminants in soils. (Van Hall Instituut, 2001). Because of the 
large variety of human exposure on contaminated sites, different model approaches 
developed by the Dutch National Institute of Public Health and the Environment 
(RIVM) are included in the model. These include CSOIL, which is a model for 
assessing human exposure to contaminants in soil and VOLASOIL, which is a model 
that has been developed for risk assessment where there are volatile soil 
contaminants.
The main conclusion of the Environment Agency report was that the models all 
perform well and could be of use in the UK but that none was easy to use. Also since 
there are a lot of assumptions underpinning the models, a thorough understanding of 
these was considered essential because they may not be applicable to a UK situation 
(Butler & Petts, 2000). A methodology not included in the review was that developed 
by the University of Nottingham in collaboration with the Scottish and Northern 
Ireland Forum for Environmental Research (SNIFFER). The SNIFFER framework is 
a paper-based tool for deriving numeric targets to minimise the adverse human health 
effects of long-term exposure to contaminants in soil according to the source- 
pathway-receptor risk assessment framework. The assessment criteria derived on a 
site-by-site basis can be used in establishing whether concentrations of substances in 
soil are unacceptable in terms of chronic risks posed to human health and in 
informing remediation objectives (University of Nottingham, 2000).
The SNIFFER framework, Risk*Assistant, RISC-HUMAN and RBCA are 
deterministic models meaning they are dependent on the selection of a single input
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value for each system parameter. Subsequently a single value for the average daily 
exposure is generated. In contrast CLEA is a probabilistic model (See Box 2.6).
Box 2.6: Probabilistic exposure models (DEFRA, 2002)
The probabilistic model replaces some single value parameters in the exposure assessment 
with a family of values selected from a defined probability distribution. Each time the model 
estimates exposure, it selects a value from this family. By repeating the assessment, a 
probabilistic model builds a range of predicted exposures rather than providing a single 
outcome. This allows the assessor a better understanding of the sensitivity of the assessment 
to parameter uncertainty and variability, and allows more informed judgements about its 
degree of conservatism.
The CLEA model, which models exposure rather than uptake with the exception of 
lead, contains eight system parameters that lie within a range of possible values 
rather than requiring a single user-specified value. The model uses a Monte Carlo 
simulation to generate a range of predicted exposures rather than a single value. This 
provides for a better understanding of the sensitivity of the assessment to parameter 
uncertainty and variability (DEFRA, 2002).
Ten exposure pathways are considered in the model (Table 2.8). Allowances are 
made for uncertainty and the model takes into consideration the bioavailability (refer 
to Box 2.7) of the contaminant. Also included in the model is ‘source 
apportionment’. For example, when looking at the risks of exposure to a substance it 
is important to first consider how overall exposure to that substance can occur, and to 
identify all potential routes of exposure, before determining how much of the daily 
intake could be reasonably attributable to exposure to contamination in the soil 
(Harrison, 2000).
Table 2.8:Ten exposure pathways considered in the CLEA model
•  O u td o o r in g e s tio n  o f  soil •  S k in  co n tac t w ith  in d o o r dust
•  In d o o r in g e s tio n  o f  dust •  O u td o o r in h a la tio n  o f  fu g itiv e  d u st
•  C o n su m p tio n  o f  h o m e -g ro w n  v eg e ta b les •  In d o o r in h a la tio n  o f  d u st
•  In g es tio n  o f  so il a ttac h ed  to  v eg e tab les •  O u td o o r in h a la tio n  o f  so il v ap o u r
• S k in  co n tac t w ith  o u td o o r soil •  In d o o r in h a la tio n  o f  so il v ap o u r
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Box 2.7: Boavailability (Paustenbach et al, 1992)
Environmental contaminants are able to cross biological barriers with varying degrees of 
efficiency but when they are bound to soil particles, the efficiency of uptake decreases. The 
bioavailability of a chemical is the percentage of the chemical in soil that is absorbed by 
humans. Chemicals in soil are usually absorbed to a lesser degree than chemicals in pure 
form. Factors which affect the bioavailability of a chemical are: 
o the physiochemical properties of the contaminant 
o the environmental matrix in which it is present 
o the nature of the biological membrane
Soil guideline values (SGVs) have been derived using the CLEA for three different 
land use scenarios: - residential, allotments and commercial/industrial. The model 
scenarios incorporate some generic assumptions, which are published and explained 
(DEFRA, 2002). Work is currently being undertaken to develop SGVs for open 
spaces such as parks (ENDS, 2002).
SGVs are to be used in establishing whether a site poses actual or potential risks to 
human health in the context of the existing or intended use of the site. So although 
‘standard’ values have been determined for each land use scenario, site-specific 
information is required to determine whether the generic assumptions incorporated 
within the CLEA model mean that the SGVs derived are directly applicable or if 
there are parameters within the model that need to be modified. To date SGVs have 
been derived for arsenic, cadmium, chromium, selenium, nickel, lead and inorganic 
mercury; separate toxicology reports have been written for each and it is anticipated 
that others will be developed in the future. It should be noted that the SGVs have 
been derived for chronic exposure to contaminants in the soil and that there are 
currently no guidelines for acute exposure.
SGVs derived using the CLEA model are intended to replace the levels developed in 
1983 by the Interdepartmental Committee for the Redevelopment of Contaminated 
Land (ICRCL) (ICRCL, 1987), which were set as guidelines for redevelopment. 
These introduced the concept of ‘threshold’ concentrations, which were non-legally 
binding values for contaminants in the soil based on the intended land use. Threshold 
or ‘trigger’ values were suggested for 20 substances, principally inorganic
2-48
contaminants, including heavy metals and those chemicals frequently encountered at 
gasworks sites. For a number of the substances, action levels were also suggested. 
Below the ‘threshold’ value, the site could be regarded as uncontaminated and above 
the ‘action’ value, the presence of a contaminant was regarded as unacceptable, so 
some kind of remedial action was required. Between the two values, there was a need 
to make an “informed judgement” based on site-specific circumstances about the 
acceptability of the level of contamination on the site.
The ICRCL guidance was not mandatory and its application has led to a wide 
variation in the policies and interpretation used by different local authorities (Peters 
& Blake, 1999). Furthermore the values were developed for use in determining the 
level of clean-up required when re-developing a contaminated site and not for use in 
determining whether a site presented a hazard to human health. Beckett (1993) has 
stated that ‘evidence of continuing misuse of ICRCL trigger concentrations has been 
accumulating’. This implies that the trigger values have not only been applied when 
sites are being redeveloped but elsewhere to determine how contaminated a 
particular site is. Yet the reason that ICRCL values have been widely used in the UK 
for the assessment and remediation of contaminated land is principally due the 
absence of anything more appropriate rather than a misunderstanding of the basis on 
which the ICRCL values were developed.
Dutch guidelines for contaminants in soil have also been quoted in addition to or 
instead of ICRCL values in UK contaminated land reports. Further information about 
these guidelines and other standards for contaminated land is provided in Appendix 
H.
Whilst guidance has been developed for the management of chronic land 
contamination incidents, little consideration has been given to the provision of 
guidance for the management of acute land contamination incidents that have the 
potential to give rise to adverse public health impacts. Furthermore it would seem 
that the majority of models that do exist for assessing the risks associated with 
exposure to contaminated land are based on chronic exposure from chronic events 
and aim to determine levels to be used for site remediation. These levels may not be
2-49
appropriate for use in responding to short-term (acute) exposures that may result as a 
consequence of an acute event. The Environment Agency has commissioned a 
research project to address some of these issues, which is due for publication later 
this year (Environment Agency, 2002). The final report will set out model 
procedures to enable a qualitative assessment of risk to human health following an 
acute exposure. Procedures addressing the wider impact of the event on the health of 
the public are not covered. As acute land contamination incidents have the potential 
to cause significant harm to human health the increasing need to develop procedures 
for responding to these events becomes apparent.
One model, which is only applicable to the acute phase of an accident and not for 
long-term assessment, is the ‘Environment Accident Index’ (EAI). EAI has been 
developed by the Defence Research Establishment in Sweden on behalf of the 
Rescue Services Agency and the Environmental Protection Agency for use as a 
simple tool to guide further risk assessment to be performed following a chemical 
incident.
EAI is calculated by multiplying the acute toxicity to living organisms in water by 
the stored or transported amount of the chemical and the chemical mobility. The 
latter is considered to be a function of consistency, solubility and the surrounding 
environment including the distance to the nearest well or watercourse, the depth of 
groundwater, and the thickness and type of soil. The numerical output calculated is 
compared to a graded classification scale, which indicates the level of further risk 
assessment required.
Unfortunately EAI considers only the environmental consequences of the incident 
and not the potential impact on human health. Also it only looks at releases to land 
and water, including groundwater, and not to air so does not take account of the 
inter-relationships that exist between the environmental media. Therefore its 
applicability as a tool for responding to and managing a land contamination incident 
is limited.
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Overall it would appear that there are few appropriate tools available for managing 
acute land contamination incidents and none that either adequately consider the 
potential impact of a land contamination incident on the health of the public or 
facilitate an effective public health response. As a result a more general review of 
existing procedures for the public health management of chemical incidents has been 
undertaken and is summarised in the next section.
2.5.1 Guidance for the Public Health Management of Chemical Incidents
Murray and Goodfellow (2002) undertook a review of published incident response 
procedures as part of a review of mass casualty chemical incidents occurring 
naturally or as a result of industrial activity or deliberate release and the problems 
experienced in medical and public health response. The aim of the review was to 
identify any procedures available to assist in the management of chemical incidents. 
The particular focus was on the management of chemical incidents and 
environmental hazards by public health practitioners in order to minimise the impact 
of such hazards on the health of the public. This covers a wider remit than just the 
management of casualties, which is considered to be largely the responsibility of 
hospital accident and emergency clinicians. The review was aimed specifically at 
establishing whether there are any published procedures for use in the emergency 
response to chemical incidents, rather than for use as an emergency planning tool. 
The main conclusion of the report was that the only guidance for the public health 
management of chemical incidents that does exist, focuses on pre-incident planning 
for such events and does not provide easy to follow procedures for responding to and 
managing chemical incidents as they evolve. Additionally procedures tend to outline 
what needs to be done rather than how to actually do things and are consequently not 
as practical as they could be.
Useful references highlighted in the review include Chapter 8 of ‘Planning for Major 
Incidents -  The NHS Guidance’, which lists different types of incidents, outlines 
special features of chemical incidents and addresses local, regional and national 
responsibilities and planning. Also ‘Health Aspects of Chemical Accidents -  
Guidance on Chemical Accident Awareness, Preparedness and Response for Health
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Professionals and Emergency Responders’ (OECD Environment Monograph No. 81, 
1994) contains three guidance documents to assist managers and other decision 
makers in developing appropriate policies for chemical accident prevention, 
preparedness and response and to treat health aspects of chemical accident 
prevention, preparedness and response in a more detailed and technical way. In 
addition a checklist for action is presented, comprising a series of items set out as a 
memory aid concerning what needs to be done in planning and implementing health 
related chemical accident prevention, preparedness and response measures.
The Chemical Incident Response Service has also written and published through The 
Stationery Office a number of useful guidance documents as part of the ‘Chemical 
Incident Management Series’. These include books aimed specifically at Public 
Health Physicians (Irwin et al, 1999), Accident and Emergency Clinicians (Fisher et 
al, 1999) and Local Authority Environmental Health Practitioners (Fairman et al, 
2001) as well as the ‘Chemical Incident Handbook’ (Farrow et al, 2000), which 
contains summary toxicological information for hundreds of chemical substances. A 
further book in the series entitled ‘The Environment and Public Health’ has been 
prepared as part of this research project in collaboration with two other Research 
Engineers based at the Chemical Incident Response Service and the director of CIRS, 
Dr Virginia Murray. The book is currently in press and it is anticipated that it will be 
published by end of 2002.
A further reference source is available from the International Programme for 
Chemical Safety (IPCS, 1999) who has published a book entitled ‘Public Health and 
Chemical Incidents’. This document describes how countries can improve the public 
health response to acute chemical incidents and ensure a better outcome for the 
health of their populations. It is divided into three main sections covering policy, 
public health response and a suggested framework into which the public health 
function can be built. In addition a series of appendices contain further information 
including a list of acronyms and a glossary.
As previously indicated, although these references provide useful information about 
preparation prior to a chemical incident, there is little information available that can
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be accessed and used during an incident to guide the response thus highlighting the 
need for further work to develop appropriate tools and resources. Additional issues 
that need to be addressed include provision of training and training material.
CODA
It is appropriate that this research project concentrates on developing procedures for 
responding to and managing acute chemical incidents and specifically those that 
result in land contamination. This ties in well with the original project brief, which 
suggested that little work had been done to investigate the impact on human health 
and the environment of an uncontrolled release of chemicals onto land during a spill. 
However, since the human health impact of a chronic land contamination incident 
has not been considered in any great detail from the viewpoint of the public health 
practitioner who may have a key role to play in the effective management of an 
incident, this reinforces the need for further work.
Recognition of the limitations of current resources for integrating health and 
environmental assessment and management of chemical incidents would suggest that 
rather than focussing on land contamination incidents, a new and more general 
methodology should be developed. Section 2.4.4 outlined the public health function 
in responding to chemical incidents. Using this as a basis, key needs of those 
responding to such events can be identified including the provision of tools to guide 
the public health response and management.
In general chemical incidents are currently managed on an ad hoc basis, either 
because of limited experience or lack of appropriate resources. Therefore one of the 
key aims is to consider whether developing a standardised approach to chemical 
incident management results in a more effective and consistent response. Since all 
incidents are different, tools need to be flexible enough to ensure that all possible 
outcomes are considered and allowances are made for situations where a decision is 
required even if limited information is available. However, experience gained whilst 
working at CIRS over the past four years has indicated that it may be possible to 
group incidents into a finite number of categories. These categories can either reflect 
the impact of the incident and hence the level of response required or the type of
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incident, such as those currently used by CIRS and the National Focus for 
surveillance purposes.
Additionally an important issue to consider is whether it is feasible to integrate the 
decision-making processes that are used to assess impacts on human health and the 
environment since current procedures seem to be aimed at either one or the other.
The work presented in Chapters 3, 4 and 5 will aim to answer the following 
questions:
• How can we improve chemical incident identification and notification and better 
communicate the risk that an incident presents to human health?
o Is it appropriate to devise a categorisation scale for all chemical incidents, to 
be able to distinguish between a ‘major incident’ and a ‘minor event’ from a 
human health perspective? How useful would this be? 
o How can this be extended to consider the impact on the environment 
simultaneously?
• If chemical incidents, and in particular land contamination incidents, can be 
grouped into a limited number of categories, can we use these to develop generic 
tools and guidance for incident response and management?
• Are there benefits to identifying patterns in the way that incidents are currently 
managed? How can we use this information to gain a better understanding of the 
genesis and chronology of incidents and subsequently improve chemical incident 
management procedures?
• How can we combine diverse factors to provide an effective tool to concurrently 
assess the impact of chemical incidents on both human health and the wider 
environment?
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3. CHEMICAL INCIDENT CATEGORISATION
In the months following September 11th 2001, interest in emergency planning and 
preparedness has escalated. The importance of inter-agency communication at a 
national and international level in providing an effective response to an accidental or 
deliberate chemical attack was highlighted repeatedly, and subsequently the need for 
a common alert and response system to communicate to potential health impact of an 
acute chemical incident was raised (Chapter 1). There has been a major drive within 
the UK to enhance the skills and knowledge of public health practitioners in 
particular, and to cascade information on to other medical professionals (Murray, 
2001).
In this chapter the value of developing a rapid response tool to be able to measure the 
potential public health impact of a chemical incident is considered. No such scale 
currently exists yet the benefits of such a tool has been recognised nationally, by the 
Department of Health, and internationally by the World Health Organisation (see 
Appendix I for a copy of the press release) and G7/G8 (See Box 3.1). Initially the 
impact on human health from an acute chemical incident was considered in isolation 
but subsequently the possibility of integrating environmental concerns was 
contemplated.
Box 3.1: G7/G8 (G8 Information Centre, 2002)
Since 1975, the heads of state or government of the major industrial democracies have been 
meeting annually to deal with the major economic and political issues facing their domestic 
societies and the international community as a whole. The 6 countries at the first Summit, in 
1975, were France, the United States, Britain, Germany, Japan and Italy. They were joined 
by Canada in 1976, by the European Community in 1977 and Russia in 1998. The G7/G8 
provides an important occasion for leaders to discuss major, often complex international 
issues, and to develop the personal relations that help them respond in effective collective 
fashion to sudden crises or shocks. The Summit also gives direction to the international 
community by setting priorities, defining new issues, and providing guidance to established 
international organizations. At times it arrives at decisions that address pressing problems or 
shape international order more generally.
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3.1 Categorising Chemical Incidents
Incident categorisation systems can be used to improve the management of acute 
chemical incidents, thereby minimising harm to human health and the environment. 
In addition they can be used as an aid to planning the level of response required, 
assessing the impact on resources and as a means of describing an incident that has 
occurred; in the early stages of response to communicate information between the 
different agencies involved in managing the event as well as to the general public; 
and, once the problem has been resolved, as a tool for surveillance (refer to Box 3.2).
Box 3.2: Reasons for categorising chemical incidents
Health and
environmental impact
Resource impact
Communication
Surveillance
Categories can also be used to predict the potential impact of an 
event on human health and the wider environment. Some chemical 
incidents have the potential to result in widespread damage 
whereas others will only affect the local area.
Impact categories can be used to determine the potential impact of 
an event on resources, for example, support staff and equipment. 
The resource impact of an event will vary from agency to agency 
and will be influenced in part by the type of the event. Some 
chemical incidents may require environmental sampling and long­
term monitoring; others may require an extensive health 
assessment of the exposed population.
The key to mitigating the impact of an incident lies firstly in 
effective communication -  the right information at the right time 
to the right people (Barry & Japp, 1997). Therefore a 
categorisation system that provides a consistent means of 
describing an incident that has occurred can be used in the early 
stages of response to communicate information between the 
different agencies involved in managing the event as well as to the 
general public.
If all incidents are described on a similar scale, it is easier to see 
patterns in the numbers and types of events occurring and to use 
this information to allocate resources, focus training requirements 
or improve response procedures for the future.
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To some extent a scaling system might be used to meet a combination of these 
demands. However, this chapter focuses on the development of a classification 
system for communicating information about an acute event quickly and effectively. 
The aim is to develop a system to be used primarily as a tool for describing an event 
in the first phase following its recognition to improve inter-agency communication, 
and also international communication in the early stages following a potential 
terrorist attack and to define and describe a ‘major incident’ and a ‘no impact 
incident’ from a public health perspective.
3.1.1 Existing Scales
The idea of being able to categorise events to enable an assessment of their potential 
impact is not new and incidents and events are categorised in many different ways. 
However, an initial search showed that very few categorisation systems for assessing 
the impact of an event have been published. There may be a large number of 
unpublished categorisation systems that are being used for specific purposes by 
companies, but they remain inaccessible and are perhaps irrelevant for the purpose 
here of identifying a general system of categorisation that improves the management 
response to acute chemical incidents.
A number of hazard ranking systems for chemicals were identified (mostly 
American); for example, categorisation of chemicals for transportation according to 
their chemical and physical properties and a classification system for hazardous 
materials designed by the National Fire Protection Association (ATSDR, 2001). 
Whilst these provided examples of how chemicals (and perhaps incidents) can be 
grouped, the impact of an event or incident was not considered.
In addition there are categorisation tools that are principally used for planning. An 
example of such a scale is that presented in the risk analysis report prepared by the 
Arctic Council’s Emergency Prevention, Preparedness and Response (EPPR) 
Working Group (September 1998). This document contains the qualitative risk
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matrix that the eight Arctic nations1 are using to identify and assess potential 
environmental hazards. All pollution incidents are considered to fall in one of four 
categories, which reflect the probability that the incident will occur and the 
magnitude of the threat (Figure 3.1).
Figure 3.1: Risk categories used by EPPR
a
HIGH
CATEGORY 2 CATEGORY 1
Probability of
occurrence
CATEGORY 4 CATEGORY 3
LOW
LOW Magnitude of threat HIGH
This two by two matrix is a fairly simple way to categorise risks and has been used 
on a number of occasions to carry out risk comparisons. For example, the Scottish 
and Northern Ireland Forum for Environmental Research (SNIFFER) publication on 
communicating understanding of contaminated land risk (SNIFFER, 1999), includes 
a figure which illustrates a range of hazards -  from smoking to genetic engineering -  
and how they are typically perceived based on degree of familiarity and degree of 
fear.
A number of scales for categorising incidents exist for natural events and include the 
Beaufort scale (wind speed), the Fujita tornado intensity scale, the Richter and 
modified Mercalli scales (earthquakes), and the Torino scale (asteroid collision) 
(Binzel, 2000) - Table 3.1.
1 The eight Arctic nations are Canada, Finland, Greenland, Iceland, Norway, Russian 
Federation, Sweden, USA
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Table 3.1: Some examples of scales to describe natural events
Name of 
scale
Use Description of scale Examples
Beaufort
scale
- created in 1805 
help sailors at 
sea estimate 
wind speed via 
visual
observations
- later modified 
for use on land
- 12 categories for wind 
speeds of less than 1 
to greater than 119 
km/hour
- for each category a 
description and 
observations have 
been outlined
Beaufort force: 0 
Description: Calm 
Observations: Smoke rises 
vertically
Beaufort force: 8 
Description: Gale 
Observations: Twigs break 
from trees, difficult to walk.
Fujita
tornado
intensity
scale
- to classify 
tornadoes and 
sometimes the 
damage done 
by other wind 
storms
- 6 categories for 
tornadoes (F0-F6) 
based on the amount 
and type o f wind 
damage
- for each category a 
description and 
observations have 
been outlined
Category F0: Gale tornado 
(40-72 mph); light damage. 
Some damage to chimneys; 
break branches off trees; push 
over shallow-rooted trees; 
damage to sign boards.
Category F5: Incredible 
tornado (261-318 mph); 
Incredible damage e.g. strong 
frame houses lifted off 
foundations and carried 
considerable distance.
Richter
scale
- devised in 1935 
to identify the 
magnitude of 
an earthquake
- value calculated 
reflects the 
amount of 
energy released
- logarithmic scale Modified Mercalli Scale: I 
Richter magnitude: <3.4 
Numbered per year: 800000 
Characteristics: Recorded only 
by seismographs
Modified
Mercalli
Scale
- less precise and 
measures the 
intensity o f the 
earthquake
- outlines characteristic 
effects of shocks in 
populated areas for 12 
categories
Modified Mercalli Scale: VII 
Richter magnitude: 5.5 -  6.1 
Number per year: 500 
Characteristics: Slight building 
damage; plaster cracks, bricks 
fall
Torino
Scale
- communication 
tool for 
astronomers 
and the public 
to assess the 
seriousness of 
predictions of 
close
encounters by 
asteroids and 
comets
- colour coded
scale (5 
categories)
- an object is assigned a 
0 to 10 value based on 
its collision 
probability and its 
kinetic energy
Number on Torino scale: 0 
Description: likelihood o f a 
collision is zero
Category: White zone -  event 
having no likely consequence
Number on Torino scale: 8 
Description: collision capable 
of causing regional destruction 
Category: Red zone -  Certain 
collisions
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Whilst these scales are essentially very different, there are some similarities.
For example:
• some kind of risk profiling
o threat (any circumstance or event with the potential to cause harm) 
o likelihood of occurrence 
o impact/consequence
• one-dimensional numerical scoring system
• omission of management response
However, a far more appropriate scale than those described above which essentially 
depict categorised groups of natural phenomena, which could be adapted for use in 
categorising acute chemical incidents, is that used to describe biological hazards. 
Biological hazards are most frequently categorised according to the number of 
people affected and the size of the affected area. For example, a disease that tends to 
be restricted to a particular region is endemic whereas an outbreak of disease that 
affects a much greater number of people than is usual for the locality or that spreads 
to regions where it is ordinarily not present is an epidemic. The World Health 
Organisation (WHO) has a preparedness plan for influenza pandemics, which 
provides a basis for WHO to determine its response to such situations as they are 
assessed. Other classification systems for biological agents are based on hazard and 
containment, for example that described by the Advisory Committee on Dangerous 
Pathogens (1995).
Information about the WHO scale and four other scales is included in Table 3.2. The 
first of these is the International Nuclear Event Scale (INES), developed by 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the Nuclear Energy Agency of 
OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development) in the aftermath 
of the Chernobyl catastrophe to provide a means of promptly communicating to the 
public in consistent terms the safety significance of events reported at nuclear 
installations (IAEA, 2001). The second scale in the table is that used by the 
Environment Agency to record all types of pollution incident across all aspects of the 
environment. The third scale in the table is that agreed by an international meeting of
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experts by the International Programme on Chemical Safety (IPCS) and defines acute 
chemical incidents requiring public health involvement and four levels that describe 
the impact of the event on the health of the public (IPCS, 1999). Finally, in February 
2002, the Centres for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) in the US published a 
paper that outlined a method for ‘Public Health Assessment of Potential Biological 
Agents’ and outlined a methodology for placing agents in 1 of 3 priority categories 
based on a risk-matrix analysis process. The purpose of this categorisation system 
was to determine the biological agents for public health preparedness activities “to 
help co-ordinate planning efforts among federal agencies, state and local emergency 
response and public health agencies and the medical community” (Rotz et al., 2002).
3.1.2 Developing a Scale for Chemical Incidents
The term chemical incident is defined by IPCS as ‘an occurrence of public health 
concern caused by an acute release of a toxic or potentially toxic agent’ (IPCS, 1999) 
and therefore can include incidents ranging from a minor spill of a common acid in a 
laboratory to an explosion at a chemical plant resulting in exposure of a large 
population and significant degradation of the environment.
To make certain of the appropriateness of the scale and to ease dissemination and 
use, it was important to determine exactly what the chemical incident scale would be 
used for. It was decided that the incident categorisation system would be used as a 
rapid response tool to communicate the potential public health impact of a chemical 
incident between the agencies involved in managing the incident. The aim, then, was 
to devise a scale that may be used quickly as a means of describing the magnitude of 
a release of a chemical substance to communicate the severity of the incident and in 
so doing initiate the appropriate response.
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3.1.3 Identifying Appropriate Parameters
Identifying the most appropriate criteria to consider when defining the categories 
required careful consideration of several alternatives. This encouraged broad 
systematic thinking about what is important about the incidents that are to be 
categorised and ranked (Morgan et al, 2000). Firstly the criteria used by CDC to 
evaluate potential biological threat agents were considered (listed in Table 3.3) 
although as they were used to categorise biological agents and not incidents they 
were not directly appropriate. However they did provide a good basis for discussions 
to evaluate the most appropriate parameters for the chemical incident scale.
Table 3.3: Criteria used to evaluate potential biological threat agents
Parameter* Factors considered
Public health impact Potential for disease/death
Dissemination potential Main routes o f infection, stability o f the agent and person 
to person transmissibility
Public perception Pre-existing heightened public awareness and interest
Requirements for special 
public health preparation
Need for increased surveillance and stockpiling of 
antidotes
*For each agent a weighting from 0 to +++ was allocated for each of the four parameters.
Since the chemical incident scale would be used as a rapid response tool, in deciding 
which parameters to use it was important to identify the information that would be 
available in the early stages following notification that an incident had occurred.
It was suggested that chemical incidents could be categorised by:
• the incident impact -  health, environmental, resource, overall
• something that is measurable -  amount of chemical, number of people 
affected
• the type of incident -  chemical hazard, event, location
The parameters selected on which to base the scale were:
• the number of people potentially exposed. This must take into consideration 
the incident location and time of day. For example, more people will be
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exposed in the event of a chemical incident at a London underground station 
during rush hour than at three o’clock in the morning. It is important that the 
categorisation system reflects this difference.
• the observed severity o f the impact on public health based on the health 
impact severity (HIS) scale. The HIS scale has been derived from the IPCS 
Poisoning Severity Scale (Persson et al, 1998) and the triage scale outlined in 
Major Incident Medical Management (BMJ Publishing, 1995) and is outlined 
in Table 3.4.
Table 3.4: Health impact severity scale
Category Description
1
N o n e
•  no  sy m p to m s o r s igns re la ted  to  p o iso n in g
2
Minor
•  m ild , tran s ien t an d  sp o n ta n eo u sly  reso lv in g  sy m p to m s
•  tr iag e  sieve P3 (g reen ): n eed s  trea tm e n t b u t can  w ait
3
Moderate
•  p ro n o u n ce d  o r p ro lo n g ed  sy m p to m s
•  tr iag e  sieve (y e llo w ): u rg en t trea tm e n t n eed ed
4
Severe
•  sev ere  o r life  th rea ten in g  sy m p to m s
•  tr iag e  sieve PI (red): n eed s im m ed ia te  re su sc ita tio n
5
F ata l
• d ea th
• tr iag e  sieve P4 (b lack /w h ite ): d ea th  o r  ex p e c ted  d ea th
These parameters were selected since this information is likely to be available, allbeit 
in a crude format, in the early stages following notification that an incident has 
occurred and it is intended that initial use of the scale should occur as soon as 
possible.
3.1.4 Defining a ‘Major Incident’
Whilst experts may be able to describe an incident objectively in terms of specified 
attributes, deciding which of two incidents has the most significant impact on the 
health of the public requires value judgements (Morgan et al, 2000). For example, 
experience of dealing with a large number o f chemical incidents may result in a
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heightened awareness of the potential impact that such events may have on human 
health and the wider environment.
The process of categorising a large number of incidents into a small number of 
categories requires value judgements because different people and organisations have 
different concerns about risks (Morgan et al, 2000). In addition, there are trade-offs 
between the two main dimensions -  the number of people exposed and the severity 
of the health impact. Is an incident where there are a few severely affected people a 
more or less significant incident than one with a greater number of affected people 
with minor adverse health effects? Therefore to gain an understanding of how 
different people perceive the seriousness of incidents, and also to confirm that 
incidents could be categorised using the selected parameters, a short survey was 
carried out.
A questionnaire listing 15 scenarios was circulated to 40 people who were asked to 
rank them as ‘Minor’, ‘Moderate’ or ‘Major’ incidents based on the number of 
people exposed and the health outcome based on the health impact severity (HIS) 
scale outlined previously. The response rate to the questionnaire was good (90%) and 
on the whole there was no significant difference between the responses received 
from those with experience of managing chemical incidents and those with limited or 
no experience (Table 3.5).
An exception to this was observed in the responses to scenarios five and eleven. In 
scenario five where there were 2 fatalities, those with experience in managing 
chemical incidents regarded this to be a less serious incident (average response=1.92) 
than those with limited or no experience (average response=2.73) (chi2 =10.250, 
p=0.006). In scenario eleven, where there were 5 people with severe exposure, again 
those with experience in managing chemical incidents regarded this to be a less 
serious incident (average response=2.08) than those with limited or no experience 
(average response=2.54) (chi =6.580, p=0.037). From an incident management 
perspective, a few severely injured or affected individuals are easier to cope with 
than many tens or hundreds of minor injuries in terms of the impact on resources. 
This is therefore perhaps the reason why the two scenarios per perceived to be less
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serious by those with incident management experience. Overall consistency in 
responses to each of the incident scenarios helped to confirm that it is possible to 
categorise incidents based on the selected parameters.
Table 3.5: Results from risk perception survey
Scenario Number of 
people
Exposure Average
response
Standard
deviation
1 10 Moderate Moderate 0.63
2 1050 Moderate Major 0.50
3 1400 None Minor 0.44
4 1600 Minor Moderate 0.43
5 2 Fatal Moderate 0.76
6 220 Severe Major 0.00
7 30 Fatal Major 0.16
8 360 Minor Moderate 0.49
9 45 None Minor 0.22
10 400 None Minor 0.37
11 5 Severe Moderate 0.54
12 600 Fatal Major 0.00
13 70 Severe Major 0.39
14 800 Minor Moderate 0.47
15 980 Moderate Major 0.50
3.1.5 The Scale
The IAEA scale could be used as a basis for a chemical incident categorisation 
system in combination with the IPCS scale. However it is unlikely that an incident 
involving the release of chemicals would reach the equivalent magnitude of a grade 6 
or 7 nuclear/radiation incident or that a very minor release of chemicals -  equivalent 
of a grade 1 nuclear/radiation incident - would do significant harm; indeed, such an 
event may not be detected. An example of such an incident might be a minor spill of 
a common acid in a chemical laboratory. Such an incident would be logged locally 
but it may not be routinely reported to either CIRS or to the Department of Health.
Incidents involving chemicals also differ from those involving the release of 
radioactive substances in that the latter can often be detected at low concentrations 
more easily than the former. Finally, our ability to predict the effects of exposure to 
low levels of radiation is greater than our ability to predict the effects of exposure to
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low concentrations of chemicals. These points have led us to think that the seven- 
point scale for nuclear events may not be ideal when dealing with chemical incidents. 
Initially, instead of a seven-point scale a three-point scale was proposed although this 
was later increased to five points.
It was decided that the chemical incident impact scale would comprise a single 
number that would indicate the severity o f the impact and that each category would 
be colour-coded in a similar way to the IAEA nuclear event scale. Chemical 
incidents present multi-dimensional problems and it is therefore difficult to translate 
the impact of an event to a single number. However, by using a one-dimensional 
scale some immediate sense of context for the hazard is provided even if there is no 
understanding of the construction of the scale Binzel (2000).
The proposed scale is presented in Figure 3.2. If the average response results from 
the risk perception survey are superimposed onto the figure almost all points are 
within the same category on the scale. The only exceptions are due to the addition of 
categories 0 and 5, which represent insignificant and catastrophic events. A 
definition for each category or ‘grade’ has been written (Table 3.6) and examples of 
past incidents have been included to illustrate the application of the scale to ‘real’ 
events.
Figure 3.2: Chemical incident impact scale (CIIS)
10000
Grade 2
Grade 0
None Minor Moderate Severe Fatal
Health impact severity scale
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Table 3.6: Scale for communicating the potential health impact of an incident
Category/
Grade
Catastrophic
incident
Definition
Incident may result in 
•  devastating impact on human health 
o more than 1000 fatalities
Exam ples
Bhopal. India 1994
Cloud o f methyl isocyanate released at pesticide 
plant following runaway reaction when water
o more than 10000 people with severe entered 45 tonne storage tank.
Serious (major) 
incident
or life threatening symptoms
Incident may result in
•  between 10 and 1000 fatalities
OR
• over 100 people with severe or life 
threatening symptoms
OR
• over 1000 people with pronounced or 
prolonged symptoms
OR
• potential exposure o f more 10000 people 
with mild, transient and spontaneously 
resolving symptoms or even if there are no 
adverse health effects (because o f the 
potential resource implications required to 
effectively manage the situation and likely 
media interest)__________________________
(over 3000 fatalities. 170000 injured)
Toulouse. France 2002
Explosion completely destroyed petrochemical 
and fertiliser factory.
(29 fatalities, more than 2500 injuries)
Flixborough. England 1974
Cyclohexane oxidation plant severely damaged
by a large explosion.
(28 fatalities, many injuries)
Camelford. England 1988 
Concentrated aluminium sulphate discharged 
into a treated water reservoir resulted in major 
contamination o f drinking water supplies.
(over 20000 potentially exposed)
Moderate
incident
Incident may result in
• less than ten fatalities
OR
• between 1 and 100 people with severe or 
life threatening symptoms
OR
• between 10 and 1000 people with 
pronounced or prolonged symptoms
OR
• over 100 people with mild, transient and 
spontaneously resolving symptoms
OR
• potential exposure o f more than 1000 
people even if there are no adverse health 
effects (because o f the potential resource 
implications required to effectively 
manage the situation and likely media 
interest)
Norfolk. England 1991
Fire at a waste plastics factory gave rise to dense 
smoke plume.
(46 casualties, many exposed)
London. England 1990
Aldicarb contamination o f cucumbers served at 
school lunch.
(50 students suffered acute gastroenteritis)
Greater Manchester. England 1997
Elemental mercury led to widespread
contamination.
(225 exposed, confirmed toxicity in 19)
Incident may result in
•  up to 10 people with pronounced or 
prolonged symptoms
OR
• •  up to 100 people with mild, transient and
Minor incident spontaneously resolving symptoms
OR
•  potential exposure o f  between 10 and 1000 
people with no adverse health effects 
reported (because o f  the potential resource 
implications required to effectively  
manage the situation and likely media 
interest)
Incident may result in 
0 less than 10 people exposed to the chemical
Insignificant hazard
incident little or no impact on the health o f the public
London. England 1999
CS gas release at comprehensive school.
(42 students experienced adverse health effects)
Derby. England 2000
Leak o f  petrol in basement o f  residential 
property.
(42 properties evacuated, no casualties, no 
adverse heath affects)
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Once an incident has been categorised, this information can be used in alerting all 
organisations that need to be aware of the event. One of the advantages of the scale is 
that it does not aim to replace any existing emergency procedures or major incident 
plans but to dovetail with existing tools. It provides a quick and easy way to 
communicate information about an incident that can then be used within each of the 
organisations to trigger the necessary internal response procedures. Developing such 
response procedures specifically for public health practitioners is explored in Chapter 
4.
Obviously as time passes more information about the incident will become available 
-  initially on the number and type of casualties and on local physical damage if, for 
example, an explosion has occurred. As symptoms and signs become apparent, 
information regarding the type of chemical involved may appear and later, analysis 
of air, soil, water and biological samples may confirm or refute initial opinions. In 
some cases the final answer may be long delayed. It is possible that the grading of an 
incident might be reduced as more data appears; conversely, upgrading may be 
required.
A short period of consultation with public health practitioners, the London Health 
Emergency Planning Advisors (HEPAs) and representatives from the Department of 
Health (DoH) provided positive feedback with regard to the applicability and use of 
the scale. However, it was noted that the different agencies that may be involved in 
responding to and managing chemical incidents, for example the emergency services 
and accident and emergency departments, will have their own criteria for declaring a 
‘major incident’. A major incident can have a significant impact on one part of the 
health service, while leaving others relatively unaffected. In a similar way, an NHS 
major incident is not necessarily a major incident for other emergency services, such 
as police, fire or local authority services -  and vice versa (Planning for Major 
Incidents, The NHS Guidance, 2000). Therefore, this category was re-named as 
‘serious incident’ to minimise confusion and overlap with existing plans.
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3.2 Integrating a Scale for the Environment
In Chapter 1 the benefits of assessing simultaneously the health and environmental 
impacts of a chemical incident were discussed. Since the proposed chemical incident 
impact scale (CHS) has only considered the potential health impact, in this next 
section the idea of producing a parallel scale that could be used to categorise the 
environmental impact is explored.
There are a number of measurable endpoints of environmental contamination that 
could be used to categorise the environmental impact of an incident, including the 
number of fish killed in a polluted stream or closure of a drinking water abstraction 
point due to elevated contaminant levels. Pollution incidents are assessed by the 
Environment Agency both in terms of their impact on the environment and on 
Agency resources. They are then graded on a four-point scale, which ranges from 
‘serious long lasting or extensive damage to the environment or people’ to ‘no 
impact occurred’. These categories are not dissimilar to those used in the CHS to 
grade the impact on human health so rather than developing a new categorisation 
system, the possibility of linking the Environment Agency’s pollution scale with the 
CHS was considered.
The Environment Agency scheme has been merged directly with the CHS, with the 
addition of an extra category to correspond to grade four or ‘catastrophic’. This is to 
reflect a devastating environmental impact with widespread damage and irreversible 
harm (see Table 3.7). More detailed information about the Environment Agency’s 
categories is presented in Table 3.8.
To test the usefulness of the integrated scale, all incidents reported to CIRS over a 
one-month period (June 2002), were categorised retrospectively.
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Table 3.7: Integrated human health and environmental impact scale for chemical
incidents
Category/
Grade
4
Catastrophic
incident
3
Serious
incident
2
M oderate
incident
1
Minor incident
0
Insignificant
incident
Human health im pact
Incident may result in 
•  devastating impact on human health
•  more than 1000 fatalities
•  m ore than 10000 people with severe 
or life threatening sym ptoms
Incident may result in
• between 10 and 1000 fatalities
OR
• over 100 people with severe or life 
threatening symptoms
OR
• over 1000 people with pronounced or 
prolonged symptoms
OR
• potential exposure o f more 10000 people 
with mild, transient and spontaneously 
resolving symptoms or even if there are 
no adverse health effects (because o f the 
potential resource implications required 
to effectively manage the situation and 
likely media interest)___________________
Incident may result in
• less than ten fatalities
OR
• between 1 and 100 people with severe or 
life threatening symptoms
OR
• between 10 and 1000 people with 
pronounced or prolonged symptoms
OR
• over 100 people with mild, transient and 
spontaneously resolving symptoms
OR
• potential exposure o f more than 1000 
people even if  there are no adverse health 
effects (because o f the potential resource 
implications required to effectively 
manage the situation and likely media 
interest) ______________________
Incident may result in
•  up to 10 people with pronounced or 
prolonged symptoms
OR
•  up to 100 people with mild, transient and 
spontaneously resolving symptoms
OR
•  potential exposure o f  between 10 and 
1000 people with no adverse health 
effects reported (because o f  the potential 
resource implications required to 
effectively manage the situation and 
likely media interest)
Incident may result in
•  less than 10 people exposed to the 
chemical hazard
•  little or no impact on the health o f  the 
public
E nvironm ental im pact
Devastating
•  w idespread dam age
•  irreversible harm
Major
•  persistent and extensive effects on quality
•  m ajor dam age to the ecosystem
•  closure o f  a potable abstraction
•  m ajor impact on property
•  m ajor impact upon am enity value
•  m ajor dam age to agriculture and/or 
comm erce
Significant
•  significant effect on quality
•  significant dam age to the ecosystem
•  non-routine notification o f  abstractors
• significant impact on property
•  reduction in am enity value
•  significant dam age to agriculture and/or 
comm erce
Minor
» minimal effect on quality 
» significant damage to local ecosystem s 
* marginal effect on amenity value 
» minimal impact to agriculture and/or 
commerce
Unsubstantiated report
* no evidence can be found o f  a pollution 
incident having occurred
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3.2.1 Results
A total of 51 incidents were reported to CIRS in June 2002, which is lower than 
average. There was sufficient information to categorise 35 of these (69%) using the 
proposed scale in terms of the impact on health, but only 3 in terms of the impact on 
the environment. The fact that information on the number of people exposed and the 
severity of the impact on human health was not available for all incidents was 
unexpected, since there is a section on the CIRS incident report form which requests 
information on the number of people exposed and affected. This was incomplete in 
many cases. However, the limited amount of environmental information was 
unsurprising. Current response procedures endeavour to manage only human and not 
environmental impacts of an incident and there is not currently a section of the CIRS 
incident report form dedicated to collecting specific environmental information.
The severity of the incidents reported in June 2002 in terms of potential human 
health impact is summarised in Table 3.10. There were no serious or catastrophic 
incidents reported in this one-month period and the majority of incidents (51%) were 
categorised as ‘minor’. These included a leaking chlorine gas cylinder dumped on 
waste ground and a family exposed to carbon monoxide. In both of these cases less 
than ten people were exposed but all experienced pronounced or prolonged 
symptoms. In a further example, about thirty children were potentially exposed to 
mercury, which they had found in a toolbox when playing. Biological samples were 
collected even though no adverse health effects were reported.
All nine incidents categorised as ‘insignificant’ involved exposure of less than ten 
people with no reported adverse health impacts. These included a lorry carrying 
phosphoric acid found to be leaking in a college car park and consumption of tea 
containing kettle de-scaler.
The incidents categorised as ‘moderate’ using the CHS included six fires in which 
several hundred people were exposed, for example a fire in a large plastics packaging 
warehouse, which resulted in a plume containing hydrogen chloride and white 
asbestos deposited in the gardens of local residents. Herbicide found in a reservoir
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used to supply drinking water to over one thousand people was also categorised as a 
‘moderate’ incident.
Table 3.9: Incidents reported to CIRS in June 2002 categorised using CHS
Incident category Number of incidents
0 9
1 18
2 8
3 0
4 0
The aim of the CHS is to be able to categorise incidents quickly, to assess the 
potential health and environmental impact and to guide the subsequent public health 
response. Therefore there were a number of disadvantages to testing the scale 
retrospectively. Firstly, the incident category designated was based on complete 
information about each incident, which in some cases had been collected over a 
number of days or weeks of investigation. Secondly, the information required to 
categorise each incident was incomplete in a number of cases especially in terms of 
the environmental impact. If used to categorise incidents as they are reported it is 
anticipated that basic details could be requested. Finally it is recommended that the 
CIRS incident report form be updated to encourage and improve the collection of 
environmental information.
One advantage of testing the scale retrospectively was that it was possible to confirm 
the appropriateness of the category definitions and to demonstrate benefits of a clear 
categorisation system for use in incident surveillance.
3.3 Summary and Conclusions
The value of developing a rapid response tool to be able to measure the potential 
public health impact of a chemical incident was considered.
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The aim was to be able to define and describe a ‘major incident’ (subsequently 
changed to ‘serious incident’) and to develop a scale for incident categorisation. 
Scales and systems for categorisation were acknowledged to have many potential 
uses, which could be broadly divided into three categories - tools for planning, tools 
for describing events and tools for response and communication. Following a review 
of a number of existing scales to identify useful features and to generate ideas, a 
scale for use in assessing the impact of a chemical incident was developed.
Five categories ranging from ‘insignificant incident’ to ‘catastrophic incident’ have 
been defined and illustrated with examples selected from past incidents. The scale is 
based on two parameters -  the number of people potentially exposed and the severity 
of the health impact. As time passes more information will become available so it is 
possible that the grading of an incident might be reduced as more data appears; 
conversely, upgrading may be necessary. Subsequently the possibility of merging the 
Chemical Incident Impact Scale (CHS) with the Environment Agency’s pollution 
incident scale as a means of integrating human health and environmental impact 
assessment was considered. The integrated scale was tested retrospectively over a 
one-month period and results demonstrated its usefulness as a tool to categorise 
incidents in terms of the potential hazard to human health. However, the limited 
environmental information currently recorded, made it difficult to quantify its 
potential value as an integrated assessment tool.
Although the capabilities of the tool for inter-agency risk communication have not 
been tested, this highlights an opportunity for further research. There is also the 
possibility that the scale could be expanded and used to communicate the severity of 
all CBRN incidents, the importance of which has been delineated in Section 2.2.3, 
but this is also beyond the scope of this research project.
It is hoped that in due course the scale will be adopted nationally and internationally 
and therefore constitute a significant contribution to knowledge.
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4. TOOLS FOR PLANNING AND RESPONSE
Chapter 3 highlighted that the proposed scale for categorising chemical incidents 
should dovetail with existing emergency procedures used by the organisations 
involved in incident response and management. However, when the public health 
role in managing incidents was presented in Section 2.4 it was noted that although 
the importance of their contribution as an integral part of the emergency response 
team is recognised, appropriate tools and information to support and facilitate an 
effective response are currently limited. The main exception to this is a manual for 
public health response to chemical incidents produced by Goodfellow (2001) as part 
of an Engineering Doctorate project based at CIRS. The main focus of the project 
was chemical incidents that result in water contamination and as a result, tools and 
guidance reflect this area of interest. It is anticipated that the work outlined in this 
chapter will be used in combination with the manual, much of which has been 
included in the forthcoming Stationery Office publication (Eagles et al, 2002).
The aim of this chapter is to design a methodology that can be used in developing 
tools for planning and response that meet with the needs of public health 
practitioners. The incident management process has been broken down into a number 
of key stages and the use of incident timelines to describe how incidents evolve is 
outlined. This idea is based on the observation that patterns in the way events present 
and progress can be identified and used to formulate a generic framework around 
which tools for planning and response to chemical incidents can be created.
The role of public health at each stage of the management process is then considered 
and the question ‘what do public health practitioners want/need?’ is posed. The 
desired output is a specification on which practical resource requirements can be 
based and against which the effectiveness of any output can be measured.
The remainder of the chapter is dedicated to the development of tools for incident 
response in the form of a risk assessment model, which is based on the source- 
pathway-receptor model described in Chapter 2.3, and a series of checklists to 
facilitate the public health decision-making process.
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4.1 Incident Timelines
All chemical incidents are different in terms of complexity and the hazard they 
present to the health of the public and the environment. Nevertheless a number of 
common features can be identified including how and when incidents present, the 
agencies involved and how incidents evolve. In developing resources for public 
health response to chemical incidents, it is important therefore to recognise that the 
management process can be broken down into a number of stages or phases and that 
the public health role and level of involvement will not be the same throughout each 
phase.
In this section the concept of incident timelines to illustrate and describe how 
incidents evolve and are currently managed is presented. This is a further 
development of the ‘event evolution’ concept introduced in Chapter 2.3 and 
presented in Figure 2.5. Shortcomings of the ‘linear’ incident timeline are addressed 
leading to an alternative cyclical model that integrates a post-incident review and 
feedback mechanism into the management process.
By looking at past incidents reported to the Chemical Incident Response Service 
(CIRS) key stages of the incident management process have been identified. In 
addition the opportunity to manage a number of incidents throughout the four-year 
duration of the research project has resulted in a much clearer understanding of 
incident genesis and evolution.
One way to illustrate the key phases of the incident management process is using a 
timeline. Figure 4.1 highlights the three main phases along the incident timeline, 
which are similar to those proposed by Goodfellow (2001): Acute, and
Post Incident, the main difference being that there is no set time period associated 
with each phase. The stages represented on the ‘event evolution’ graph in Figure 2.5 
-  event start and event recognition - have also been indicated. The terms used in 
Figure 4.1 are defined in Table 4.1.
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Table 4.1: Definitions of terms used in Figure 4.1
Term Definition
Event start The point in time that the event that resulted in the contamination problem occurred.
Recognition The point in time that the contamination problem was first recognised. Figure 4.1 
indicates that there could be a time delay between the ‘Event start’ and the problem 
being recognised -  refer to Figure 2.5.
In acute chemical incidents, local residents will generally be the first to recognise a 
contamination problem if  it has occurred in a public or residential area, whereas the 
owner or an employee will be first to recognise an industrial accident such as a leak 
or spill in a factory. In chronic chemical incidents, recognition will either be via 
complaints o f adverse health effects from local residents or through routine 
testing/environmental monitoring.
Notification Incident notification will generally come from local residents or directly from the 
company in the event o f an industrial accident. It is the point in time that the 
regulatory agency or another organisation is notified o f the contamination problem. 
Pre-existing communication networks should ensure that all appropriate agencies are 
subsequently advised that an incident has occurred. There may be an interval between 
recognition and notification o f the event. An example is illustrated in the incident 
timeline presented in Appendix J, which is based on Case Study 5, Appendix A.
Initial
response
The initial response is the immediate action taken to control and manage the 
contamination problem. In an acute incident the primary aim o f the initial response is 
to contain the hazard and to minimise further exposure, either through evacuation or 
sheltering etc., o f local residents and sensitive populations acknowledged to be 
potentially at risk. This type o f response is generally only necessary when responding 
to an event where adverse health effects could result from acute exposure.
The initial response might involve communication with the media, in an acute 
incident to disseminate information to the local community and in a chronic incident 
to prevent adverse media attention whilst a potential problem is being investigated.
Investigation Once the ‘emergency’ has been dealt with the next stage is to investigate what has 
happened and collect evidence on which to base subsequent management decisions.
Clean up Action taken to manage and mitigate the problem.
Clean up could involve removal o f the contaminant source or the exposure pathway. 
Although receptor removal (evacuation) may be necessary in the acute phase to 
minimise exposure it is not a long-term solution since residents will want to return to 
their homes as quickly as possible.
Event close The point at which the incident has been declared over by all o f the agencies involved 
in the response, generally follows the ‘Clean up’ stage and precedes the ‘Post 
incident review’.
Post-incident
review
The opportunity for agencies involved to discuss what worked well and what could 
be done to improve future response.
The scale along the time axis on the incident timeline in Figure 4.1 has intentionally 
been left blank so that acute and chronic incidents can be characterised on the same 
scale since essentially the management phases are the same even if the urgency of 
response is different. Across the top of the timeline, the agencies most likely to be 
involved at each stage have been highlighted in blue boxes. The Emergency Services
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will usually take a lead role at the initial response stage in acute incidents while in 
chronic incidents the local authority will generally be the lead agency. In both acute 
and chronic incidents however if there is drinking water contamination or pollution 
of controlled waters either the Water Company or Environment Agency will 
generally be the lead agency. The exception to this is contamination of a private 
water supply where the local authority (as the regulator) will take the lead.
Along the timeline, the acute phase has been subdivided into three stages: 
recognition, notification and initial response. These stages are preceded by the ‘Event 
start’. Essentially the shorter the time interval between the start o f the event and the 
problem being recognised and notified, the more effective the initial response is 
likely to be. It will generally be easier to contain a chemical within a few hours of the 
event start than after a few months by which time the chemical could have migrated a 
considerable distance through the ground and caused widespread contamination. This 
reflects the model used by Thames Water to demonstrate the ‘Golden Hour’ concept, 
which was presented in Figure 2.5.
Public health practitioners are unlikely to be the first organisation notified in the 
event of an acute chemical incident. Indeed even though they have role to play in the 
acute phase of the management process by identifying the population at risk and 
advising on immediate action to protect the health of the public, such as the need to 
evacuate or shelter, public health may not be informed about the incident until the 
investigation stage. Therefore in general, the role of public health can be more 
clearly defined in the phase. The phase comprises two stages -
incident investigation and clean up. The purpose of the incident investigation stage is 
twofold, firstly to establish what has happened and secondly to collect evidence on 
which to base decisions about the most appropriate action to manage and mitigate the 
problem. This process could take between a few hours if the incident is 
‘insignificant’ or ‘minor’ (refer to Chapter 3 for definitions), or up to several years if 
for example investigating a disease cluster associated with an industrial process. Key 
responsibilities for public health practitioners are identifying the population that has 
actually or potentially been exposed and determining the most appropriate action to 
minimise the long-term health impact. Biological samples might also be requested.
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Information from the incident investigation is used as evidence on which to base 
decisions about the action required to return the area to a condition that is deemed 
acceptable or, in the case of land contamination incidents, ensure that it is ‘suitable 
for use’ (explained in Chapter 2.3). Results of any environmental samples taken will 
be used to determine the level of clean up required. From a public health perspective, 
practitioners need to be satisfied that appropriate action has been taken to minimise 
exposure, either by eliminating the source of contamination or removing the 
exposure pathway, such as advising not to drink contaminated drinking water or to 
eat vegetables grown in contaminated soil. In some cases, no clean up will be 
required although it may be necessary to initiate an environmental monitoring 
programme.
Public health practitioners will also use information from the incident investigation 
stage to determine if long-term follow up of exposed individuals is necessary.
The third phase of the incident management process illustrated on the timeline in 
Figure 4.1 is labelled as post-incident. For all ‘serious’ and perhaps a few 
‘moderate’ incidents (refer to Chapter 3 for definitions), once the incident has been 
declared over by all agencies involved in the response, referred to as ‘event close’, a 
post incident review or debrief will be carried out. This provides the opportunity for 
the agencies involved to discuss what worked well and what could be done to 
improve future response. These suggestions may or may not be incorporated in local 
plans and furthermore, recommendations are unlikely to be disseminated beyond the 
local area. An incident debrief is unlikely to take place following an ‘insignificant’ or 
‘minor’ incident, since the management o f such an event will probably be less 
complicated with fewer agencies involved in the response. Obviously there will be 
exceptions to this if  there are particular concerns that need to be examined.
4.1.1 Closing the Loop
The importance of analysing possible disaster scenarios in depth as a means of 
gaining a better understanding of the potential impact of an event is recognised by 
Jenkins (1999). Furthermore Heathcote (1996) advocates the dissemination of
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important recommendations from incident inquiries to prevent recurrence of the 
same event. It is as important to leam what worked well to establish ‘best practice’ as 
well as what went wrong. It is suggested that there is a need for a clear mechanism 
whereby mistakes can be brought to the attention of others (Heathcote, 1996) to 
ensure that lessons learned from past incidents are not lost when the incident report is 
consigned to the filing cabinet.
Lessons learned by looking at the response to previous emergencies and reviewing 
how past incidents have been managed can be used to gauge our scientific 
understanding of a particular set of circumstances as well as to assess the 
effectiveness of incident management procedures currently in place and to identify 
‘best practice’. Additional benefits of learning from actions taken in responding to 
past incidents include better understanding of incident genesis to improve early 
problem recognition, development of plans based on real events and not theoretical 
situations, a clearer definition of the public health function in the management of 
chemical incidents and also prevention of incidents occurring through enhanced 
awareness of potential hazards.
Yet in spite of the obvious benefits of looking at the response to previous 
emergencies, there is currently no formal procedure for writing up and reporting 
incidents and identifying lessons learned. Very few incident reports are published in 
journals, the main exception being those reported in in-house publications produced 
by the Regional Service Provider Units (RSPUs). For example, CIRS produces a 
quarterly newsletter, ‘The Chemical Incident Report’, which includes incident 
summaries as well as information to support the public health response to chemical 
incidents such as environmental legislation and tools for response (including the 
checklists discussed later in this chapter).
Consequently one of the flaws in the timeline concept presented in Figure 4.1 is that 
it is very linear and there is no provision to identify ‘best practice’ and suggest 
improvements to incorporate in future response procedures. One suggestion to 
promote a more proactive approach to chemical incident response and management 
is to ‘close the loop’ by introducing a feedback mechanism into the process so that
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best practice is identified and used to shape plans for managing events in the future. 
The proposed framework is illustrated in Figure 4.2.
Figure 4.2: Chemical incident management -  closing the loop
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4.2 W hat do Public Health Practitioners Want/Need?
An important step in the process of developing tools and resources to facilitate the 
public health response to chemical incidents was consultation with public health 
practitioners since professional acceptance and ‘ownership’ is key to the successful 
implementation of tools to assist in performing a job function. Two main sources of 
information were used. The first was the results of a questionnaire undertaken by 
ALPHA (Access to Learning for the Public Health Agenda) in July 2002, to assess 
the learning needs of Consultants in Communicable Disease Control (CsCDC). 
Additionally feedback from CIRS training days and obtained through working with
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public health practitioners over the four years of the project has generated a better 
understanding of public health requirements.
4.2.1 Conclusions From Questionnaire
Although a full survey was not undertaken as part of this research project, the results 
from a questionnaire sent to all 133 Consultants in Communicable Disease Control 
(CsCDC) in England, Wales and Northern Ireland in July 2002 provides useful 
evidence highlighting the key learning needs of those public health practitioners.
The aim of the questionnaire was to assess the learning needs of CsCDC in respect of 
the possible deliberate release of specifically biological agents. However, responses 
drew attention to gaps in knowledge about chemical, radiological and nuclear 
releases and 88% of respondents felt that training should address chemical, 
radiological and nuclear threats. Therefore it is likely that the responses are also 
indicative of the learning needs for responding to chemical incidents.
Overall, protecting the environment was identified as the top priority of those 
wanting more skills/knowledge. This demonstrates that public health practitioners 
are very aware of the negative consequences that environmental contamination can 
have on human health. It also supports the view that procedures for responding to 
chemical incidents should be integrated and that health and environmental impacts 
should be assessed and managed concurrently.
Of most interest was the response to the question that asked ‘how would you prefer 
to learn about the skills and knowledge identified as gaps?’ which revealed that there 
was a clear preference for practical scenarios and that discussions/lectures were least 
favoured. Taking past incidents and using these to create interactive exercises that 
can then be used as tools for training is a concept that has been adopted by the staff 
at CIRS. Feedback from CIRS training days where the exercises have been used 
confirms that using real examples to illustrate ‘best practice’ is beneficial and 
provides the opportunity to ask questions, develop ideas and learn from mistakes.
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When the CsCDC were asked ‘which of the following resources would be useful to 
support your learning?’ a small majority (83%) favoured an information web site, 
78% wanted nationally agreed guidance and 73% wanted a manual in electronic 
format. The advantage of having a single national source of electronic guidance is 
that it could be updated regularly was identified. The downside however is that 
information presented in this form might not be easily accessible in the field.
4.2.2 Summary of Public Health Requirements
Discussion with public health practitioners also identified a number of requirements:
• practical guidance is needed to facilitate public health response and decision­
making which should provide an indication of how to do things and not 
simply a list of what should be done
• a tool is needed to facilitate rapid decision making at an early stage following 
notification of a chemical incident, even if limited information is available. 
The purpose of the tool should be to:
o identify what action should be taken to minimise harm 
o recognise significant gaps in the information available, either in terms 
of quality or quantity 
o allow for refinement once more information becomes available
The need for tools and guidance to reflect the differences between acute and chronic 
chemical incidents was also raised and was perceived to be important in terms of 
resource availability as well as training. Guidance for responding to and managing 
acute chemical incidents was considered to be a priority; in contrast for land 
contamination incidents, chronic problems were considered to present the greatest 
knowledge gap from a public health perspective. As a result the remainder of this 
chapter will look at chemical incident procedures in general and land contamination 
incidents will be addressed separately in Chapter 5.
In the next section a methodology for developing a decision support tool to facilitate 
the public health response to a chemical incident is presented. Based on the
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requirements identified earlier in this chapter, the tool aims to include the 
components summarised in Box 4.1.
Box 4.1: Summary of requirements to support the public health risk assessment 
process for chemical incidents
•  A  r isk  a s se ssm e n t m ode l w h ich  co n s id e rs  b o th  the  h e a lth  an d  en v iro n m en ta l 
im p acts
•  A  lis t o f  ac tio n s  to  be  co n s id e red  a t each  p h ase  o f  th e  in c id en t m a n ag e m en t 
p ro ce ss
•  In fo rm a tio n  stru c tu red  and  se q u en c ed  so  it is ea sy  to  find  an d  use
•  In teg ra tio n  w ith  the  in c id en t ca te g o risa tio n  scale
•  T ra in in g  re so u rce s  w h ich  co m p rise  in c id en t sc en a rio s  an d  p rac tica l ex e rc ise s
4.3 Developing Resources for Incident Response
Essentially the key decision that public health practitioners need to make when 
responding to any chemical incident is whether there is a significant risk of harm to 
human and environmental health (although the latter has received little attention from 
public health practitioners until recently). This approach, introduced in Section 2.3, 
most typically reflects the requirements of Part IIA of the Environmental Protection 
Act for the management of contaminated land (Section 2.3), although additionally it 
provides a good starting point from which to develop a useable risk assessment tool 
for all chemical incidents. Therefore the aim of this risk assessment model is to assist 
in detennining the actual or potential impact of a chemical incident on the health of 
the public. There are essentially two possible incident management responses:
1.There is a significant or potentially significant health impact; therefore an 
appropriate action to contain and cleanup the chemical to minimise harm is required 
OR
2.There is no significant impact therefore no further action is required.
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It may be necessary to include a third ‘maybe’ option if limited or unsuitable 
evidence on which to base a decision is available. In this situation the precautionary 
principle should be adopted until sufficient information to carry out a complete risk 
assessment has been obtained.
The proposed methodology for developing the tool is outlined in the form of a flow 
diagram (Figure 4.3) and is based on the source-pathway-receptor linkage.
Figure 4.3: Methodology for developing public health risk assessment tool
Key parameters
Sources
Pathways 
Receptors: 
Human health factors 
Environmental factors
Further information required
Maybe
Significant 
possibility o f  significant 
\h a r m  being c a u se d ? /
Checklist/
questions
Action requiredYesInteractions
No further 
action required
No
One of the key steps in developing a risk assessment tool is to establish the minimum 
data set necessary to inform the decisions regarding what action should be taken, by 
whom and at what time. By identifying key criteria or parameters and the 
interactions between them, patterns in the nature and urgency of the response 
required to manage the problem effectively can be recognised. The essential 
information to apply this approach to a chemical incident risk assessment is 
summarised in Figure 4.4 and discussed in more detail below. Implementation o f the 
methodology outlined should result in an effective risk management strategy 
including the identification of sensitive human and environmental receptors and, if 
necessary, the development of procedure for further action such as a strategy for 
environmental sampling and long-term monitoring.
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The main elements of the methodology are discussed below.
Characterise site.
An initial assessment will involve the collection and assessment of existing 
information about the site and the surrounding area, for example maps, plans, 
photographs, geological and hydrogeological records and local records. For an acute 
incident, such as a fire or leak, the meteorological conditions can be useful in 
determining the population at risk.
Identify contaminant.
The actual chemical or chemicals involved in an incident may not be known 
immediately although the state of the chemical is usually known (i.e. whether solid, 
liquid or gaseous) and an estimate of the volume of chemical that has been released 
may be available. The latter is particularly important as for some chemicals only 
minimal quantities are required to cause an adverse health or environmental effect. If 
more than one chemical is involved a reaction may occur and generate by-products, 
which may be more or less harmful than the individual chemicals.
Goodfellow (2001) proposed a method whereby various properties or characteristics 
and sources of information can be used in identifying an unknown chemical. This 
was modified in August 2002 as part of the London-based CBRN project, described 
in Section 2.2 and in Appendix D, so that it could be used in identifying an unknown 
chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear agent. It is presented in Figure 4.5.
Release mechanisms.
How the chemical(s) was released will influence the options available for 
containment and management of the hazard. Mechanisms by which chemicals are 
released into the environment can be natural or anthropogenic and include fires, 
leaks, leaching, runoff and dust.
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Figure 4.5: Identifying an unknown chemical
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Identify affected environmental media.
Chemical incidents may result in direct or indirect contamination of one or more 
environmental medium. Water is subdivided into three categories: drinking water, 
groundwater and surface water and this is reflected in the differing exposure 
pathways associated with each (see ‘exposure pathways’ below). If environmental 
sampling has been undertaken and results are available, these should be compared to 
the most appropriate guidelines or standards available.
Care should be taken when using environmental standards. Before any standard or 
guideline is applied, it is vital that the original basis for its derivation is understood.
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Standards may not necessarily be health based, and are often determined for a 
number of alternative reasons, for example:
• broader environmental reasons and the protection of ecosystems e.g. 
prevention of crop damage, or acidification;
• aesthetic considerations e.g. limiting iron in water to prevent staining of 
laundry and sanitary ware;
• operational reasons e.g. use of aluminium in the treatment of drinking water; 
or technical reasons e.g. using the lowest possible limit of detection for 
current analytical methods
(Eagles et al, 2002).
Identify receptors.
This includes all potential ‘endpoints’ for the contamination for example humans, 
animals, buildings, plants, ecosystems and water. For the purposes of this research 
project, only human and environmental receptors will be considered. Impacts on 
human and environmental receptors can be measured using the chemical incident 
impact scale (CHS) presented in Chapter 3, in particular Tables 3.7 and 3.8.
Identify exposure pathways.
This should be regarded as the most important stage in the risk assessment process, 
as accurately establishing the existence of pathways can confirm or disprove the 
likelihood of exposure and subsequently the adverse impact on human and 
environmental health. The effects of exposure can then be considered and compared 
to any reports of adverse health effects in the local population. It may be necessary to 
confirm the existence of possible exposure pathways by undertaking environmental 
sampling. Exposure pathways may be direct, for example inhalation of smoke from a 
fire or ingestion of contaminated drinking water, or indirect such as the ingestion of 
vegetables grown in contaminated soil.
Once all of the information has been collected it should be possible to identify 
sources of contamination, human and environmental receptors and any actual or 
potential exposure pathways. If an exposure-effect relationship is established or 
considered to be likely, it may be necessary to develop a procedure for further action.
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This might involve further environmental and/or biological sampling. The results of 
this will influence the decision on the most appropriate clean up to minimise 
exposure and finally determine what follow-up or long-term monitoring is required.
To aid in the collection of the information summarised above, a series of interactive 
checklists is proposed.
4.4 Checklists
Checklists are regarded as a form of ‘job aid’, tools to support work and activity and 
direct, guide and enlighten performance (Kanse, 1997; Embrey & Richardson, 1998). 
They are particularly useful when performance is infrequent, the situation is 
complex, the consequences of error are high and there are not sufficient resources to 
support training (Kanse, 1997). All of these are valid when describing the role and 
experience of public health practitioners in chemical incident management.
Prior to deciding which questions to include in the checklist to yield the required 
information, a review of the checklists currently available and used by CIRS for 
managing incidents was undertaken. These include a checklist for water incidents 
presented as part of a research project completed at CIRS last year (Goodfellow, 
2001) and a generic checklist for all acute incidents as well as a number of event- 
specific checklists, for example for flooding and non-domestic fires. The majority of 
these have been published in the Chemical Incident Report. A guide to resources 
available from CIRS for chemical incident response, including all of the checklists 
was presented in the April 2002 issue (Harrison, 2002).
Besides detailed analysis of the checklist content, the review of checklists involved 
discussion with public health practitioners, some of whom were familiar with the 
checklists and had used them in chemical incident response and others who had less 
experience. This review included consultation with individual practitioners as well as 
more structured group discussions. In general the checklists were considered to 
provide a useful aide memoir for managing a chemical incident although a number of 
issues were raised, including:
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• duplication of questions between checklists;
• event specific questions on the acute incident checklist may not always be 
relevant;
• inconsistency in layout;
• too many checklists are confusing and represent a barrier to some users;
• density of information makes it difficult to work through quickly;
• need provision to record completed items during an incident;
• limited training in the use and applicability of the checklists.
It seemed sensible therefore to address these issues when developing a new checklist 
to support the proposed risk assessment methodology. The checklist should be easy 
to use and the information presented logically. In addition, suggested actions should 
reflect the perceived seriousness of the incident, which could be determined using the 
Chemical Incident Impact Scale (CHS). It might be inappropriate however to carry 
out a full-scale risk assessment for a ‘minor’ incident in terms of time and resource 
limitations yet it would perhaps be necessary for a moderate ‘incident’. Nevertheless, 
always using the same basic process should improve familiarity and understanding of 
the proposed risk assessment methodology and subsequently afford a more effective 
response.
4.4.1 Basic Acute Incident Checklist
Initially the common features or actions to be considered at the initial response phase 
for all incidents, regardless of the cause or type of event, were identified and are 
listed in Box 4.2. Further similarities between the individual event checklists were 
then identified and combined with the criteria listed in Box 4.1 to create a basic 
checklist for all acute chemical incidents (Appendix K).
The structure of the checklist is intended to reflect the risk assessment process 
thereby providing a clear and consistent approach to incident management. A further 
inclusion in the basic acute checklist is an assessment of the seriousness of the 
incident based on the CHS, with grade/category specific actions where appropriate.
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Box 4.2: Initial response questions for all incidents
• Identify contaminant(s)
• Ensure chemical contained & fire/explosion hazard mitigated
• Identify major pathways between contaminants & receptors
• Undertake assessment of impact on health of the public
• Restrict access to contaminated area
• Ensure all appropriate organisations are aware of incident
4.4.2 Event-specific Checklists
In addition to the basic checklist, a number of supplementary event-specific 
checklists with a uniform layout have been created and are presented in Appendix K. 
More detail about the land incident specific checklists is presented in Chapter 5.
Although it is generally straightforward and apparent to decide which of the 
supplementary checklists to use when responding to a particular incident a user 
guide, comprising a series of questions to ascertain the nature of the problem, has 
been developed to assist in identifying the most appropriate event specific 
checklist(s). This is presented in Appendix K. Public health practitioners based at 
CIRS have tested the decision tree and feedback suggests that although it is very 
‘busy’, the process is logical and can be used to quickly identify which checklist to 
refer to.
One of the main features of the event-specific checklists is the separation of general 
management activities from the more specific actions to protect the health of the 
public. There were a number of reasons for doing this. Firstly, it is necessary to 
ensure that public health decisions are based on complete information. As 
highlighted previously in this chapter, public health will not be directly involved in 
certain activities yet may need information from other agencies to carry out a 
detailed risk assessment. The checklists therefore provide a prompt to aid the 
collection of this additional information. Finally the checklists can be used to record 
progress and information about a particular event thus providing a suitable tool for 
incident reporting and feedback.
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The checklists presented are not intended to provide a comprehensive set of 
resources but suggest a template on which further checklists, or other tools, can be 
based. The use of a standard layout, including font, use of bullets and numbering etc, 
increases familiarity and hence will mean that the tools are easier to use particularly 
if  opportunities for training are limited.
Development of the checklists has been a dynamic and iterative process over the 
four-year period of the research project. There has been no formal assessment period 
or rigid framework against which to test the effectiveness of the tools although 
evaluation of the content and layout has been undertaken at regular intervals, through 
use in training exercises (see below) based on incident scenarios in addition to ‘real’ 
events. Checklists have subsequently been updated as necessary to reflect current 
‘best practice’ as well as a result of feedback from the public health practitioners 
actually using them.
4.5 Training Resources
Training is essential in ensuring that public health practitioners and other key 
agencies involved in incident response are familiar with response procedures and are 
not accessing plans and resources for the first time during an actual incident. To 
substantiate this, research undertaken by Goodfellow et al (2001) demonstrated the 
benefit of previous training in chemical incident management in improving response 
performance. As a result it is suggested that training should be an integral part of the 
incident management process.
Earlier in this chapter it was highlighted that public health practitioners expressed a 
clear preference for practical scenarios and exercises to test current knowledge and to 
learn new skills. There are four basic types of exercise (Home Office, 1998) listed in 
Table 4.2 the most commonly applied of which are seminar and tabletop exercises. 
Therefore to assist with training in the use of the checklists, a mixture of seminar and 
tabletop exercises resources have been developed and used at CIRS training days, 
which are run at approximately monthly intervals throughout the year.
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Table 4.2: Types of exercise
Seminar
exercises
• workshops or discussion based exercises
• low cost activities that inform participants about the organisation and procedures 
that that would be invoked to respond to an incident
• emphasis on problem identification and solution rather than decision making
Tabletop
exercises
• cost effective and efficient way to test plans, procedures and people
Control
post
exercises
• team leaders and communication teams positioned at control rooms they would use 
during an incident
• aim is to test communication arrangements and information flows
Live
exercises
•  scale is very variable
• provide best means of confirming the satisfactory operation of emergency 
communications
Examples of the training resources produced as part of this research project are 
presented in Appendix L. These comprise one long exercise based on an acute 
chemical incident involving fuel and several short ‘buzby box’ exercises based on 
past events and fictional problems. All exercises have been run at CIRS training days 
in part to test the practical application of the checklists but also to test plans and 
procedures and for teaching purposes to illustrate ‘best practice’.
CIRS training days range in topic from ‘How to Respond’ days, which provide junior 
public health staff on the on-call rota with a basic understanding of chemical incident 
response, to more specialist events including ‘Environmental Management’, 
‘Transport Incidents’ and ‘Environmental Epidemiology’. In addition, an annual 
‘Land Contamination Incidents’ training day has been designed and co-ordinated by 
the Research Engineer. This event has been held annually since 1999 and aims to 
provide delegates with the tools and information required to facilitate a prepared and 
timely response to land contamination incidents. The training days have consisted of 
a series of presentations provided by CIRS staff and external speakers, interactive 
discussions and group exercises, which encouraged the use of the checklists and 
requested feedback on their usefulness as tools to support the public health response 
to land contamination incidents. Reaction to the checklists from delegates, which 
have included CsCDC, Specialist Registrars in Public Health, Infection Control 
Nurses, Local Authority Environmental Health Practitioners, has been extremely 
positive and the subsequent inclusion in a number of public health on-call packs
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endorses their value as tools to support and facilitate the public health response to 
chemical incidents.
4.6 Conclusions
The aim of this chapter was to propose a methodology to support the public health 
decision-making process in chemical incident response and management. This has 
resulted in the development of a methodology for public health risk assessment, 
which considers both the health and environmental impacts of the incident and a list 
of actions to be considered at each phase of the incident management process, which 
are presented in the form of a basic checklist for acute chemical incidents and 
supplementary event-specific checklists. The layout of the checklists has been 
designed to ensure that information is easy to find and use. Colleagues working in 
public health and emergency planning have reviewed the checklists presented in this 
chapter and in addition they have been tested at CIRS training days. Feedback has 
confirmed the effectiveness of the checklists as tools to support public health 
practitioners in responding to chemical incidents and to facilitate the decision­
making process to determine whether an incident presents a significant risk to human 
and environmental health.
The basic checklist includes an assessment of the seriousness of the incident in terms 
of the potential impact on human and environmental health based on the CHS 
presented in Chapter 3. Where appropriate, suggested actions to protect the health of 
the public reflect the incident grade/category, which could be beneficial in terms of 
resource allocation for example. The supplementary checklists contain event-specific 
information to guide actions to protect the health of the public and to aid the 
collection of data needed to undertake a more detailed risk assessment.
The checklists have an additional use as a reporting tool to improve feedback of 
lessons learned and to shape future response plans. They are intended to be dynamic 
tools that should be modified and updated to reflect current best practice and the 
preferences of the public health practitioners who use them.
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Now that the basic incident management framework and chemical incident risk 
assessment methodology have been developed, the approach is available for other 
agencies involved in incident response, including local authority environmental 
health practitioners and the emergency services to use and refine further to suit their 
respective needs. The advantages of all agencies using the same basic framework 
include improved communication, minimised use of agency-specific jargon, better 
understanding of roles and responsibilities and ultimately a more coherent and 
effective response.
4-23
5. TOOLS FOR LAND CONTAMINATION INCIDENTS
Land contamination incidents present an interesting challenge for public health 
practitioners compared to a fire or an explosion since the potential impact on the 
health of the public may not be immediately apparent. Indeed it may take some time 
to recognise that land is contaminated and that there is an exposure pathway between 
the source of contamination and human receptors. As with all chemical incidents, 
every land contamination problem is different and each one should be dealt with on a 
case-by-case basis. Nevertheless there are number of steps and management 
activities that tend to be common to all incidents and one of the major aims of this 
research project has been to consider whether incident management and response 
could be improved by a standardised approach.
The first part of this chapter summarises the results of a review of all land 
contamination incidents reported to the Chemical Incident Response Service (CIRS) 
between February 1996 and October 2001. Subsequently a categorisation system 
based on observed patterns in how land incidents present and evolve is proposed and 
tools for response developed.
5.1 Review of Land Chemical Incidents
Important issues that need to be considered when managing land contamination 
incidents can only really be identified though experience and by looking at past 
incidents. Hence a review of all land incidents reported to CIRS over a five-year 
period was undertaken. In particular the review aimed to find out whether:
• patterns exist in the way incidents present, evolve and can subsequently be 
managed
• the majority of land contamination incidents can be grouped into a limited 
number of categories
• patterns identified can be used to develop general guidance for the 
management of land contamination incidents in each category.
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A search on the CIRS database indicated that there were 279 land contamination 
incidents reported to CIRS between February 1996 and September 2001. A number 
of these were operating landfill sites where there had been complaints about odour, 
which, for the purpose of this investigation, was considered to have little to do with 
soil. Therefore it was decided not to include ‘waste’ incidents for the following 
reasons. Landfilling involves intentional contamination of land and this project has 
been concerned with acute or chronic land contamination incidents (such as historic 
sites where the consequences of spilling chemicals onto the land were not fully 
understood at the time and accidental releases). From a legislative viewpoint ‘new’ 
landfills are managed very differently to land contamination.
It was realised prior to data collection that the amount of information collected and 
available for each incident would differ because the level of CIRS and public health 
involvement varied (refer to Chapter 2.3). However since there are typically around 
1000 incidents of all types reported to CIRS each year it was considered that there 
should be sufficient information available to collect a reasonable sample size to 
enable useful statistical analysis. Also the CIRS chemical incident database 
represents the largest dataset that has been collated by any single organisation in the 
UK, other than the National Focus (described in Chapter 1). The usefulness of the 
surveillance data collated by the National Focus is quite limited however because the 
Regional Service Provider Units (RSPUs) report incidents differently. So whilst there 
are inconsistencies in the CIRS database due to the fact that people have reported 
incidents disparately, these differences would be more pronounced should one 
attempt to collate chemical incident data from all RSPUs.
To aid collection of information, a structured evaluation form to enable the analysis 
and classification of incidents was designed and used; a copy is included in 
Appendix G. The evaluation form contains 28 questions, of which 26 are closed 
questions, and aims to collect quite general information, including how the was 
problem identified (presentation), the incident type (acute/chronic) and known 
contaminants. A pilot study on ten past incidents was also carried out to refine the 
evaluation form before use.
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The data was coded and entered in SPSS, a powerful computer software package for 
statistical analysis. It was necessary to have a ‘no response’ option as some of the 
incident information was missing from the files or had not been recorded. Of the 279 
land contamination incidents recorded, 217 were identified as being actual land 
incidents. The remaining 62 incidents were either operating landfill sites or had been 
wrongly categorised. Of these 217 incidents, 16 were duplicate incidents and 16 were 
missing from the files thereby making the total number of incidents analysed 185. 
Suggested reasons for why incidents may be missing from the files includes misfiling 
(there are over 10,000 incident reports filed chronologically hence there is a high 
probability that one or more file might have been removed and replaced to the wrong 
location) or that the incident had been removed as part of a detailed study and not 
replaced at all.
For the remainder of incidents (185), the ‘completeness of information’ on which the 
investigation is based was assessed. Incident reports were categorised as:
Good • detailed or very detailed information
• able to build up clear picture of incident
• incident report in file (either CIRS site visit report or site 
investigation report)
• able to respond to most (if not all) questions in questionnaire
Average • some information / limited information
• able to develop reasonable understanding of incident
• able to answer at least half of questions in questionnaire
Poor • little or no information on incident form
• only able to answer a few questions in questionnaire
Overall 68% of the 185 incident reports were classified as ‘average’ or ‘good’. This
provides therefore a reasonable data set from which conclusions about land
contamination incidents in general can be drawn. The categorisation scheme, which 
enabled judgement of the completeness of the information available, might be 
regarded as somewhat subjective. Yet it was considered necessary to provide a
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distinction between incidents for which there was little or no information available 
(other than, for example, the chemical involved) and incidents for which a full, 
detailed site investigation report was available.
The data revealed that land contamination incidents have been discovered most 
frequently through ‘complaints’ and acute events (leaks, spills etc.) but that historic 
land is the most frequent cause of the problem (Figure 5.1).
Figure 5.1: The cause of the problem
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Interestingly leaks and spills do not appear to have been a problem until 1998, 
although this is more likely to be due to changes in reporting and categorising 
incidents than anything more sinister. The results also indicated that land 
contamination incidents present in a number of areas of different current land use 
(Figure 5.2) although residential housing accounted for more than a third.
Data was also collected about the different agencies involved in managing land 
contamination incidents. The agency that most frequently informed public health of a 
land contamination incident was the local authority environmental health department 
(43%). In 35% of the incidents reported the environmental health department was the 
lead agency although this information was only available for 46% of incidents. A 
number of different groups and organisations were involved in the management of 
the incidents including Water Companies, the Environment Agency, emergency
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services and the Health and Safety Executive (HSE) as well as local action groups 
and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) (Figure 5.3). The management of the 
majority of incidents (69%) involved more than one agency with the mean being 
2.45.
Figure 5.2: Location o f land contamination incidents -  current land use
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Figure 5.3: Agencies involved in the management of land contamination incidents
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When considering the duration of the problem, it was observed that of those that had 
existed for less than 6 months, 89% involved organic chemicals compared to 60% of
•y
the incidents that had been ongoing for 24 months or more (chi“=11.92, p=0.003).
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However, o f  those incidents that had been ongoing for 24 months or more, 61% 
involved heavy metals compared to 10% o f  the incidents that were concluded within 
6 months (chi2 35.32, p=0.000) (Figures 5.4 and 5.5).
Figure 5.4: Organic chemicals and 
duration o f  incident
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Figure 5.5: Heavy metals and 
duration o f  incident
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A lso the absence o f  data in the ‘between 6 months and 24 months’ category further 
substantiates the proposal in Chapter 2 that land contamination either results from 
acute events/accidents or is a chronic (historic) problem and that incidents are either 
acute OR chronic.
Furthermore the chemicals involved in each o f  the two incident categories tend to be 
different. For example, 97% o f  leaks and 96% o f  spills involved organic chemicals 
compared to 54% o f  historic land problems (chi2 33.42, p=0.000). In contrast, 86% 
o f  historic land problems involved heavy metals compared to 3% and 6% for leaks 
and spills respectively (chi2 49.12, p=0.000).
These observations confirm that it is possible to divide land incidents into two 
categories - acute and chronic - that have similar characteristics and this information 
can be used to characterise land contamination incidents more effectively. This 
distinction was first introduced in Chapter 2.3. On the basis o f  this classification
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approach the data was recoded and indicates that 33% of incidents could be 
categorised as acute and 67% as chronic.
43% of land contamination incidents involve two or more different chemicals (mean 
= 2.5) and Figure 5.6 indicates the ‘top ten’ chemicals most frequently concerned. 
There were no significant changes in the top ten from one year to the next over the 
period of the study.
Figure 5.6: Top ten chemicals most frequently involved in land contamination 
incidents
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Figure 5.7 highlights the chemicals most frequently involved in acute land 
contamination incidents (only seven) and Figure 5.8 the top ten chemicals most 
frequently involved in chronic land contamination incidents.
Figure 5.7: Chemicals involved in acute land contamination incidents
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Figure 5.8: Top ten chemicals involved in chronic land contamination incidents
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Results substantiate the distinction that acute land contamination incidents usually 
involve organic chemicals whereas heavy metals are most frequently encountered in 
chronic land contamination incidents.
It is interesting to note that this list of the top ten chemicals involved in land 
contamination incidents reported to CIRS is not dissimilar to the top ten chemicals in 
the CERCLA (Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and 
Liability Act) priority list published every two years by the Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) in the United States (ATSDR, 2001) -  Table 5.1. The CERCLA 
priority list is not a list of "most toxic" substances, but rather a prioritisation of 
substances based on a combination of their frequency of release, toxicity, and 
potential for human exposure at facilities on the national priority list (NPL). The 
objective of this priority list is to rank substances across all hazardous waste sites to 
provide guidance in selecting the substances for which toxicological profiles will be 
prepared by ATSDR. Those chemicals found at three or more NPL sites were 
considered for the CERCLA priority list, which amounted to 840 hazardous 
substances (ATSDR, 2001). The notable omission from the list is substances of 
petroleum origin, which do not appear because they are regulated by legislation other 
than CERCLA.
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The similarity between the two lists is unsurprising since the majority of land 
contamination incidents reported to CIRS are chronic problems as are those sites on 
the NPL in the US. Similar industrial processes and substances are used in both the 
UK and US and indeed throughout the developed world. Therefore this suggests that 
the top ten list of priority substances and their relative ranking are likely to be 
applicable across the majority of industrialised countries although this would need to 
be confirmed through further research.
Table 5.1: CERCLA Top Ten Priority List
Order Substance Name
1 Lead
2 Trichloroethylene
3 Arsenic
4 T etrachloroethylene
5 Cadmium
6 Benzene
7 Chromium
8 Volatile Organic Compounds (VOCs)
9 Polychlorinated Biphenyls (PCBs
10 Mercury
5.2 Land Incident Categories and Tools for Response
The benefits of categorising incidents have been discussed in some detail in Chapter 
3 and a scale for communicating the potential impact of a chemical incident on the 
health of the public developed. However this scale is primarily for acute incidents 
and is not really appropriate for categorising land contamination incidents, 
particularly chronic problems. As a result a separate system to identify and manage 
these incidents from a public health perspective is required. Effectively categorising 
land incidents will enable the most appropriate tools for responding to be quickly 
identified. Additionally, if  used to record information about an incident, a limited 
number of incident categories will reduce variability in incident reporting thus 
improving efficiency of information retrieval.
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It was suggested in Chapter 2.2.3 that land contamination incidents can be divided 
into two quite distinct categories - acute and chronic - based on incident duration and 
cause of contamination - and this observation has been confirmed in the previous 
section. Definitions for acute and chronic incidents have also been proposed 
(Chapter 2). By considering the data collected on the evaluation form a number of 
subcategories of land contamination incidents, or ‘incident types’, that share 
common features can be established. These are summarised in Table 5.2 and 
discussed in Sections 5.1.1 and 5.1.2 below.
Using the land incident data from 1999 presented in Chapter 2.2, the incidents listed 
in Table 2.5 have been re-classified using the proposed definitions. The suitability of 
the proposed classification system is confirmed since 96% of incidents can be 
categorised (Figure 5.9) with only 4% described as ‘other’.
Figure 5.9: Land incidents reported in 1999 classified using proposed categories
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5.2.1 Acute incident categories
For acute incidents two subcategories have been suggested - direct contamination 
such as a leak or spill and indirect or secondary contamination. These reflect the 
cause of the problem or the event since this information is rapidly available in the 
early stages following incident notification (Chapter 4.1). Direct contamination of 
land is likely to involve a single chemical rather a mixture of chemicals. The main 
exception to this is a leak of effluent or from a drum of mixed chemical waste. The 
substance may be leachable or non-leachable, which will affect behaviour in the 
subsurface (Chapter 6). If the problem is recognised and notified quickly, the 
chemical can be contained to minimise further contamination. Organic substances 
including petrol, diesel kerosene and solvents are the chemicals most frequently 
involved.
Indirect contamination accounts for a small proportion (~5%) of land contamination 
incidents reported to CIRS and may be via air or water. For example particles, 
including asbestos fibres, and dust from fires, may be deposited onto land, and 
firewater runoff and floodwater may also give rise to land contamination problems.
Casualties are more likely to present themselves in an acute land contamination 
incident because of concerns about adverse health effects resulting from an acute 
exposure. Therefore it is imperative that procedures are in place to enable a rapid 
assessment of the potential health impact, to communicate the risk and to ensure that 
appropriate resources are available to manage the problem. The chemical incident 
impact scale (CHS) proposed in Chapter 3 would be a suitable tool to use for this. 
The acute chemical incident checklist developed in Chapter 4 and presented in 
Appendix K is also considered appropriate to use in responding to acute land 
contamination incidents since the majority of these have been shown to result from 
leaks or spills (acute chemical incidents). Also this limits the number of event- 
specific checklists, minimising both duplication of information and confusion over 
which tools to use. The main exception is acute chemical incidents involving fuel 
since they present an interesting problem in terms of the potential human and 
environmental health impact. As a result a detailed study of fuel incidents has been
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undertaken as part of this research project and is presented in the following chapter 
(Chapter 6).
5.2.2 Chronic incident categories
In contrast to acute incidents, the chronic incident subcategories reflect how the 
problem was discovered since it is unlikely that the event that caused the 
contamination would be easily identifiable. Four subcategories are proposed: Part 
IIA investigation, planning investigation, routine testing and accidental discovery. 
Waste disposal has also been included as a subcategory of chronic incidents.
Part IIA investigation is used to describe investigation undertaken to identify 
whether land is ‘contaminated land’ in accordance with the definition proposed in the 
Environment Act 1995 and quoted in Chapter 2.3. These incidents account for a 
relatively small number of problems reported to CIRS since many of the local 
authority strategies to identify contaminated land have yet to be implemented 
(Chapter 2.3). However, it is anticipated that the number of incidents in this category 
will increase significantly as more sites are identified as contaminated land.
Planning investigation is used to describe contamination identified during a site 
investigation prior to redevelopment. Very detailed information may be available 
about the site history, including historic maps to locate potential hotspots since 
contamination may be widespread across the site. There may also be details about the 
site hydrogeology so that movement of water and hence chemicals in the soil can be 
more accurately predicted.
25% of the chronic land contamination incidents reported to CIRS were categorised 
as accidental discovery (Figure 5.9), which describes land contamination incidents 
that are identified either through a complaint about adverse health effects and which 
is subsequently traced back to exposure to contaminated soil or to problems 
identified during construction (see Case Study 2, Appendix A).
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In order to confirm the suitability of a site for its current use routine testing is often 
undertaken. The best example is allotment soil. Allotments are a particular concern if 
soil is contaminated with heavy metals because of the potential for plant uptake (see 
Case Study 3, Appendix A). The review of incidents reported to CIRS revealed that 
80% of land contamination on allotment sites had resulted from historic 
contamination, suggesting inadequate sampling at the time when the land was 
designated for that use.
With all chronic land contamination problems there is usually more than one 
chemical involved and these are most commonly inorganic substances, particularly 
heavy metals such as mercury and lead. When organic chemicals are present, they 
may have been broken down by microbial action over time thereby giving rise to 
secondary rather than primary contamination. In these situations, if the land is 
disturbed either during sampling or redevelopment, an acute exposure can result. It is 
therefore necessary to ensure that tools for responding to chronic land contamination 
incidents are flexible enough to recognise the urgency of the response required in 
such situations.
The acute checklist developed in Chapter 4, which is appropriate for use in 
responding to acute land contamination incidents, is not applicable for chronic 
problems. The main reason being that the emphasis is on the initial response to 
contain the hazard and minimise exposure rather than incident investigation, which 
was highlighted as the key factor in successful chronic incident management 
(Chapter 2.2). As a result, tools specifically for managing chronic land 
contamination incidents are required.
5.2.2.1 Model and checklist for chronic land contamination
The incident timeline presented in Figure 4.1, Chapter 4 can be used to describe how 
both acute and chronic land contamination incidents evolve. However, for chronic 
problems, the incident management process is focused on three main stages - initial 
response, incident investigation and clean up. These have been illustrated in Figure 
5.10 and the key points summarised below.
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Figure 5.10: Incident management model for chronic land contamination incidents
STAGE 2b: 
Detailed 
investigation
STAGE 1: 
Initial response
STAGE 3: 
Clean up
STAGE 2a: 
Incident 
investigation
•  site assessment 
undertaken
•  basic conceptual 
site model 
developed
• site visit 
considered
• extensive sampling 
programme 
instigated
•  detailed conceptual 
site model produced
•  health questionnaire 
developed
• media involvement 
possible
• usually involves 
the local authority
• primary aim to 
determine source- 
pathway-receptor
• action taken to 
protect public 
health
• most appropriate 
option for 
removal of 
contamination 
selected and 
applied
• long term 
monitoring o f site 
considered
• epidemiological 
investigation 
considered
Stage 1: Initial response
The initial response, which usually involves the local authority, has the primary aim 
of determining the source of contamination, identifying any sensitive receptors that 
have potentially been or are likely to be exposed and ultimately ascertaining whether 
a pathway exists between the two. Action may be required to protect the health of the 
public, for example minimising exposure through hand-washing etc, and ensuring 
that any food produce that has been grown in potentially contaminated soil has been 
washed thoroughly prior to consumption.
Stage 2: Incident Investigation
The incident investigation stage involves undertaking a site assessment and 
confirming exposure pathways so that appropriate actions can be taken to minimise 
harm to sensitive receptors. A conceptual site model may be developed based on the 
preliminary site assessment, maps and knowledge of the local area (type of soil, 
topography, underground utility pipes etc.). Following the results of the preliminary 
investigation a more detailed site assessment may then be required which could 
involve extensive environmental sampling and a site visit. This work may attract 
attention from local media and therefore it is imperative to have a well-prepared 
communication strategy. From a public health perspective, it may be necessary to
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develop a health questionnaire to circulate to those residents that have been 
potentially exposed and to ensure that appropriate advice and information is made 
available.
Stage 3: Clean up
A review of options available for removal of the contaminant from the site or to 
block the exposure pathways is undertaken to determine the most appropriate action 
required to make the site ‘suitable for use’. There is unlikely to be extensive public 
health involvement in the decision making process at this stage although advice on 
long-term monitoring and following up of individuals that have been exposed may be 
required.
The chronic land incident model presented in Figure 5.10 has been used as the basic 
framework for planning and developing a checklist for responding to chronic land 
incidents. The chronic land checklist is presented in Appendix K and additionally 
two ‘event specific’ checklists for land contamination problems have been developed 
for allotments and construction sites (or sites being redeveloped). These problems 
have been selected since they require collaboration with the Food Standards Agency 
(FSA) and the Health and Safety Executive (HSE) respectively as well as the 
collection of extra information on which to base the risk assessment and subsequent 
management decisions. For allotments this includes the type of food grown in the 
soil, how much produce is consumed and by whom and for construction sites 
information about the use of personal protective equipment (PPE) is needed to assess 
exposure.
In order that the layout of the chronic land contamination incident checklist is 
consistent with the checklist for acute chemical incident response, general 
management actions are separated from specific actions to protect the health of the 
public, which should encourage wider use of the tools since uniformity in content 
and presentation will enhance familiarity and accessibility.
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As with the acute chemical incident checklist, the chronic land contamination 
incident checklist is not meant to provide an exhaustive list of actions but be a 
practical and pragmatically applied tool to guide the public health response and to 
help ensure complete, appropriate investigation and successful management and 
through these means to represent current ‘best practice’. Again it serves as an aide 
memoir of the major actions needed at each stage of the incident management 
process but can also be used to record progress and information about a particular 
event with the check boxes indicating when an action has been completed.
5.3 Conclusions
Since the relationship between humans and soil is less direct than with air or water 
i.e. we are far less likely to ingest or inhale soil, the link between exposure to 
contaminated soil and adverse human health effects is never easy to establish. As a 
result, land contamination incidents present an interesting challenge for public health 
professionals particularly since experience in managing these problems is usually 
limited.
In order to develop tools and resources to support the public health response to land 
incidents, patterns in the way incidents present and evolve have been established. 
Firstly, it has been demonstrated that land incidents can be divided into two quite 
distinct categories - acute and chronic - based on incident duration and cause of 
contamination. Each of these principle categories has then been divided into a 
number of subcategories or ‘incident types’. For acute incidents the incident types 
are based on the event that resulted in contamination, for example a leak or spill. In 
contrast the chronic incident type categories reflect the way in which the problem 
was discovered. For each incident type, principal features and typical contaminant 
species have been identified.
It was considered appropriate to use the acute chemical incident checklist presented 
in Chapter 4 for managing acute land incidents with the exception of those involving 
fuel. However, it is not applicable for chronic problems since the main emphasis is 
not on incidents investigation, which was highlighted as the key factor in successful
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chronic incident management (Chapter 2.2) but on the initial response to contain the 
hazard and minimise exposure. As a result, tools specifically for managing chronic 
land contamination incidents have been developed. This includes a generic model to 
illustrate the key stages in chronic land contamination incident response, which has 
provided the basis for the development of a checklist to guide and support the public 
health response to this category of land incident. Additionally two event specific 
checklists for allotments and construction sites have been developed. The former has 
been published in the Chemical Incident Report (October 2002) and feedback 
requested.
Although these resources have been developed with public health practitioners in 
mind, it is anticipated that they would be useful to all agencies, in particular local 
authority environmental health and planning departments, who are involved in 
investigating and managing chronic land contamination problems.
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6. ACUTE INCIDENTS INVOLVING FUEL
The retrospective review of past incidents reported to CIRS revealed that around one 
third of land contamination incidents are acute incidents, and of these over 70% 
involved fuel oils1 or chemicals that that are used fuel additives, including petrol, 
diesel, kerosene and heating oil.
Fuel leaks and spills at petrol stations are relatively common, which is consistent 
with the large number of fuel storage sites in the UK. The latest Institute of 
Petroleum retail marketing survey identified 13,065 petrol stations across the country 
(Skrebowski, 2001). Other fuel storage sites and depots include Ministry of Defence 
sites and pipelines and heating oil storage tanks on housing estates or individual 
properties. In addition fuel oil is transported around the country primarily in tankers 
and through a network of underground pipes. This highlights the potential for acute 
chemical incidents involving leaks and spills of fuel (Harris, 1994).
Fuel that is spilt onto an impermeable surface either outside or indoors may not pose 
a significant risk to health since it can easily be cleaned and the area decontaminated 
at relatively low cost and the impact on indoor air can be ameliorated through 
adequate ventilation (Grant, 2002). An example of such an incident was reported in 
The Independent (2000) following a leak of 1000 litres of diesel onto the floor of a 
generator room at Charing Cross Hospital after a pump had broken down. Even 
though a large amount of fuel was involved in the incident, it was adequately 
contained and cleaned up by the emergency services with no long-term impact on 
human health or the environment.
In contrast, once fuel is released into the environment onto a permeable surface it can 
be difficult to manage and presents a much more complex problem in terms of
1 The term ‘fuel oils’ is used to describe a range of petroleum based products that are refined from 
cmde oil and which contain mixtures of aliphatic and aromatic hydrocarbons as well as other chemical 
additives. They are distinguished from one another primarily by their boiling point ranges, chemical 
additives and uses (Grant, 2002). Consequently all fuels have chemical ‘fingerprints’.
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containment, clean up and decontamination. Vapours may accumulate under the 
floorboards of residential properties and contaminate the indoor air as well as 
presenting a fire and explosion hazard. Additionally fuel migrates readily through the 
subsurface, channelling along pre-existing underground features such as land drains 
or service pipe trenches travelling a significant distance from the site of the leak or 
spill. Low molecular weight hydrocarbons such as those present in fuel are able to 
permeate through plastic water supply pipes and contaminate drinking water. As a 
result inadequate planning and tactical decision making with regard to fuel spill 
events is likely to result in inefficient cleanup efforts with high operating and cleanup 
costs (Iakovou et al, 1996).
From a human health perspective, exposure to low levels of the volatile components 
in fuel, which often includes benzene, toluene, ethylbenzene, xylene and naphthalene 
at varying concentrations as well as other additives, can give rise to a number of 
acute and chronic adverse health effects. For example, acute exposure to these 
chemicals can cause respiratory tract irritation and pulmonary oedema whereas 
chronic exposure may result in blurred vision, visual disturbance and delirium 
(Farrow et al, 2000).
A study was undertaken to review in detail this category of acute land contamination 
incidents and included a review of fuel incidents reported in the literature. This is 
presented in Appendix M and the key points summarised below. Subsequently a 
more detailed evaluation of some of the incidents reported to CIRS from which ‘best 
practice’ for managing fuel incidents is identified and used in developing a checklist 
to facilitate the public health response to this type of event.
6.1 Key Points from Literature Review
The literature review highlighted the increasing percentage of acute incidents that 
involve fuel and the huge potential for further incidents, which emphasises the 
importance of developing a structured approach to the management of such events to 
minimise long-term harm human and environmental health.
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The incidents reported demonstrate some of the distinguishing features that make 
acute incidents involving fuel unique in terms of the management response required. 
This includes the likelihood of explosion if  vapours accumulate within a confined 
area and the subsequent need to evacuate residents and other property owners, the 
potential to affect water either through the direct contamination of groundwater 
aquifers used for drinking water abstraction or the permeation of low molecular 
weight hydrocarbons from the soil through plastic drinking water supply pipes and 
also the difficulty in remediating soil and groundwater once contaminated.
6.2 Incidents Reported to CIRS
Incidents reported in the literature highlight that leaks and spills occur relatively 
frequently although additional information obtained from the Environment Agency 
and CIRS data suggest that many more problems occur than are published. As a 
result more detailed analysis of all incidents reported to CIRS between January 1997 
and December 2000 was carried out in order to identify acute incidents that involved 
fuel.
The number of incidents reported involving fuel increased from 18 in 1997 to 45 in 
2000 (Figure 6.1). Overall there were 149 acute fuel incidents reported in this four- 
year period. These ranged from an accidental leak of heating oil from a broken 
storage tank to a spill o f crude oil at sea leading to deposition of contaminated 
seaweed and other debris on gardens of sea front properties during high winds.
Figure 6.1: Incidents involving fuel reported to CIRS by year
■  Petrol
□  Petrochem ical
□  Oil
□  K erosene/H eating oil
□  Diesel
1997 1998 1999 2000
Year
ou 
45 
<2 40 
J  35
'1 30
0 25
1  20
E
I  15 
10
5
r
-----
6-3
Petrol and kerosene were involved in 63% of the total number of incidents involving 
fuel reported which perhaps reflects the underlying frequency of their usage and 
storage in relation to other fuels.
It was considered that the increasing number of fuel incidents reported is more likely 
to be due to a greater awareness of the potential for environmental contamination to 
result in adverse health effects rather than an actual increase in the number of 
incidents occurring. Consequently the number of fuel incidents as a proportion of the 
total number of incidents was calculated and, using Epi-info, a chi-squared test for 
linear trend was used to compare changes in this proportion over the four-year 
period. Over the same time period, the total number of incidents reported to CIRS 
has remained fairly constant indicating that fuel incidents are accounting for an 
increasing proportion of the total (Table 6.1) (chi2=10.24, p=0.001).
Table 6.1: Incidents reported to CIRS January 1997 - December 2000
Total number of 
incidents reported*
Number of fuel 
incidents reported
Fuel incidents as a 
percentage of all incidents
1997 885 18 2.0%
1998 887 40 4.5%
1999 934 46 4.9%
2000 885 45 5.1%
•  This total does not include incidents involving CS spray
Three recent fuel incidents that resulted in an actual or potential threat to the health 
of the public were reviewed in detail. These incidents were selected to highlight the 
diversity of fuel incidents and on the basis that they clearly illustrate specific aspects 
of incident response and management and present key lessons in terms of best 
practice. The research engineer has been involved in the management of all three 
incidents, which also makes it easier to identify what worked well and what 
improvements could be made.
The review of cases sought to identify both positive and negative aspects of incident 
management, the agencies involved and how each was notified, whether incident 
control meetings were held, the investigations undertaken, any delayed or omitted
6-4
investigations and the timeliness of action taken to protect the health of the public. 
These are presented in Appendix N.
6.3 Key Issues and Project Contributions for More Effective Management of
Acute Fuel Incidents
The incidents described in Appendices M and N illustrate the complexity of acute 
fuel incidents and also the financial burden in terms of remediation costs and fines 
that may be imposed as the result of successful prosecution. Therefore the aim of this 
next section is to identify similarities in the way these acute fuel incidents evolve and 
should subsequently be investigated and managed. Features addressed include roles 
and responsibilities of key agencies, potential for secondary contamination, common 
contaminant pathways and ‘environmental’ parameters.
6.3.1 Roles and Responsibilities of Key Agencies
One of the most difficult features in any incident is the contact and communication 
between agencies. A number of different agencies were involved in each of the 
incidents described including the local authority, emergency services, water 
companies, the Environment Agency and the Health and Safety Executive. Therefore 
the need to carefully co-ordinate actions is paramount. In the first study, the local 
authority were fairly prompt in contacting public health, an incident control meeting 
was held approximately 10 days after the incident was reported and used to bring key 
agencies together and establish clear lines of responsibility. In the other two case 
studies, public health involvement was delayed. In the second case this led to the 
failure to consider the possibility of water contamination and delayed investigation. 
In the third case, public health was not involved in an incident control meeting until 
the 5th day following the event. However, the local authority in this case had 
evacuated any properties exhibiting elevated levels of petrol, as well as neighbouring 
premises that were not contaminated. This action eliminated any immediate potential 
risk to the health of the public.
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Overall it is apparent that the roles and responsibilities need to be more clearly 
defined and that guidance should reflect the multi-disciplinary nature of incident 
management, even if its main purpose is to facilitate the public health response.
6.3.2 Contaminant Pathways and Potential for Secondary Contamination
The incident investigation involves undertaking a detailed site assessment and 
determining potential and actual contaminant pathways. A contaminant pathway is 
the link between the source of contamination and the receptor -  human or 
environmental (see Chapter 2.2).
In managing any chemical incident, the development of a conceptual site model 
based on the preliminary site assessment, maps and knowledge of the local area (type 
of soil, topography, underground utility pipes etc.) is important since from this, all 
potential contaminant pathways can be identified (see Chapter 4). These potential 
pathways are then used to direct the investigation process and ensure that all 
appropriate environmental samples are collected. This type of approach is considered 
to represent current ‘best practice’ since it follows the methodology recommended in 
the contaminated land guidance for applying the CLEA model.
Whilst it is important to consider all potential exposure pathways, experience 
suggests that in an acute fuel incident two key exposure pathways can be identified. 
They are:
• water contamination (ingestion) either through permeation of fuel through 
plastic water supply pipes or direct contamination of a borehole. Additionally 
the potential for groundwater contamination if the problem is not quickly 
identified and contained is a concern.
• indoor air (inhalation) through vapour migration into the property. Fuel will 
migrate through the subsurface along the easiest possible route.
Failure to consider all such contaminant pathways can lead to delayed or omitted 
investigations hence potentially unnecessary exposure and subsequently negative 
health and environmental impacts.
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6.3.3 ‘Environmental’ Parameters
The way in which chemicals move through the ground is influenced by the soil 
structure and the chemical composition of the soil including soil moisture content, 
redox condition (the oxygen availability in the soil) the pH (the acidity of the soil) 
(Van Wensem, 1998), and also the physical and chemical properties of the 
contaminant including concentration.
If a hydrocarbon (such as petrol or kerosene) or contaminated water is spilled onto 
the surface of the soil, it will initially migrate downwards under the action of gravity. 
It may also begin to spread horizontally. Not all of the liquid will continue to flow 
through the soil - some of it will be adsorbed onto the particles of the soil through 
which it has moved. Some of the contaminant may evaporate into the soil gases and 
be transported through the soil air. When the contaminant reaches the zone where all 
of the soil is completely saturated with water (saturated zone):
• if  the contaminated liquid has a density that is lower than the groundwater, it 
will float like a lens on the water table and will spread horizontally. These 
contaminants are often referred to as light non-aqueous phase liquids — 
LNAPLS - and include kerosene and petrol.
• if the contaminated liquid has a density that is equal to the groundwater, it 
will accumulate at the capillary fringe until enough pressure has been built up 
for it to enter the groundwater. It will then sink into the groundwater and 
move through the aquifer in the direction of the groundwater flow.
• if the contaminated liquid has a density greater than the groundwater, again it 
will accumulate at the capillary fringe until enough pressure has been built up 
for it to enter the groundwater. It will move through the groundwater to 
greater depths under the action of gravity until it reaches a layer of low 
permeability. It may then migrate horizontally along the upper surface of the 
low permeability layer. These contaminants are often referred to as dense 
non-aqueous phase liquids -  DNAPLS -  and include chlorinated 
hydrocarbons such as trichloroethylene.
Other parameters that have been identified as having an important influence over 
chemical spreading and migration through the subsurface include (Scott, 1998):
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• weather precipitation and strong winds can increase spreading; higher air
temperature can increase evaporation
• reactivity some chemicals react with water and form products that may be harder
to decontaminate/remediate
• volatility a chemical with high volatility will evaporate and be spread by air; a
chemical of low volatility is likely to be migrate through land or water
However, if there are any ‘obstructions’ in the topsoil or subsoil such as service pipes 
or land drains, liquid contaminants will preferentially migrate along these. This is 
also true for any geological features, such as an impermeable rock. Therefore 
determining how and to where liquid contaminants have migrated in the subsurface 
may require extensive sampling and detailed knowledge of the underlying geology 
and any underground pipelines or other buried objects. There are a number of 
mathematical models and associated software packages that seek to model the 
behaviour of contaminants in the subsurface, based on the fundamental adsorption- 
convection-diffusion equations describing contaminant distributions and fluxes. 
However, consideration of these is beyond the scope of this project.
Given these common features, the frequency of acute fuel incidents and the potential 
impact of such events on the health of the public, guidance for the management of 
acute fuel incidents has been developed in the form of a checklist of actions to 
facilitate the public health response.
6.3.4 Checklist for Acute Fuel Incident Response and Management
A detailed checklist of actions has been developed for responding to and managing 
acute fuel incidents (Figure 6.2). The same methodology used in compiling both the 
acute chemical incident checklist and chronic land contamination checklist has been 
applied.
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Figure 6.2: Checklist for public health response to acute incidents involving fuel
Emergency response
• identify contaminant(s) involved.
• ensure contaminant has been contained.
• ensure all appropriate organisations are aware of the incident
- consider incident control meeting.
- establish clear lines of responsibility & communication.
- consider contacting the media (press statement).
• restrict access to the site.
Action to protect the health of the public:
• identify population at risk.
• consider if  evacuation/sheltering o f residents is necessary.
• provide information to the public as needed.
Incident investigation
• identify source-pathway-receptor
- confirm source of contamination & estimate volume o f chemical released.
- identify all potential pathways between the source of contamination & receptors
(human & environmental)
>  is there an aquifer used for drinking water abstraction?
>  are there plastic water supply pipes?
>  is there a river or stream used for recreational purposes?
>  is the land used to grow food?
>  are there other pathways that would transport the contaminants elsewhere?
• undertake detailed site assessment if necessary
- collect maps & plans of the area to show geology, hydrogeology, any underground
features, utility trenches, land drains, historical land use etc.
- determine direction o f groundwater flow.
• undertake appropriate environmental sampling.
• maintain clear lines o f communication with all agencies including the media.
Action to protect the health of the public:
• undertake assessment o f public health impact o f event
- determine exposure amongst local residents.
- has the wider population been potentially exposed?
- have appropriate actions to protect the public health been taken.
• confirm that appropriate environmental samples have been taken
- drinking water samples will be required if  there are plastic water supply pipes.
- air samples will be required if  vapour migration into property is suspected.
•  consider whether biological sampling o f exposed population is necessary.
• provide information to the public as needed.
• if  necessary, initiate study (e.g. case control study) to assess health impacts.
Remedial action
• review options available for removal o f contamination from site
- select & apply most appropriate option.
- make provisions for long-term monitoring.
- ensure involvement o f all stakeholders in decision making process .
- ensure good risk communication to stakeholders.
Action to protect the health of the public:
•  consider long-term follow up & monitoring o f exposed population.
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It is likely that use of the fuel checklist in the three cases studies presented would 
have resulted in a more structured approach to their management, helped ensure 
appropriate investigations were undertaken and a more timely response provided. For 
example, in cases one and two it would have confirmed the presence of plastic water 
supply pipes at an earlier stage in the investigations and hence confirmed this as a 
potential exposure pathway to human receptors. In case three the checklist could 
have been used as an aide memoir by the health agency in undertaking a complete 
assessment of the exposed population.
6.3.5 Checklist Validation
Two options were considered for testing the checklist. The first was to wait for an 
appropriate incident to occur; the alternative was to write an exercise and test the 
checklist in that way. The latter option was selected because it allowed feedback 
from a greater number of people and also it was not certain that an appropriate 
incident would occur or that testing the checklist for one incident would provide 
adequate feedback. The disadvantage of using an exercise was that the checklist was 
not tested in real circumstances.
If the decision to wait for a ‘real’ incident had been adopted, it would have taken 
longer than the timescale of the project to collect the necessary data. However, a 
decision was made to forward the checklist to public health practitioners for any 
actual incidents reported and request feedback on presentation and usefulness. 
Results are summarised below.
The checklist was also presented at the 6th South West Conference in May 2002 and 
received feedback from participants.
6.3.5.1 Incident exercise
An exercise based on Case Study 1 (a leaking fuel pipeline) was written, a copy of 
which is included in Appendix L. It was tested at a training day for Specialist 
Registrars in Public Health, which was attended by thirty delegates. Delegates were 
aware that a series of checklists for managing chemical incidents existed but the 
checklist for fuel incidents was not introduced formally. Therefore prior to taking
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part in the exercise, none of the delegates had seen the checklist or had had an 
opportunity to review the content. However, the format of the checklist had been 
discussed with CIRS, Health Emergency Planning and public health colleagues so it 
had undergone some peer review.
A short questionnaire was designed to gauge the delegates’ thoughts on the 
usefulness and presentation of the checklist. A copy can be found in Appendix G.
6.3.5.2 Results
Verbal and written comments from delegates indicated that they all found the 
checklist useful for managing the incident in the exercise and would consider using it 
for responding to similar incidents in the future. Also, all indicated that they 
considered checklists to be either useful or very useful for responding to and 
managing chemical incidents.
In response to the two open questions, which recorded thoughts and opinions about 
the checklist and invited suggestions for improvements, delegates provided some 
useful ideas.
Positive comments included ‘helped to make things systematic’, ‘helps prompt 
questions to agencies’ and ‘headings helpful’. Suggested improvements included 
giving a prompt as to which organisations to get involved at which stage and when to 
involve the media. The former is addressed to some extent in the incident model on 
which the checklist is based. The checklist has been updated to include the latter.
Over the review period (a month), three acute fuel incidents were reported to CIRS 
and the checklist forwarded to public health in each case.
Two of the three incidents were reports of elevated levels of hydrocarbons in 
drinking water thought to have resulted from past spills. These were both very minor 
incidents and if categorised on the Chemical Incident Impact Scale (CHS) presented 
in Chapter 3, they would be ‘insignificant’ with less than 10 people exposed to the 
chemical hazard and little or no impact on the health of the public or the
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environment. Yet in both cases the checklist was requested and used as a post 
incident audit tool to confirm that appropriate action had been taken rather than as a 
prompt in dealing with the problem. It was suggested previously that the checklist 
could be used record progress and information about a particular event, but this 
feedback highlights a further use for the tool.
The third incident was more serious. A leak of heating oil had resulted in 
contamination of a pond (fish had been killed) and elevated vapour levels inside a 
property. Residents, including two small children had complained of headaches and 
insomnia. Thus this incident was categorised as ‘moderate’ because of the 
‘significant’ environmental impact and ‘minor’ health impact.
Since public health were not informed immediately of the incident, the initial 
response section of the checklist was used to confirm that appropriate action had 
been taken to minimise exposure and contain the problem at the time rather than to 
guide the public health response. However, the incident investigation section was 
used to collect general information on which to base the public health risk 
assessment and to guide the response. In particular questions to identify all of the 
contaminant pathways ensured that all possible exposure routes were considered, 
including the presence of plastic water supply pipes although drinking water supplies 
were unaffected by the spill.
Feedback from the public health practitioner involved in managing the incident 
confirmed that the checklist had been useful and that similar tools for responding to 
specific types of chemical incident would be welcomed. It was considered to have 
provided a useful guide to the general management approach whilst highlighting 
more specific actions to protect the health of the public. Specifically the 
straightforward layout of the checklist with clear subsections that reflected the 
logical evolution of the incident was described as particularly constructive.
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6.4 Conclusions
A review of past incidents reported to CIRS and in the wider literature revealed the 
increasing percentage of acute incidents that involve fuel and the huge potential for 
further incidents. Incidents reported demonstrated some of the distinguishing features 
that make incidents involving fuel unique in terms of the management response 
required, including the likelihood of explosion, the potential to affect water and the 
difficulty in cleaning up soil and groundwater once contaminated. This warranted the 
development of a structured approach to the management of acute fuel incidents to 
minimise long-term harm to human and environmental health.
The fuel model and checklist was a first attempt at compiling a list of the key actions 
to protect the health of the public that need to be addressed at each stage of the 
management process for a very specific type of acute chemical incident. The tool 
also endeavoured to integrate the actions of other agencies involved in managing the 
event into a concise checklist; the benefits of doing so were outlined in Chapter 4.
Testing and validating the model reinforced the observation that until now 
appropriate tools and guidance for the public health management of chemical 
incidents has been quite limited. In addition feedback confirmed that public health 
practitioners welcome a standardised approach to incident management and 
resources to support this idea.
The checklist has been included in a number of local authority and public health 
chemical incident on-call packs thus providing practical evidence of the perceived 
usefulness of the tool for responding to this type of problem.
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7. THESIS OVERVIEW AND CONCLUSIONS
The work presented in this thesis demonstrates the contributions that the research 
project has made towards improving the public health response to chemical incidents 
and their effective integration within the wider principles of environmental 
technology and sustainability. These contributions were made possible through the 
unique position of the Chemical Incident Response Service (CIRS), the project 
sponsor, within the NHS. CIRS has provided the opportunity to spend time with 
public health practitioners to identify more precisely their resource needs and to test 
and explore proposed solutions in ‘real’ situations, thus ensuring that project outputs 
are both pragmatic and functional.
The overall aim of the project has been to develop a methodology for public health, 
which could also be adapted by other agencies involved in emergency response to 
support and facilitate their role in managing chemical incidents. This objective has 
been met through developing a greater understanding of incident genesis and 
evolution and subsequently preparing and disseminating resources based on 
identifying best practice from past events.
Such resources include the co-authorship and overall editing of a Stationery Office 
publication entitled ‘The Environment and Public Health’ which is to be published 
by the end of 2002. The book covers all types of chemical incident, but is primarily 
intended for use in responding to minor incidents rather than catastrophic or disaster 
events. Its main objective is to provide an operational tool that can be used in the 
emergency response to all types of chemical incident. The primary audience is 
expected to be public health practitioners, although much of the information is 
applicable to others involved in the management of chemical incidents, including the 
emergency services and local authority environmental health practitioners.
This concluding chapter begins with an overview of the project aims and objectives, 
including identification of current gaps in knowledge and an outline of the salient 
research questions. Significant project outputs may be categorised broadly as ideas 
and concepts which provide the philosophical overarching framework and the more
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practical tools and resources which have been created around it. Suggestions for 
further work, to complement and enhance the contributions that this project has made 
towards improving chemical incident response and management, are then 
summarised.
7.1 Project overview
Incidents involving chemicals, whether deliberate or accidental, can have far 
reaching implications in terms of the potential impact on human and environmental
tVihealth. Following the events of September 11 2001 and the subsequent anthrax 
outbreaks across the US a drive has been instigated in the UK to enhance the skills 
and knowledge of public health practitioners and to improve how information is 
cascaded to other medical professionals.
Preventing incidents from occurring in the first place is the most desirable option. 
However, it is important to recognise that in an increasingly industrialised society, 
accidents are to some extent inevitable. In addition, the potential for deliberate 
releases can never be ruled out and whilst the emphasis throughout this project has 
been on accidents, it is suggested that the tools and guidance proposed could also be 
applied to deliberate ‘incidents’.
The need exists therefore for a structured approach to the management of incidents 
and this has been widely acknowledged. Such an approach needs to include the 
provision of appropriate resources to be able to respond effectively to any potential 
or confirmed problem. Many agencies are involved in chemical incident response 
including the emergency services, the Environment Agency, the local authority and 
the local public health department so clearly defined roles and responsibilities, good 
communication and effective co-ordination of activities is fundamental to achieving 
a successful outcome. The work in this project has focussed on the role of the public 
health practitioner in responding to chemical incidents since limited experience, 
combined with a lack of suitable guidance, has resulted in the public health aspects 
of these incidents being managed on an ad hoc basis. This has tended to mean that
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the lessons learned from the management of past incidents have not been acted upon 
in the most effective manner.
Identification of the limitations of current resources for the management of chemical 
incidents (Chapter 2) has highlighted in particular the inadequacies of current risk 
assessment methodologies that consider the health and environmental impacts of an 
incident, project or planning proposal where they are usually considered separately. 
An unquestionable link is demonstrated between human health and the quality of the 
environment (Chapter 1). Throughout the project, attention has been drawn to the 
interactions that exist between human and environmental health and the need for a 
framework, tools and resources, which take account of these interactions by 
considering simultaneously, has been established. The importance of ensuring that 
pollution streams are not diverted from humans to the environment or from one 
environmental medium to another, possibly more sensitive, medium has also been 
emphasised.
A particular focus of the project has been chemical incidents that result in land 
contamination since although air, land (soil) and water are interlinked, until recently, 
soil has not been granted the same level of protection as air or water. Additionally, 
land contamination incidents present an interesting challenge from a management 
viewpoint. This is in part due to limited experience of public health practitioners in 
dealing with such problems. Furthermore, unusual features such as indirect exposure 
pathways combined with insufficient understanding of chemical behaviour in the 
subsurface, mean that establishing a relationship between the presence of 
contaminants in the soil and reported adverse health effects is not always 
straightforward.
The need to improve procedures for responding to and managing chemical incidents 
and in particular land contamination incidents, prompted discussion that resulted in 
the generation of a number of different ideas and a series of research questions 
(Chapter 2) that provided a foundation for the project work undertaken.
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7.2 Project contributions
These may be divided broadly speaking into five separate but interlinked categories, 
each of which is reviewed in turn below.
A system for categorising chemical incidents
In general, chemical incidents are currently managed on an ad hoc basis, either 
because of limited experience or lack of appropriate resources. Therefore one of the 
key aims of this project has been to consider whether developing a standardised 
approach to chemical incident management results in a more effective and consistent 
response. Since all incidents are different, tools need to be flexible enough to ensure 
that all possible outcomes are considered and allowances are made for situations 
where a decision is required even if limited information is available. Experience 
gained whilst working at CIRS over the past four years has indicated that it may be 
possible to group incidents effectively into a finite number of categories.
Scales and systems for categorisation were acknowledged to have many potential 
uses, which could broadly be divided into three categories - tools for planning, tools 
for describing events and tools for response and communication. Categories currently 
used either reflect the impact of the incident and hence the level of response required 
or the type of incident, such as those currently used by CIRS and the National Focus 
for surveillance purposes.
To date, however, a review of existing literature revealed that a practically applicable 
rapid response tool to measure the potential public health impact of a chemical 
incident does not currently exist. Therefore, following a review of a number of 
existing scales to identify useful features and to generate ideas, a scale for incident 
categorisation has been proposed; this has been subsequently referred to as the 
chemical incident impact scale (CHS). A further aim has been to define and describe 
a ‘major incident’ (subsequently changed to ‘serious incident’) from a public health 
perspective.
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Five categories ranging from ‘insignificant incident’ to ‘catastrophic incident’ have 
been defined and illustrated with examples selected from past incidents. The 
categories on the chemical incident impact scale (CHS) are based on two parameters 
-  the number of people potentially exposed and the severity of the health impact. 
These parameters were selected since the information is likely to available soon after 
an incident has occurred. Incident categorisation is expected to be an iterative 
process, which will continue until the incident is declared over. Therefore as time 
passes and more information becomes available, it is possible that the grading of an 
incident might be reduced increased.
Subsequently the possibility of merging the chemical incident scale with the 
Environment Agency’s pollution incident scale as a means of integrating human 
health and environmental impact assessment was considered. The integrated scale 
was tested retrospectively using data reported to the Chemical Incident Response 
Service in June 2002. Results demonstrated its usefulness in categorising chemical 
incidents from a public health perspective but that due to limitations in the usefulness 
of environmental information currently collected it was not possible to gauge the 
usefulness of the CHS as a tool for assessing health and environmental impact 
simultaneously. Therefore, this represents an area for further work.
A generic framework for chemical incident management
The second project output is the proposal of a generic framework for the 
management of chemical incidents. This recognises that although all incidents are 
different, clear patterns in the way events present and progress can be identified and 
used in creating guidance, including tools for planning and response, to all chemical 
incidents.
The current incident management process was broken down into three key phases -  
acute, post-acute and post-incident - and illustrated using an ‘incident timeline’. The 
phases along the timeline, which were further divided into sub-stages, were 
positioned to reflect the time lapse between when the incident occurred and the 
management actions taken. By considering the management process in this way, it 
became apparent that there was no formal mechanism for reviewing how an incident
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is managed, including what works well in addition to suggestions for improvements 
and identifying key lessons learned. This resulted in the proposal of a cyclical or 
‘closed-loop’ framework for incident management, a dynamic process incorporating 
a feedback mechanism, which recognises the importance of updating emergency 
plans with observations and improvements from past incidents. Through these means 
it should be ensured that management plans reflect current ‘best practice’.
Tools for planning and response
The number of incidents reported to the CIRS as well as recent reports from the 
Department of Health (DH)and the British Medical Association (BMA) clearly 
illustrated that public health have an important role in responding to and managing 
chemical incidents. However, it was recognised that there were limited resources 
specifically for public health response to these types of event. The role of public 
health at each stage of the management process was considered and a methodology 
to support the public health decision-making process in chemical incident response 
and management proposed. Prior to developing guidance, identifying the wants and 
needs of public health practitioners was considered to be important since professional 
acceptance and ‘ownership’ are key to the successful implementation of tools to 
assist in performing a job function.
This resulted in the development of a methodology for public health risk assessment, 
which considers both the health and environmental impacts of the incident. A list of 
actions to be considered at each phase of the incident management process has been 
presented in the form of a basic acute incident checklist and supplementary event 
specific checklists. Suggested actions also reflect the seriousness of the incident 
measured on the CHS. By this means it should be ensured that appropriate actions are 
taken and that resources are allocated effectively. The checklists can be used 
additionally as reporting tools to collect information during an incident, facilitate the 
feedback of lessons learned and subsequently shape future response plans. The 
layout of the checklists has been designed to ensure that information is easy to find 
and use, though they are dynamic tools that can be modified and updated to reflect 
current ‘best practice’ and the preferences of the public health practitioners who use 
them.
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As well as a better understanding of incident genesis, utilising the incident timeline 
concept to advocate a standard framework for incident response has resulted in a 
more thorough understanding of the key agencies that are likely to be involved in 
incident response. Although this project has focussed on the needs of public health 
practitioners in the development of tools and guidance, the generic framework and 
risk assessment methodology is available for other agencies involved in incident 
response to use and to refine further to suit their respective needs. The advantages of 
all agencies using the same guidance in responding to incidents would be expected to 
include improved communication, minimisation of the use of agency-specific jargon 
and as a result a better understanding of roles and responsibilities.
Tools for land contamination incidents
After looking generally at chemical incidents, the project focussed on land 
contamination incidents. The link between exposure to contaminated soil and adverse 
human health effects is never easy to substantiate since it may take some time to 
establish that land is contaminated and that there is an exposure pathway between the 
source of contamination and human receptors. As a result, land contamination 
incidents present an interesting challenge for public health professionals compared to 
a fire or an explosion, since the potential impact on the health of the public may not 
be apparent immediately and experience in managing these problems is usually 
limited.
Land contamination has a proven potential to impact on human health and the 
environment, which justifies the need to develop a response tool for public health 
practitioners to minimise such impacts and to prevent long-term contamination, 
which could continue to give rise to impacts into the future. As with all chemical 
incidents, every land contamination incident is different and each problem needs 
therefore to be dealt with on a case-by-case basis. However, an aim of this research 
project was to consider whether incident management and response could be 
improved by a standardised approach. It was recognised that any such approach 
would need to reflect the fact that incidents are dynamic. Patterns in land
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contamination incident evolution were therefore used to develop both a 
categorisation scheme for such incidents and guidance for managing future incidents.
Two distinct categories of land contamination incidents have been defined -  acute 
and chronic - and subsequently referred to as ‘principal categories’. The term acute 
has been used to describe land contamination that results from a sudden one-off 
release of a chemical either directly to the soil, such as leak or spill from a tank, or 
indirectly via aerial deposition or firewater runoff. In contrast, chronic describes land 
contamination that has resulted from a continued or repeated release of chemical 
substances over a period of time. Response time was identified as the key parameter 
that determines the effectiveness of response for acute land contamination incidents, 
whereas for chronic land contamination incidents success is more likely to be 
determined by accurately establishing the most significant exposure pathways 
between the source of contamination and sensitive receptors. Further, differences 
between acute and chronic incidents were identified and discussed, including 
legislation, the roles and responsibilities of organisations involved in response and 
management, the requirements of an effective risk communication strategy and the 
chemicals typically involved.
It was appropriate that the research project concentrated on developing procedures 
for managing acute land contamination incidents since the review of tools and 
guidance (Chapter 2) revealed current resources were limited. Also there was already 
a significant amount of research into the management and remediation of chronic 
land contamination and hence limited original work that could be added. The main 
exception was that much of the published information was not available in a form 
that public health practitioners could use in the event of an incident to determine the 
potential adverse health effects following exposure to chemically contaminated soil. 
This justified a need for further work.
Detailed consideration showed that the chemical incident impact scale (CHS) for 
acute chemical incidents (Chapter 3) could be used to categorise acute land 
contamination incidents since the majority of these problems result from leaks and 
spills i.e. acute chemical incidents. However, it was not appropriate for categorising
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chronic land contamination problems and therefore a separate system to identify and 
manage these incidents from a public health perspective was required.
Following a review of all land incidents reported to CIRS between February 1996 
and October 2001, within the two principal categories a number of incident 
subcategories that share common features were established. For example, for acute 
incidents there are two categories, which reflect the cause of the problem or the event 
- direct contamination such as a leak or spill, and indirect or secondary 
contamination. For chronic incidents four incident types are proposed: Part IIA 
investigation, planning investigation, routine testing and accidental discovery. Waste 
disposal has also been included as a subcategory of chronic incidents. In contrast to 
acute incidents, the chronic incident categories reflect how the problem was 
discovered since it is unlikely that the event that caused the contamination would 
easily be identifiable. In this way the categories reflect the taxonomy for acute and 
chronic incidents presented in Chapter 2.2. The principal features and typical 
contaminant species have also been highlighted for each of the incident types.
A generic incident management model for chronic land contamination incidents was 
developed and provided the basis for a checklist to guide and support the public 
health response to this category of land incident. However, in order to limit the 
number of checklists used by public health practitioners, the acute chemical incident 
checklist presented in Chapter 4 was considered acceptable to use in responding to 
acute land contamination. The benefits of this were minimising duplication of 
information and confusion over which tools to use. The main exception to this was 
acute chemical incidents involving fuel since they present an interesting problem in 
terms of potential human and environmental health impacts. As a result a detailed 
study of fuel incidents was undertaken as part of this research project.
Fuel incidents
The retrospective review of past incidents reported to CIRS revealed that around one 
third of all land contamination incidents are acute incidents, and of these over 70% 
involved fuel oils or chemicals used as fuel additives, including petrol, diesel, 
kerosene and heating oil. A review of reported incidents highlighted some of the
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distinguishing features that make acute incidents involving fuel unique in terms of 
the management response required; for example, once fuel is released into the 
environment it can be difficult to manage. Thus fuel presents a complex problem in 
terms of containment, clean up and decontamination. Vapours may also accumulate 
under the floorboards of residential properties and contaminate the indoor air as well 
as presenting a fire and explosion hazard. Additionally, fuel migrates readily through 
the subsurface, channelling along pre-existing underground features such as land 
drains or service pipe trenches, travelling a significant distance from the site of the 
leak or spill. Low molecular weight hydrocarbons such as those present in fuel are 
able to permeate through plastic water supply pipes and contaminate drinking water.
Given these common features, the frequency of acute fuel incidents and the potential 
impact of such events on the health of the public, it was realised that there was an 
urgent need for guidance for the management of acute fuel incidents. This has 
therefore been developed and is in the form of a checklist of actions to facilitate the 
public health response. It is recognised that this is a first attempt at compiling a list of 
the key public health actions that need to be addressed at each stage of the 
management process for a very specific type of acute chemical incident. However, 
the checklist will need to be further developed through iterative feedback. The tool 
also endeavoured to integrate the actions of other agencies involved in managing the 
event into a concise checklist. Feedback from public health practitioners who used 
the checklist in responding to exercises as well as ‘real’ incidents confirmed that the 
straightforward layout of the checklist, with clear subsections that reflected the 
logical evolution of the incident, was particularly constructive.
Testing and validating the model also reinforced the observation that appropriate 
tools and guidance for the public health management of chemical incidents had been 
quite limited and that practitioners welcomed the standard approach to incident 
management proposed in this project and the associated tools and resources.
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7.3 Recommendations for Future Work
Improved incident surveillance
Enhanced surveillance would facilitate a greater understanding of when and where 
incidents are occurring thus ensuring that resources, including further research, are 
allocated appropriately.
There are several suggestions to improve collection and dissemination of chemical 
incident information. In general, it has been identified that clear and consistent 
definitions agreed by all agencies involved in managing incidents would have several 
advantages, not least by improving communication in an acute incident. It would also 
make sharing of information between agencies for surveillance purposes more 
straightforward. The standard framework for incident management proposed in this 
project would also provide a good starting point from which to develop these 
definitions since it takes into consideration the actions of all agencies involved in the 
process.
It was also recognised that within CIRS it would be beneficial to collect information 
in a more structured way including details of environmental impacts and actions 
taken. As the proposed checklists aim to integrate health and environmental 
information, it is suggested that these could be used as a basis for recording 
information.
Incident impact scale
Since the environmental information collected by CIRS was not sufficient to test the 
CHS retrospectively, it would be interesting to use the scale to categorise incidents as 
they are reported. The required health and environmental information could be 
requested. This would provide the opportunity to test the scale in more realistic 
circumstances and to ascertain whether it is easy to use in the early stages following 
incident notification to determine the potential health and environmental impact. 
Subsequently the capabilities of the tool for inter-agency risk communication could 
then be tested, though this would require prior training in the use of the scale. The
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development of inter-agency training resources to facilitate linking to existing 
emergency plans would also be beneficial.
It was also suggested in Chapter 3 that the CHS could be expanded and used to 
communicate the severity of all CBRN incidents. Since there is a move towards 
developing integrated CBRN plans it would also seem sensible to expand the 
definitions in the scale to take account of biological, radiological and nuclear 
incidents. Since the CHS is has been developed from the International Nuclear Scale, 
this should not present too big a challenge.
Formal testing o f resources
As a suggestion for further research in this area, it would be interesting to undertake 
extensive testing to assess whether using the checklists results in a significantly 
improved public health response to chemical incidents and whether more directed 
training might also achieve the same goal. Whilst this would be time consuming and 
developing a suitable testing methodology would be difficult since accurately 
simulating incidents is not straightforward and public health practitioners may not 
respond as if they were dealing with a ‘real’ incident, it would be a useful exercise to 
carry out.
Interactive resources
It would be interesting to explore the possibility of creating an interactive computer 
tool for public health, based on the proposed incident management framework and 
risk assessment methodology. Information from past incidents could also be used in 
establishing a comprehensive ‘knowledge base’ and responses to the questions, such 
as those used in the checklists, could be used in generating a list of public health 
actions. In this way, a site-specific action plan based on ‘best practice’ can be 
instigated.
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PERSONAL CLOSING STATEMENT
The contributions set out in this thesis provide an improved understanding of 
chemical incident genesis and evolution and have been used as a basis for the 
development of tools and resources to improve the management of chemical 
incidents. A more effective approach to incident management is less wasteful in 
terms of resource use both now and in the future thus providing a more sustainable 
environmental solution.
We live in a society where so much is taken for granted, so much energy consumed 
and so much waste generated but even implementing the small changes proposed by 
this work could cumulatively contribute to making a difference in the way we 
interact with the world around us.
“What is needed is a fundamental transformation o f people’s attitudes and 
practices (...) Only a new world view and mortality can change this basic 
relation o f people to the earth. People’s behaviour is a matter o f choice 
based upon values (...) The need for a world ethic o f sustainability -  an ethic 
that helps people co-operate with one another and nature for the survival and 
well-being for all individuals and the biosphere — could not be greater. ” Fien 
(1993).
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APPENDIX A
A. CASE STUDIES
Case study 1: School on Contaminated Site
Summary
A primary school was built on potentially contaminated land adjacent to a former gas 
works site.
Presentation
During excavation of a storm water drain, two workers collapsed and reported to the 
local Accident and Emergency Department. It was suggested that they might have 
been exposed to hydrogen cyanide gas although it is unclear where this may have 
come from. Following this incident the HSE requested that all workers on site wore 
personal monitors.
Incident Investigation
Workers commented on the fact that when land had been excavated along the side of 
the school building for drainage pipes to be laid, an almond smell and high readings 
for HCN registered on their personal monitors and on monitors located within the 
school buildings. However, levels dropped quickly.
Prior to the construction of the school a number of site investigations had been 
undertaken both on the proposed school site and on the adjacent land (former gas 
works site). Two thirds of the school buildings were built on one, perhaps two 
infilled ponds that had been used to dump various waste materials including builders’ 
rubble and other refuse. It was considered that one of them might also have been 
used as a vehicle inspection pit in the past. However, a number of problems were 
experienced when attempting to sink boreholes into the ‘ponds’ and consequently 
there are gaps in the information obtained and the extent of contamination beneath 
the buildings is unknown.
Raised levels of spent oxide, referred to as blue billy, were identified on the gas 
works site. When the land was excavated for the school to be built, the waste topsoil 
was dumped onto the gas works site covering the previously exposed spent oxide. It
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was identified as the potential site for the development of a supermarket in the near 
future following sufficient remediation to remove the spent oxide and other 
chemicals associated with gas woks sites.
A stream running along the bottom edge of the site was monitored by the 
Environment Agency. Although the water was found to be slightly acidic, goldfish 
thrive. There were no aquifers or abstraction points in the area.
Remedial Action
A recommendation was made to not open the school until a thorough investigation of 
the site had been carried out.
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Case study 2: New development on land contaminated with heavy metals
Summary
The planning department of the Local Authority granted planning permission to build 
a three-storey residential nursing home on a former factory site. The site had a long 
industrial history dating back to 1865 when it was used as a builders yard. By 1893 
the builders yard had become a dye works and around 1900 a boiler manufacturer. 
In 1954 a metal plating works occupied the factory site. Heavy metals were used in a 
number of the processes. During operation activities carried out by the company 
gave rise to contamination both on the site and to some surrounding gardens. The 
factory closed in 1985 and had since been left derelict.
Prior to developing the site, samples were taken to determine the extent of 
contamination in the soil. Information about the previous site use, the contaminants 
likely to be present and the location of potential ‘hot spots’ was available. However, 
the depth of contamination was unknown. For this reason, a multistage sampling 
process was undertaken. This involved taking a series of samples in areas of known 
contamination and using a wide-spaced sampling strategy in other areas.
A total of approximately 4000m of ‘contaminated’ soil was excavated from the site 
prior to the before building work commenced.
Presentation
Following reports by the local media of health concerns from local residents who had 
formed an action group, the CCDC contacted the Pollution Control Team at the 
Local Authority.
Incident Investigation
With the permission of the owners/occupiers, the Pollution Control Team undertook 
a programme of soil sampling in the gardens around development in collaboration 
with CIRS and the CCDC. Not all of the 31 gardens were accessible for sampling at 
that time. Many of the gardens had been paved with concrete or planted with grass. 
Samples were not taken from these gardens. Although contamination may be present 
in the soil underneath, as no pathway between the source and receptor currently
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existed the likelihood of health effects resulting from exposure to the soil was greatly 
reduced. Ten gardens were sampled in initially and samples from the remaining 
gardens were collected subsequently.
Where practical, two bulk samples were taken from each garden. One of these 
consisted of a mixture of three samples taken from as near to the boundary wall as 
possible and the other a mixture of two or three samples taken about 5 metres from 
the wall. Further samples were taken in areas where there was known to be heavy 
contamination on the factory side of the wall prior to excavation.
The top layer of soil was removed using a small trowel and the sample taken at a 
depth of 15 - 2 0  centimetres. The samples were then sent to the laboratory for 
analysis. Analyses for copper, lead, zinc, cadmium, chromium and nickel were 
undertaken on all samples. The sample data was compiled in a spreadsheet and a 
graph showing the variation in contamination around the perimeter of the boundary 
wall was produced. This highlighted ‘hotspots’ and enabled the determination of 
patterns of contamination.
Plants are able to tolerate cadmium and lead at higher concentrations than those 
recommended for human consumption. Therefore, home-grown vegetables 
presented a potential health risk in areas with contaminated soil. Lower 
concentrations of zinc, copper and nickel are considered to be more toxic to plants 
than harmful to human health. Chromium does not pass from soil into plants too 
readily so is not likely to be present in foodstuffs at a level which is toxic to humans. 
However, the sensitivity of different plants and mammals (including humans) to 
heavy metal poisoning is dependent on a number of factors. These include the metal 
concerned, the presence of other trace elements, the pH of the soil, the uptake of the 
metal from the soil and the metabolic activity within the plant.
A health questionnaire was sent to local residents. No adverse health effects were 
reported with one exception. A pregnant lady was concerned about the risk to her 
unborn baby.
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Remedial Action
No remedial action was taken in the gardens as there was considered to be a risk to 
human health.
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Case study 3: Proposed allotments contaminated with heavy metals and PAH’s
Summary
Soil sampling and analysis was undertaken in order to establish the suitability of an 
area of grassland adjacent to a large housing estate for use as allotments.
Presentation
The Local Authority contacted the PCT as raised levels of heavy metals and 
polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons (PAH’s) had been detected in the soil.
Incident Investigation
The soil on the proposed allotment site was very ashy and small pieces of coal were 
identified. The grass was patchy and quite straggly in places although this was 
unlikely to be due to contaminants in the soil. There was evidence to suggest that the 
site had been used for the disposal of domestic waste and bonfires.
Soil samples taken from the proposed allotment site were found to contain heavy 
metals (lead, zinc, copper, nickel and mercury), arsenic and Polycyclic Aromatic 
Hydrocarbons (PAHs) above ICRCL ‘action’ levels. Further investigation.identified 
the former land use of the area and part of the adjacent housing estate as an ash tip. 
It was decided that a series of samples should be taken from gardens on the housing 
estate to try and determine the extent of the contamination because the exact location 
of the former tip was unknown.
Further sampling was undertaken in the gardens of vacant properties on the adjacent 
housing estate and communal open spaces to establish the extent of the 
contamination in the area. In total, 33 samples were taken from 15 locations on the 
estate including communal areas near to blocks of flats and the private gardens of 
vacant properties. Samples were taken at depths between 0.2m and lm. Elevated 
levels of heavy metals were found in 19 of the samples (8 gardens), arsenic in 11 of 
the samples (6 gardens) and PAHs in 4 of the soil samples (2 gardens). In 6 of the 
sample locations the levels of the contaminants screened were below ICRCL action 
levels for domestic use. Of greatest significance from a human health viewpoint is
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the level of lead present in some of the soil samples. 2170 mg/kg was measured. 
This greatly exceeds the ICRCL action level of 500 mg/kg.
The most likely source of the contamination was considered to be a former ash tip on 
which the housing estate was constructed in 1949. The extent of the former tip was 
unknown but it was believed that it infilled a former V  shaped valley. The trough 
was believed to be around 15m deep and filled with ash and colliery spoil discard. 
There was also a history of mining and quarrying in the area. At the bottom of one 
of the boreholes a black sludgy mixture containing pieces of glass and similar 
material was found but not identified. This suggested that domestic and other waste 
may have been disposed of at some time in the past.
Residents who attended a meeting of the local council to oppose the proposed 
relocation of the allotments commented on the fact that attempts to grow vegetables 
in gardens on the estate in the past had usually failed. No adverse health effects had 
been reported to the Environmental Health Officer or to the PCT although it was 
known that around 90% of the residents were smokers therefore any exposure to 
PAH’s from the soil would be negligible compared to the PAH’s in cigarette smoke.
Remedial Action
A number of recommendations for further investigation were made.
• To determine if any vegetables were grown in any of the gardens on the 
housing estate and if so, what?
• To identify whether any of the children living on the estate/playing has pica 
(especially repeated mouthing of soil).
• To collect further samples in order to characterise the black sludge at bottom 
of borehole and also to try and locate the boundary of the former ash tip.
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Case study 4: Contamination of a drain with leachate from a former coal ash tip
Summary
Concerns were raised about the possibility of drainage from a former ash tip 
polluting an inland watercourse including a drain approximately 100m downstream 
of the tip.
Presentation
The Inland Drainage Board contacted the Environment Agency and later the Local 
Authority and PCT with two primary concerns:
• Occasionally, drainage board employees worked in the dyke usually using 
machinery to clear weed and sediment but sometimes by hand particularly 
in culverts. They wore standard protective clothing;
• In dry summers farmers with land adjacent to the drain may, under an 
abstraction license use the water for irrigation.
Incident Investigation
There were three consented discharges from the site. It was believed that the 
discharge to the drain was from 4 old lagoons buried to the middle west of the site. 
A significant amount of liquid was discharged from these lagoons. The leachate 
could be continuing to flow for a number of reasons. For example, the lagoons may 
have been poorly capped. This would allow water (e.g. rainwater) to penetrate 
through the waste material and become contaminated.
The Environment Agency had analysed the water downstream of the on a monthly 
basis for a number of years. Samples were screened for biological oxygen demand 
(BOD), chemical oxygen demand (COD), ammonia, suspended solids, thiocyanate, 
oil and grease, free cyanide, monohydric phenols and total iron.
Raised levels of iron were detected in the drainage water. There was not believed to 
have been any iron in the slurry disposed of in the lagoons although it was 
highlighted that iron in the form of pyrites (FeS) is present in a lot of colliery waste. 
The ammonia in the drainwater was considered to present the biggest problem but 
the levels measured were not dissimilar to those found in watercourses near to
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sewage works. The levels of phenol in the drain water had been raised but were 
reducing gradually. In any case levels were not excessive and unlikely to increase, 
as the lagoons had not been used for 8-10 years. Local drinking water was unlikely 
to be affected as the site was located on the edge of a sandstone aquifer and not near 
a water abstraction point. The nearest abstraction point was 9-10 km from the site. 
If there were raised levels of phenol in the public water supply there would be 
complaints of a phenolic taste from customers.
It was considered that the nature of the crops planted should determine whether the 
water was suitable for irrigation. It was felt that MAFF should be contacted, advised 
of the analyses and asked to provide more detailed advice.
Remedial action
No further action was taken as it was therefore concluded that as long as the drain 
water was not directly ingested there was no risk to human health.
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Case study 5: Kerosene spill
Summary
This incident involved a leak of domestic fuel oil into the ground, leading to the 
possible contamination of a private drinking water supply.
Presentation
A fuel leak was reported the Environmental Health Department of the Local 
Authority in September although the leak was believed to have occurred some time 
between January and June. In June the fuel supply pipe, which had cracked, had 
been repaired and the fuel tank refilled. Fuel was not believed to have leaked from 
the tank after this date. Approximately 4000 litres of the fuel oil (kerosene) were lost 
over the six-month period.
Incident Investigation
Some of the bricks on the driveway close to where the fuel oil was stored had been 
removed to reveal contaminated sand. There was a strong smell of oil and the sand 
and bricks were discoloured. It was unclear how the fuel oil had travelled through 
the soil, which was sandy silty clay above chalk, and no soil samples were taken. 
Consequently, there was no clear indication of the probable migration route or 
migration time of the fuel oil through the soil. There was the possibility that the fuel 
oil may have migrated through the soil to a ‘soak away’, a brick chamber (perhaps an 
old slurry pit) located somewhere under the driveway.
Primary concern was that the fuel oil had leached through the soil and contaminated 
the drinking water. Water for drinking and domestic use was pumped from a 
borehole in the grounds and treated with sodium hypochlorite prior to distribution. 
The borehole was of unknown depth and had been used to supply drinking water for 
a number of years. There were no records of past problems with the water supply 
and no unusual taste or odour had been reported.
Remedial Action
It was concluded, following laboratory analysis of water samples taken from the 
borehole, that contamination of the water resulting from the migration of fuel oil
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from the spill was not likely although further sampling and a continual monitoring 
programme was recommended. Also sources drawn from the same aquifer were 
sampled and were not contaminated.
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APPENDIX B
B. DEFINITIONS
1. National Focus definitions for incident ‘type’
Type Definition Examples
deposit Inappropriate deposit of chemical 
substances in non-designated location 
which cannot be attributed to a fire, 
explosion, leak or spill
Fly-tipping, over-chlorination of a 
swimming pool, inappropriate dosing 
of drinking water, spread of mercury 
from containers, pouring pesticide into 
a drain, acid applied to toilet seats, 
chemical drums on beach etc.
explosion Violent release of energy resulting 
from rapid chemical reaction
Mixing of incompatible, reactive 
chemical substances etc.
fire Combustion of a material with the 
production of heat, light, smoke etc.
Fire at factory or warehouse triggered 
by an electrical fault etc.
land Release associated with substances in, 
on, or emanating from, the surface or 
sub-surface of previously 
contaminated land which cannot be 
attributed to a leak or spill.
Wind blown dust from redevelopment 
activities, contamination of air, 
surface water or groundwater etc.
leak Gaseous, liquid or solid release arising 
from a fault in a container or pipe.
Release from damaged from or 
fractured pipe, CO exposure due to a 
faulty boiler or blocked flue, CS gas 
release due to faulty container etc.
other A release of chemical substances 
attributed to a specific event that 
cannot be described as deposit, 
explosion, fire, land, spill, leak or 
release.
Acid thrown in a person face etc.
release Inappropriate release from an 
identified source that cannot be 
attributed to other types of incident 
(excluding,unknown and other).
Intentional CS gas exposure, pesticide 
over-spray, gas produced during 
inadvertent mixing of chemicals, 
venting including relief value 
discharge, operational malfunction 
increasing stack emissions, exposure 
to damp-proof agents, dust from a 
stockpile etc.
spill Unintentional gaseous, liquid or solid 
release from an intact container or 
pipe.
Open drum knocked over, valve on 
pipe opened by mistake, CS gas 
exposure due to unintentional 
depression of release valve etc.
unknown A release of chemical substances that 
cannot be attributed to a specific 
event.
River contamination in which the 
contaminant source is not known etc.
B-l
2. Chemical Incident Response Service definitions for incident ‘event’
Fire State o f combustion in which inflammable material burns, 
producing heat, flames and often smoke
Explosion Violent release o f energy resulting from a rapid chemical 
reaction, especially one that produces shock wave, loud noise, 
heat and light
Transport accident Unforeseen event involving a vehicle used to transport goods 
or people
Spill Act o f disgorging contents from a container unintentionally
Leak Crack, hole or fault in a container or pipe leading to a release 
o f material. Carbon monoxide exposures from blocked flues or 
faulty systems can be inserted here
Malicious act Act motivated by wrongful, vicious or mischievous purpose
Air Contamination o f the gases that we normally breathe
Water Contamination o f drinking water, oceans rivers, lakes, 
estuaries, groundwater etc.
Food & drink Contamination o f any substance containing nutrients, such as 
carbohydrates, proteins, fats that is ingested for the purpose o f  
generating energy and body tissue
Land Contamination o f the land surface o f the earth that is 
composed o f disintegrated rock particles, humus, water and air
Waste Inappropriate or unauthorised disposal o f waste products, both 
domestic and industrial; seepage o f waste products from waste 
disposal site to an adjacent site leading to contamination
Medicine Contamination o f substances that are used to restore or 
preserve health
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APPENDIX C
C. BOOK CHAPTERS
Sources and types of pollution
Chapter 2 from ‘The Environment and Public Health’ (Eagles et a l , 2002)
Chapter aims and content
The aim of this chapter is to provide an introduction to some of the sources and types 
of pollution that may result in contamination of environmental media -  air, land and 
water. The section begins with a general introduction to sources of contamination 
before considering each of the environmental media in turn. Naturally occurring 
incidents, as well as those resulting from human (anthropogenic) activities, are 
included along with a number of case examples to illustrate key points.
Sources o f environmental contamination
Environmental contamination may result from a number of sources including 
chemical incidents. A general awareness of these different sources is important so 
that when a problem is reported the cause of the contamination can be more easily 
identified. This ensures that the most appropriate way to prevent any further 
exposure can be determined and the best clean-up (remediation) option selected.
For many incidents the cause is obvious, so the incident can be described by what 
actually happened or the ‘event’, such as ‘fire’ or ‘explosion’. However, for other 
incidents the event may not be obvious or the contamination may be the result of 
more than one event. These incidents are often described according to the 
environmental medium affected. Environmental media are considered to be air, land 
(soil) and controlled waters (groundwater, surface water, freshwater and coastal 
water), which includes rivers, lakes, streams and aquifers. In addition sources of 
drinking water contamination will be included.
Contaminants that are released to the environment are controlled by a complex set of 
processes that include various forms of transport and cross-media uptake (Asante- 
Duah, 1998). So whilst environmental media may be directly contaminated, there
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will always be the potential for secondary (indirect) contamination if the contaminant 
source is not contained and mitigated in an appropriate and timely manner. Some 
examples of direct and indirect cross media contamination are indicated in Figures 1
- 3 .
Figure 1: Sources of air contamination
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Figure 2: Sources of land contamination
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Figure 3: Sources of water contamination
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These highlight contaminant sources (or contamination events), environmental 
pathways (or mechanisms) and environmental receptors. The source-pathway- 
receptor linkage (Figure 4) is an important concept in the investigation of both 
environmental contamination and chemical incidents, and will be discussed in greater 
detail in later chapters.
Sources of contamination that can affect all environmental media fall into one of two 
categories
• natural sources
• anthropogenic sources
o historical legacies 
o contemporary issues
o accidents/emergencies (e.g. fire, explosion, spill, leak)
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Figure 4: Source-Pathwav-Receptor Model: Method for Determining and
Preventing/Minimising Health Impact (adapted from Richards et aL 1996)
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L
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• location/amount
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Characterise the 
exposure pathway:
• direct
• indirect
• none
Assess the significance 
of the risk:
• significant
• insignificant
• none
Contamination sources can be described as point or non-point sources. Point sources 
refer to discrete, localised discharges of contaminants into the environment and 
include emissions from an industrial chimneystack, a leak of fuel from an 
underground storage tank or effluent discharge to a river. Usually the contaminant is 
identifiable and can often be measured. Non-point sources may be referred to as 
diffuse sources, which are releases of contaminants into the environment over a 
wider area. Examples include traffic emissions and contamination with radon gas in 
homes built upon granite.
Natural Sources
Many pollutants within the environment have natural as well as anthropogenic 
sources. For example, some natural emissions of air pollutants include:
• releases of gases such as sulphur dioxide through volcanic eruptions
• releases of hydrogen sulphide from geyser and hot spring activities and by
biological decay from bogs and marshes
• increased concentration of ozone in the lower atmosphere as a result of
unstable meteorological conditions such as violent thunderstorms
• emissions of a variety of smoke and particles from forest fires and storms
In addition the geology in different areas of the country will influence the 
background level of certain chemicals in the soil. Examples include greatly enhanced
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levels of arsenic and copper in soils contaminated by drainage waters and stream 
sediments from mining and smelting in South West England and much higher than 
normal levels of copper, lead, zinc and cadmium in soils downstream from disused 
mines in Wales (Senesi et al, 1999).
Anthropogenic sources
An anthropogenic source of contamination can be defined as any process or facility 
that has the potential to release chemicals that may result in contamination of 
environmental media, for example a factory, a farm or a landfill site.
Many industrial processes have the potential to give rise to environmental 
contamination. As a result the Department of the Environment (DoE now DEFRA) 
prepared ‘industry profiles’, which are available for 47 different industrial activities 
and provide information on the processes, materials and wastes associated with 
individual industries, including information on the potential contaminants. The 
Industry Profiles are available from The Stationery Office.
Sources o f Air Contamination
There are two main groups of air pollutants:
• Primary pollutants: emitted directly into the air e.g. carbon monoxide and 
sulphur dioxide
• Secondary pollutants: produced when primary pollutants react with other 
pollutants or normal atmospheric compounds e.g. ozone
Some pollutants fall into both categories, e.g. nitrogen dioxide, and some particulate 
matter is formed as a secondary pollutant, but may also be emitted directly.
Both indoor and outdoor air may be affected. Indoor air can be contaminated directly 
from another environmental medium such as water or soil, or via contamination of 
the outdoor air. For example, contaminated water or soil beneath a building may 
result in vapour entering the house directly and contaminating the indoor air.
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Internal furnishings, such as carpets and upholstered furniture, as well as building 
materials, may have been treated with chemicals (e.g. formaldehyde), which can also 
give rise to direct contamination of indoor air. Alternatively, a fire outside or other 
outdoor/atmospheric contamination may give rise to indoor air contamination if the 
chemical/plume is able to enter the building through windows, doors or an air 
conditioning inlet. In addition, both land and water may become contaminated when 
pollutants from air are deposited. Some examples are presented in Boxes 1 and 2.
Box 1: A travelling chemical incident
Sea
w ater
A irT anker
C ollision
A chemical tanker and a petrol tanker collided in the English Channel and a quantity of 
unleaded petrol was spilt. This evaporated and was carried several hundred kilometres in the 
wind across central England and Wales, resulting in widespread complaints of odour 
associated with streaming eyes, noses and upper respiratory tract irritation.
Box 2: A warehouse fire______________________________________________________
A warehouse used for storing paper-based material was destroyed by fire. It was quickly 
confirmed that none of the contents of the warehouse would give combustion products with 
particular toxicological concerns, however it soon became apparent that the roof was made 
from asbestos cement. This disintegrated due to the heat of the fire and chunks of asbestos 
containing material were deposited along the path of the plume covering roads, houses and 
gardens.
As vehicles drove over the material, the chunks were broken up further distributed, with the 
potential for fibres to be released back into the air. Rain is effective at clearing asbestos fibres
from air and washing them into the soil or into surface water drains.
A ir Soil
A ir
Soil
R ain
w ater
Surface
w ater
N earby
properties
W arehouse
fire
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Sources o f  Land Contamination
Land contamination is a widespread problem in the UK due heavy industrial activity 
in the past. Many sites have been left derelict and may contain chemicals that are a 
potential hazard to human health and the environment. In addition, ‘new’ land 
contamination may result from industrial processes or acute events, including leaks, 
spills, fires and explosions. These may result in direct contamination of land or 
indirect contamination through surface runoff or aerial deposition.
In addition to being a ‘sink’ for contaminants, soil often provides a pathway for 
contaminants to other environmental media: air and water (including surface water 
and groundwater). There is also potential for food contamination if crops are grown 
in contaminated soil. Some examples are presented in Boxes 3 and 4.
Box 3: The redevelopment of an inner city contaminated land site
A irD ustSoil on  site G arden  soilW aste chem icals
Planning permission was granted for the redevelopment of a small brownfield site in an inner 
city area. The site had a long industrial history dating back to 1865 including a builder’s yard, 
a dye works, a boiler manufacturer and a metal plating works. The plating works closed in 
1985 and whilst most of the equipment was dismantled and chemical baths drained and 
removed, no further clean up of the site was undertaken and it was left derelict. Heavy metals 
were used in the process and spills and dumping during operation gave rise to contamination 
both on the site and to some of the surrounding gardens.
Sources o f Water Contamination
Water can be subdivided into surface water, groundwater, marine water or drinking 
water. Water contaminants may be point or non-point sources. Discharge to a river 
from a sewage works is an example of direct contamination from a point source. A 
poorly contained waste disposal site with leachate migrating through to an aquifer 
used for drinking water abstraction is an example of indirect contamination of 
drinking water from a non-point area source.
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Box 4: A leak of petrol from an underground storage tank
A leak of petrol from an underground storage tank (UST) into the ground resulted in 
contamination of surface water drains that ran to a ditch that became contaminated. 
Drinking water samples were taken from a number of properties in the area and elevated 
levels of petroleum hydrocarbons were found in the drinking water of two neighbouring 
properties. The water pipes supplying the two properties were made of lead except at the 
point where the supply entered the properties where plastic connectors had been used so it 
was considered that the petrol had permeated through the plastic. Soil saturated with petrol 
was exposed during excavation to replace the pipes. One year later, complaints of petrol 
smells inside one of the properties were reported and elevated levels of petroleum 
hydrocarbons were detected.
Surface w ater
W ater
D rink ing  w ater
The major water pollutants are
• oxygen demanding waste (BOD) for example, milk or sugar
• pathogens
• nutrients
• synthetic organic and inorganic compounds
• oil
• heavy metals
• radioactive materials
• heat
• sediment
This chapter will concentrate on those that are chemical in origin and are underlined 
in the list above.
Drinking Water
Drinking water may be contaminated directly via surface, ground or marine water, 
where these water sources are subsequently used for drinking water. Water may also 
become contaminated if plastic water supply pipes are used in areas of soil that are
C-8
contaminated or become contaminated with organic chemicals, as these are able to 
permeate through the plastic material. The treatment of wastewater may also lead to 
environmental contamination from sewage discharges to surface or marine waters, or 
by the disposal of sewage sludge to land.
In addition, drinking water can also become contaminated directly without any 
associated environmental contamination. There are four main stages at which water 
that has been abstracted for drinking water purposes can become contaminated and 
examples of contamination occurring at each of the stages are provided below:
Storage reservoir: the pre-treatment raw water storage reservoir is often open to the 
environment and vulnerable to any spills, or runoff from road drainage.
Water treatment and final storage: in the water treatment plant itself inadvertent 
spills or overdosing of treatment chemicals such as aluminium sulphate could occur 
or a fuel spill on site resulting in pollution of stored water.
Distribution system: in the distribution pipes, chemicals from the pipe itself or 
corrosion deposits/sediments may become dislodged and contaminate the water. 
Alternatively, mis-connections may lead to the backflow of chemicals used in 
industrial processes or heating/cooling systems directly into the drinking water 
supply. In addition, low molecular weight hydrocarbons, such as those in fuel, are 
able to permeate through plastic water pipes, which may result in contamination.
Internal premises: within buildings themselves, internal piping may have similar 
problems to those of the distribution system. A further source of contamination may 
arise from the linings of internal water storage tank.
It should be noted that, water that is polluted in a raw water storage reservoir, prior to 
any treatment, might be decontaminated in the water treatment process, depending on 
the type and quantity of the pollutant.
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In most contamination incidents water is a sink for contaminants. Some examples are 
presented in Boxes 5 and 6.
Box 2.5: Fire at a chemical recycling plant
A site used for the storage of multiple chemicals, where many containers were in a damaged state 
and different chemicals were stored next to each with the potential for reaction, was destroyed by 
fire, causing an air pollution event. Contaminated firewater was initially contained on site, however, 
subsequent heavy rain led to flooding of the site when a nearby river burst its banks. The firewater 
then caused contamination of surrounding surface water, agricultural land and flooded into nearby 
homes. The resulting widespread contamination necessitated a lengthy remediation process.
Air
Soil
C hem ical
fire
C ontam inated
firew ater
S urface w ater
N earby
properties
Box 2.6: Long-term leakage of heating oil into soil leading to permeation of plastic 
water supply pipes
Soil
Surface
w ater
D rink ing
w ater
L eaking oil 
central heating
A small housing estate in a rural location was supplied with oil for central heating. Following the 
discovery of oil contamination in lake near to the site, investigations found the external oil meters 
outside some of the houses were leaking. The meters were replaced and no further pollution was 
found in the lake. However, the contaminated soil surrounding the meters subsequently caused 
contamination of the drinking water supply to the houses, due to permeation of organic chemicals 
from the oil through plastic water supply pipes.
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Groundwater
Groundwater is a very important resource and in the UK almost 30% of our drinking 
water is abstracted from groundwater sources (Figure 5). Some potential sources of 
groundwater contamination are highlighted in Figure 6. Once a groundwater source 
becomes contaminated it is very difficult to remediate and therefore groundwater 
protection is vital.
Figure 5: UK drinking water supplies from groundwater
NORTI
S EVERN
TRENLLi
boundary
Percen tage  of 
total supply 
from groundwater
Total annual 
groundwater  
abstraction  
in millions of 
cubic m etres
SO U T H  W E S T
SO U T H E R N  
W E S S E X  THAMES
I'K  G roundw ater Forum
NOR T HE R N
IRELAND
SC O TLAN D
NORTHUMBRIAN  
YORKSHIRE
ANGLIAN
£  Chalk
Jurassic  lim eston es
Perm o-Triassic
sa n d sto n e s
Devonian/Carboniferous- 
Older cover
C-l l
Figure 6: Potential groundwater contamination sources
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The transport o f  pollutants through the subsurface will be strongly influenced by the 
direction o f  groundwater flow and the nature, quality and mobility o f  groundwater 
are all dependent on the rock formations in which the water is held (Manahan, 1993).
Most groundwater was originally rainwater that has infiltrated through the ground, 
although some water is held by dry soil particles at the surface. The quantity o f  water 
that can be accommodated under the surface depends on the porosity o f  the sub­
surface strata (W ilson, 1990) and the ease with which the water is able to flow  is 
influenced by the permeability o f  the material. Below the surface, some soil particles 
will be covered in water but the gaps between the soil particles are filled with air 
(Figure 7). This is referred to as the unsaturated zone or the aeration zone.
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Figure 7: Soil particles*
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Further underground, all of the voids between the soil particles become filled with 
water. This is referred to as the saturated zone. The water table is situated at the 
very top of the saturated zone and may also be referred to as the phreatic surface. A 
perched water table is produced when there is an impervious rock in the unsaturated 
zone. Water is drawn above the water table by small passageways through the soil in 
a region called the capillary fringe (Manahan, 1993). These features are illustrated in 
Figure 8.
A bed or ‘stratum’ of rock below the Earth’s surface that holds water and through 
which water can flow is called an aquifer (Watt, 1990). Rocks that are too 
impermeable to allow the flow of water are referred to as aqicludes. An aquifer that 
has become overlain by impermeable material is called a confined aquifer.
For more information about groundwater and the UK groundwater industry refer to 
‘Groundwater -  Our Hidden Asset’, published on behalf of the UK Groundwater 
Forum by the British Geological Survey (2000).
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Figure 8: Labelled diagram of subsurface*
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*Figures 2.8 and 2.9 are taken from ‘Fundamentals of Environmental Chemistry’, 
Stanley E. Manahan, Lewis Publishers 1993
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Risk Communication
Chapter 9 from ‘The Environment and Public Health’ (Eagles et a l , 2002)
Chapter aims and content
In all chemical incidents it is important that risk is communicated and managed 
effectively to ensure that the public are aware of any dangers and also to minimise 
any inappropriate media attention. This is true for both acute incidents, such as a fire 
in a warehouse or a chemical leak, and long-term chronic problems, such as a landfill 
site or a derelict factory site that is to be redeveloped. The aim of this chapter is to 
provide an overview of some of the key issues that should be considered when 
communicating environmental risk.
Introduction
The link between the quality of the environment and human health has been 
recognised for centuries but recent years have seen increased interest in the 
interactions between human health and the environment in which we live. 
Environmental problems are often perceived to have a public health impact and 
many people now have access to the Internet and are able to obtain detailed 
information on the risks associated with various chemicals and industrial processes. 
This information has not always been peer reviewed and so may be inaccurate or 
misleading or perhaps require careful interpretation. Communicating risks effectively 
has therefore become an important issue.
It is important that all of the people who may be interested in a particular issue are 
identified and involved in the communication process. This group of people are 
collectively referred to as ‘stakeholders’ and may include local industry, lawyers and 
representatives of financial institutions as well as local residents and community 
action groups. However, it is important to realise that all stakeholders may have 
conflicting views and concerns and may require different information and 
reassurances.
Communicating with the public
The primary aims for communicating with the public are to:
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• alert the affected population to the hazard;
• provide information on all actions the public should be taking to minimise 
adverse health effects;
• where possible, reassure the public about the level of risk in order to 
minimise anxiety.
Communicating about risks to the public’s health can be a difficult task. The 
Department of Health has produced some Pointers to Good Practice that give a good 
overview of the complexities of risk communication and lay down a framework for 
good communication (Department of Health, 1998).
The public reaction to risk may seem surprising, especially when compared with 
scientific estimates. The concept of ‘risk’ means different things to different people, 
which is why public reaction to risk can differ so much from what the evidence 
would suggest. Until recently the prevailing view has been that the public are simply 
behaving irrationally when worrying unnecessarily about low-level health risks. 
There is now widespread acceptance that the reaction of the public to risk is not 
irrational but based upon issues that relate to
• the characteristics of the risk,
• the trust they feel for the people and organisations giving them the risk 
message and
• the extent to which they are involved in two way communication.
The way in which the public treat and respond to risks will also depend on their 
perception of how the risks relate to them and things they value (Health and Safety 
Executive, 1999).
Certain types of risk are known to have characteristics that alarm the public. Factors 
that are important in understanding what triggers concern and sometimes anger have 
been established through many years of research. These include whether the risk is 
voluntary, how familiar the risk is, the apparent equity of the distribution and so on 
(Box 1). It appears that these characteristics reflect fundamental values and they 
cannot be dismissed as irrational. Box 2 presents an example which uses these ‘fright
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factors’ to demonstrate why the public are so often opposed to the siting o f  waste 
disposal facilities.
Box 1: Key factors affecting the tolerability o f  risk by individuals and society 
(Adapted from Communicating about risks to public health: pointers to good 
practice , NHS Executive. 1998)
“FRIGHT FACTORS”
Risks are generally less acceptable i f  perceived to be...
1. involuntary rather than voluntary
2. inequitably distributed
3. inescapable by taking personal precautions
4. arise from an unfamiliar or novel source
5. result from manmade rather than natural sources
6. cause hidden and irreversible damage
7. pose some particular danger to future generations
8. arouse particular dread
9. damage identifiable rather than anonymous victims
10. poorly understood by science
11. subject to contradictory statements from responsible sources
Because o f  the factors that affect risk perception, the use o f  risk comparisons should 
be avoided (Fairman et al, 2000). Comparing the public health risks o f  one issue with 
another familiar accepted risk (such as crossing the road) may appear to put the risk 
into perspective, but could backfire especially i f  involuntary and voluntary risks are 
juxtaposed.
Therefore in communicating risk it is important to look at issues much wider than the 
preparation o f  m essages and the release o f  announcements, although these are 
important.
C-17
Box 2: Waste disposal
Waste Disposal (Keller 1992, Sandman 1985)
In the UK  we are currently facing a huge waste disposal problem which has resulted 
from the fact that too much waste is being produced for the current disposal facilities 
to deal with. A particular problem is the disposal o f  hazardous waste. An obvious 
solution to this dilemma would be to develop new disposal facilities. However, no 
one wants to live near to an incinerator or landfill site due to the perceived hazards 
associated with such facilities. These include endangering public health, air and 
water quality, property values, peace o f  mind and quality o f  life (the media is often 
responsible for providing much o f  this information). The principal barrier to disposal 
facility development is therefore considered to be community opposition.
The following points outline some o f  the reasons why communities fear hazardous 
waste disposal sites.
• The perceived risk associated with a hazardous waste facility is, in part, a 
reflection o f  its unfamiliarity.
•  The risk is perceived as involuntary due to outside coercion.
• The risk is perceived to be in the control o f  others.
•  There are undetectable risks, for example, a large part o f  the dread of
carcinogenity is its undetectability during its inactive/dormant period.
• A  substantial share o f  the fear o f  hazardous waste facilities is attributable to 
the fact that only a few are to be sited and therefore a few people must suffer 
the costs/risks to provide the benefit for many.
•  The individual is unable to protect him /herself in the event o f  an accident.
The public places most trust in management strategies that recognise and identify 
risks and which provide for rapid response and implementation o f  corrective action 
(Petts, 1994). Trust is easily lost while building it is a long-term cumulative process. 
Short o f  a reputation for infallibility the single most important factor is openness. 
Perception o f  the potential hazards associated with a chemical or chemicals can 
provoke a great deal o f  anxiety. This is further amplified by speculation and rumours 
when appropriate information is not available. It is therefore really important that 
clear and appropriate information is provided and made available to the public. This
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should include a candid account of the underlying evidence (Department of Health, 
1998) and of any assumptions made or areas of uncertainty.
It is vital to ensure that the affected population is clearly identified and contacted to 
avoid causing unnecessary anxiety in areas that are not affected by the incident. The 
affected population can be alerted about hazard through a number of routes 
including:
• personal letter
• general letter
• information leaflet
• door-to-door visit
• local media (radio, newspaper, television)
• public meeting
• e-mail
• the Internet
In addition other facilities can provide information for the public seeking 
information. For example, it may be necessary to set up a telephone 
helpline/information line. For a good precis of the pros and cons of different methods 
of communicating risk, see Sniffer (1999).
Care should be taken to ensure that vulnerable sections of the population are able to 
receive and act on information, for example, the elderly or disabled, particularly 
those living alone and/or those who are housebound. The need to provide 
information in languages other than English should also be considered. Contingency 
plans should be made for the possibility of an electricity failure, which would limit 
the methods available for contacting the public.
It should not be assumed that the public will not understand complex information, 
and uncertainties should not be covered up as a consistent conclusion from research 
on the subject is that this reduces public trust. In addition, in the age of the Internet, 
somebody is bound to find out if information is being distorted or hidden. Refer to
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Boxes 3 and 4 for checklists o f  D o ’s and D on’ts o f  written and verbal risk 
communication.
Box 3: Dos and D on’ts o f  written risk communication
Things to do Things to avoid
©  Be as clear as possible about the data 
and its meaning
©  Highlight the way decisions were 
made
©  Be constructive about the w ay risk is 
being communicated 
©Emphasise areas o f  value judgement, 
uncertainties and underlying assumptions 
©  Accept the concerns and fears as 
legitimate and understandable sentiments 
©  Respond positively to reasonable 
requests
©  Offer further contact points
©  Make the m essage and the programme
understandable
©  Invite key individuals to take part
©  Provide conflicting information to 
different audiences 
©  Make promises you cannot keep 
©  Justify involuntary risk by pointing at 
higher risk acceptance at voluntary risk 
©  Assume that no response means ‘all is 
w ell’
©  D on’t only admit to what you know  
‘the other side’ knows already 
©  Change your story as you go along 
©  Hide behind legal (or any other) 
jargon
©  Becom e confrontational
Box 4: Dos and D on’ts o f  verbal risk communication
Things to do Things to avoid
©  Be as clear as possible about the data 
and its meaning
©  Highlight the way decisions were 
made
©  Emphasise areas o f  value judgement, 
uncertainties and underlying assumptions 
©  Listen!
©  Leave contact details for follow  up
©  Assum e the ignorance o f  the audience. 
It is condescending, hazardous and often 
wrong.
©  Talking ‘at’ people, appearing too 
keen to get your own m essage across at 
the expense o f  answering the question 
©M ake promises you cannot keep 
©  Justify involuntary risk by pointing at
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©  Accept the concerns and fears as
legitimate and understandable sentiments
■
©  Be as open and honest as possible
■ ■
©  Empathise with the audience -  how  
would you react if  you were in their 
position?
©  Make the m essage and the programme 
understandable
©  Have an interdisciplinary team 
preparing and presenting the 
communication
higher risk acceptance at voluntary risk 
©  Surprise the audience with new  
insights or data they could/should have 
had access to in advance 
©  Change your story as you go along 
©  Act on the feeling o f  threat towards 
you
©  Hide behind legal (or any other) 
jargon
©  A llow  individuals m onopolise the 
debate
Regardless o f  the quality o f  the information provided, merely making information 
available is not the solution to eliminating public concern, particularly when 
managing more complex chronic problems. Information must be communicated 
effectively and there should be a provision for feedback so that there is a feeling that 
concerns have been heard and not just dismissed. A  dynamic consultation process 
whereby local residents are able to request information, voice concerns and be 
satisfied with the response is needed.
Communicating with the media
A possible risk to public health is more likely to become a major story if  any o f  the 
‘media triggers’ listed in Box 5 become apparent. Media interest may amplify public 
awareness and concern about a particular issue. The media are often accused o f  
sensationalising stories and fabricating the truth. Because o f  this the media are often 
regarded quite negatively when considering their role in communicating risk to the 
general public.
C-21
Box 5: Media triggers (Adapted from Communicating about risks to public health:
pointers to good practice, NHS Executive, 1998)
•  Questions o f  blame
• Alleged secrets and attempted “cover-ups”
•  “Human interest” through identifiable celebrities, heroes, villains, dupes, 
etc. (as well as victims)
•  Links with existing high-profile issues or personalities
•  Conflict
•  Signal value: the story as a portent o f  further ills
•  Many people exposed to the risk, even if  at low levels
•  Strong visual impact
• Links to sex and/or crime
It is important to consider communications with the media at a very early stage o f  the 
incident because:
• the media can provide valuable assistance in providing information to the 
public on any precautionary action that should be taken to minimise adverse 
health effects.
• you can have a much greater influence over the information that is released to 
the public and reduce any unnecessary anxiety from inaccurate reports and 
‘scare’ stories. If you do not provide information then the media w ill be 
compelled to obtain details from other potentially less reliable sources.
• the media may be a useful source o f  information.
When communicating with the media it is important to be very clear about the 
m essage you wish to convey. Consider putting your local press first as this w ill 
foster goodwill. It is usually from there that local TV and radio and the national 
media pick up stories to gain wider attention where this is appropriate. Using the 
media both to disseminate information to the public is considered to be o f  major 
value in the United States hence the development o f  the SOCHO (single over-riding 
communication health objective) sheet (Figure 1). This is a very practical and easy
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to use tool that can be used in preparing a press statement or for a television or radio 
interview (Latham, 2000).
The aim of the SOCHO sheet is to put the onus on the interviewee to state the issue 
accurately and concisely and to give advice -  not to elicit a sound bite or to ‘dumb 
down’ the information.
Releasing a joint press statement that has been agreed by all of the agencies involved 
in managing the incident is considered to be the most appropriate course of action. 
This ensures that all agencies involved are sharing the same information.
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Figure 1: The SOCHO sheet
SOCHO sheet
In one brief paragraph, please state the key point or objective o f your (media/press 
story) submission. This statement should resemble what you, the writer, would like 
to see as the lead paragraph in a newspaper story or in a broadcast news report 
about your submission.
What are the three facts or statistics you would like the public to remember as a 
result o f reading, or hearing about your story?
1.
2 .
3.
What is the main audience or population segment that you would like this to reach?
Primary
Secondary
What is the one message the audience needs to take from this article?
Name:
Telephone number:
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Site Investigation and Remediation
Chapter 11 from ‘The Environment and Public Health’ (Eagles et a l , 2002)
Chapter aims and content
This chapter looks at the on-site response that may be required to manage an 
incident. The information will be most relevant for those dealing with historic 
(chronic) land contamination problems although more general topics include carrying 
out a site visit, identifying an unknown chemical, decontamination and personal 
protective equipment (PPE).
Introduction
Chemical incident management can broadly be divided into three stages as 
highlighted in Figure. 1.
Figure 1- Three stages of chemical incident response and management
STAGE 1: 
Emergency response
STAGE 2: 
Incident investigation
STAGE 3: 
Remedial action
•  usually involves the emergency 
services
•  primary aim is to remove risk of  
explosion or fire
• chemical contained to prevent 
further contamination and migration
•  take immediate action to protect 
public health (shelter/evacuate)
•  address health and environmental 
impact o f event
• identify source-pathway-receptor
•  undertake detailed site assessment 
i f  necessary
•  identify any affected individuals
•  take further action to protect public 
health
• review options available for removal o f  
contamination or inhibiting exposure 
pathways
•  select and apply most appropriate option 
based on suitable for use approach
•  continue care o f affected individuals
•  determine i f  long term environmental 
monitoring or epidemiological 
investigation is required
Emergency response
The immediate or emergency response to many chemical incidents involves the 
emergency services and often the Fire Service will take a lead role. When dealing 
with incidents that involve hazardous materials, frequently referred to as 
HAZMATS, the primary aim is to remove the risk of explosion and prevent pollution 
of controlled waters -  surface water, such as rivers and streams, freshwater lakes and 
groundwater. Local residents may need to be evacuated largely, at this stage, due to 
risk of fire or explosion. Once this hazard has been mitigated, the contaminant needs
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to be contained as far as possible to prevent wider migration of the chemical and 
minimise further contamination. Control of the incident is then passed to the 
appropriate regulatory authority for further investigation and management. This is 
usually the local authority or the Environment Agency.
Also at this stage any immediate action required to protect public health, and in 
particular any individuals that have been exposed, should be taken. Casualties may 
require decontamination before further medical treatment. It is also imperative that 
those managing the incident have appropriate personal protective equipment (PPE) 
so that exposure is minimised. Further information about decontamination and PPE 
is outlined in Box.l.
Box 1 - Personal decontamination and personal protective equipment 
The NHS guidance on planning for major incidents issued in 1998, states that:
Health authorities must ensure that appropriate health care measures are being provided by acute 
hospital trusts, am bulance trusts and other providers to (a) guard the health, safety and welfare o f  their 
own em ployees and (b) assist and treat those people who have or may have been exposed to a 
chemical incident, including:
•  provision o f protective clothing for those adm inistering care either at the scene o f  the 
incident or at the receiving hospital(s); and
•  availability o f  facilities for the decontamination o f  casualties, staff and equipment, either at 
the scene o f  the incident or at the receiving hospital(s).
Advice on decontam ination and personal protective equipm ent (PPE) may be available from the 
regional health em ergency planning advisor (HEPA) or from relevant occupational health 
professionals. The National Focus is currently reviewing guidance for decontam ination/PPE on behalf
:
o f the Departm ent o f  Health.
Incident Investigation
The incident investigation stage addresses the health and environmental impact of the 
event. It involves undertaking a detailed assessment and determining potential and 
actual contaminant pathways. A contaminant pathway is the path taken by the 
chemical between the source of contamination and the receptor (the person, product 
or part of the environment that will potentially be affected by the chemical).
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A site investigation may be carried out in order to identify and assess any hazards 
that may be present on a site. This information can then be used to determine 
whether any remedial action is required and what measures or controls need to be put 
in place in order to protect human health and the environment.
It is generally considered that a site investigation can be divided into two phases.
The initial assessment involves the collection and assessment of existing information 
about the site and the surrounding area, for example:
• maps
• plans
• photographs
• geological and hydrogeological records
• local records (for land contamination problems, information about the past 
industrial use of the site may be used to identify the contaminants likely to be 
present).
Once the information has been analysed a site visit is often carried out [refer to Box 
2]. A site visit can help you to visualise the problem and enable a more informed 
assessment of the on-site and off-site risk. Site visits usually require collaboration 
between public health and other agencies that may be involved in the management of 
the incident, such as environmental health officers and pollution control officers as 
well as inspectors from the Environment Agency and the Health and Safety 
Executive.
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Box 2 -  Carrying out a site visit
Checklist for site visits: the hazard assessment process (adapted from Public Health 
Assessment Guidance Manual, Chapter on Evaluating Site Information, ATSDR 
Science Corner; http:/ ATSDR@cdc.gov)
Dominique Crowley, Specialist Registrar, CIRS & Dept, of Public Health and Epidemiology, 
University College, Dublin
Site visits and data collected for the subsequent report should aim to address, where relevant, 
the following issues.
Site identifiers
Site name, i.e. address and location 
Site type (e.g. mine, landfill, spill etc.)
Site status and description in terms of registration/official listing e.g. CIMAH, Integrated 
Pollution Prevention and Control (IPPC)
EA/EHO contact name, phone number and fax number. Also names and grades of those 
who accompanied you on the site visit
Description of problems/concerns. This may include perceived concerns of the referring 
authority and the real/actual concerns after assessment.
Site History
Current and past uses of the site including buildings and areas where workers members of
the public may be exposed to contaminants
Dates of significant events (e.g. fires, changes in use etc.)
Descriptions of any previous history of contamination on the site and any remedial action 
taken
Information on the process of treatment, storage and disposal of hazardous waste on the site 
both currently and in the past
Description of number and location of service pipes and utilities on the site, under the site or 
through the site and of over-head power lines, if present.
Recent meteorology and description of weather conditions during the site visit (if 
appropriate)
Geographic and demographic data
Ordnance survey map co-ordinates of the site, the scale of the map used
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Distance for the site to closet residence
Approximate population size residing within one mile radius of the site or within the 
potentially affected area, whichever is greater
Uses of the land in the surrounding area including schools, hospitals, residential care etc., in 
addition to features such as streams, agricultural land, water reservoirs, other industrial sites 
etc.
Topographic features of the land and description, where available, of geology of the region. 
Location and relation shin to surroundings
On-site activities and estimated number of people involved in these activities 
Barriers and fencing enclosing the site and preventing, where appropriate, public access 
Security on site
Estimated frequency of on-site activities
The methods of transporting hazardous material to the site and off-site
Number of other potential sources of environmental contamination in the surrounding area
Description of safety procedure, if any, in place to limit exposure off-site
List of substances identified
List of chemical names and CAS numbers if known
Estimate of the quantities of contaminates released into each medium (soil, air, surface 
water, ground water)
Maximum concentration, range and extent of contamination of each medium, including 
where possible peak and trough concentrations
Potential or actual movement of the chemical by dispersion, diffusion etc.
Identification of waste materials and their quantities
Documentation of any chemical, mechanical, meteorological or other phenomenon that 
might rapidly alter the current physical state of the chemicals present or the general 
condition of the site (e.g. fire, tidal zone, rain earthquake etc.)
Documentation of potential toxicity to humans of each of the substances identified and any 
mixtures or compounds that might be formed, for example, as a result of combustion or 
atmospheric conditions.
Health Assessment
Documentation of any adverse health reports among the workers at the site; these may be 
categorised as acute, acute-on-chronic and chronic health effects
Ascertainment of any health complaints among the emergency services or those working on
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the clean-up process
Documentation of safety measures being taken to contain the hazard - both occupational and 
public safety
Ascertainment of those with increased susceptibility to adverse health effects 
Documentation of any reports of health complaints as a result of the incident among the local 
population; these may be categorised as acute, acute-on-chronic and chronic health effects 
Plans for follow-up of those exposed.
Analytical information for biological and environmental sampling
Name and contact number of the laboratory conducting the analysis of samples
Description of the methods of sampling used
Detection and quantification limits for analytical data
Sample storage protocol and holding times
Number and location of all samples taken and date and time of sampling; reference to peak 
an trough samples should also be indicated where necessary
Assurance of care with sampling equipment and protective clothing to prevent cross- 
contamination of samples
Description of the level of quality assurance/ quality control guidance for the analytical 
process
Evidence of ‘chain of custody’, if necessary, for samples.
A meeting prior to the site visit w ill allow for agreement between agencies about the 
purpose o f  the visit and will provide the opportunity to raise any specific issues and 
concerns. It is important to ensure that all personnel visiting a potentially 
contaminated area wear appropriate personal protective equipment (PPE). At the end 
o f  the visit a further meeting to agree further actions and request additional 
information is invaluable. The public health practitioner should write a report o f  the 
site visit, so it might be useful to take a camera and a site visit report form (Form 1) 
to record incident details for future reference.
The results o f  this first phase o f  the site investigation w ill lead to one o f  the 
following conclusions:
• the site is free from contamination and that risk from exposure is negligible 
® the site is contaminated and further investigation is required to determine the 
exact nature and extent o f  the contamination.
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In the latter situation, further investigation is undertaken in order to:
• determine the distribution of contaminants (where and how much)
• identify possible hazards and potential exposure pathways
• determine the most appropriate clean-up option for the site
One of the most important stages of the site investigation process is sampling and 
analysis of the environmental media that may have been affected. Information from 
sampling points can be used to determine the distribution of contaminants and the 
volume of contaminated material. This can be done using calculations or computer 
models but these will not be discussed in any further detail at this stage.
Soil samples
This section will focus on soil sampling patterns although a more detailed discussion 
of collecting and analysing environmental samples is provided in Chapter 10 of ‘The 
Environment and Public Health’ (Eagles et al, 2002). In contaminated land 
investigation, a sampling programme is designed to establish the spatial distribution 
as well as the concentration of contaminants present. The sampling programme 
could be single or multistage. The extent of knowledge of where contaminant 
‘hotspots’ or plumes are located within the soil will influence the sampling pattern 
selected. In practice, the information collected during the initial phase of the site 
investigation should provide a strong indication of the location of potential hotspots 
so a sampling pattern can be selected and modified accordingly. The obvious 
advantage of using a multistage sampling programme is that it is more flexible, but it 
is more expensive and time consuming. So if there is no indication of the spatial 
distribution of the contaminants, a multistage sampling programme should be 
undertaken with a series of wide-spaced samples taken initially to search for areas of 
significant contamination. Subsequent samples can then be taken from areas where 
contamination has been detected. Some sampling patterns are shown in Figure 2.
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Figure 2 -  Soil sampling patterns
1. X-pattem 2. W -pattem 3. Transects
4. Square grid 5. Rectangular grid
6. Diam ond grid
7. Grid samples plus hotspots
8. Random 9. Stratified random 10. Herringbone
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A review of the effectiveness of some of the patterns for locating elongate areas of 
contamination was carried out by Ferguson (1992). He concluded that
(a) the square grid sampling pattern is efficient for locating elongate hotspots but can 
suffer from severe loss of performance for elongate hotspots lying parallel to the grid 
direction;
(b) the stratified random pattern is a relatively poor performer and the simple random 
pattern is worst of all;
(c) the herringbone pattern is the best performer and is only very weakly influenced 
by the orientation of the hotspot.
In order to establish the vertical extent of the contamination, a series of samples are 
taken across the site. The depth of contamination can be determined by taking a 
series of samples from the same hole at different depths. Great care should be taken 
to collect representative samples and maintain sample integrity; for many 
contaminants the concentration sufficient to present a hazard is very low. This is 
especially true in the case of some Polycyclic Aromatic Hydrocarbons (PAHs).
Samples of contaminated soil may be obtained by excavation of trial pits or from 
boreholes. Manual sampling is only really practical to depths of < lm  and the 
samples obtained are not always very representative.
Remedial Action
Once a site investigation has been undertaken, the nature and extent of contamination 
will have been assessed. This information can then be used to determine what level 
of clean up or ‘remediation’, if any, is required.
The aim of remedial action is to achieve one or possibly more of the following:
• remove or remediate the source of contamination;
• remove the pathway of exposure between the source and the receptor;
• remove the receptor from the location of the contamination.
Source removal
Examples of source removal are:
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• extinguishing fires;
• clean up of spills;
• removing or remediating contaminated soil;
• flushing water pipes of contaminated drinking water;
• fitting a filter to an industrial facility to remove particulates.
Secondary contamination sources may also require removal or remediation. For 
example, mercury can be carried on clothing into homes and contaminate 
furnishings, and attempts at decontamination by occupants may result in further 
contamination of vacuum cleaners and washing machines.
With all removal techniques the contaminant still has to be disposed of somewhere. 
The aim, however, is to either render the chemical harmless or to keep it in a more 
appropriate location, away from populations and/or under conditions which prevent 
its escape. Some remedial options have the potential to remove the source of 
contamination completely, rather than just moving it somewhere else. Some 
examples for land contamination are discussed later in this chapter.
Pathway removal
Removing the pathway involves making the chemical unavailable to the receptor, 
which, in terms of risks to public health, is usually humans, but may also be animals, 
plants or buildings. For example, pathway removal may occur in contaminated land 
by stopping people eating plants grown in contaminated soil, or providing plastic 
coated metal pipes to prevent chemical contamination of water supplies through 
permeation. Alternatively, chemicals could be solidified so they can no longer move 
and therefore cannot be taken up by plants for human consumption or contaminate 
water sources. In an incident of drinking water contamination, the pathway between 
the contaminant and the population at risk could be removed by preventing the 
population from drinking or using the water. In an incident of acute outdoor air 
contamination, for example as the result of a fire, the pathway can be removed by 
advising those at risk to remain indoors with windows and doors shut to prevent or 
reduce ingress of the contaminants into the house (sheltering). Obviously some
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pathway removal measures can only be temporary and some sort of source removal 
or remediation will be required in the long-term.
Receptor removal
Focusing on human populations, the most common method for removing the receptor 
would be the evacuation of the population at risk away from sources or pathways of 
contamination and chemical exposure. Such action may be most appropriate in 
circumstances of significant environmental contamination, for example the Love 
Canal hazardous waste incident.
Figure 3 illustrates a more detailed version of the source-pathway-receptor model 
introduced in Chapter 2 of ‘The Environment and Public Health’ (Eagles et al, 2002). 
It outlines the information required to describe each stage and the methods that can 
be implemented in order to minimise exposure.
Remediation options for contaminated land
In the UK, the level of remediation undertaken on a particular site is based on a 
‘suitable for use’ approach. This means that risks to human health and the 
environment are assessed based on the current or intended future land use and any 
remedial action undertaken should ensure that those risks are mitigated. It is 
considered that risks from contaminated land can be satisfactorily assessed only in 
the context of specific uses of the land (whether current or proposed), and that any 
attempt to guess what might be needed at some time in the future for other uses is 
likely to result either in premature work (thereby distorting social, economic and 
environmental priorities) or in unnecessary work (thereby wasting resources) 
(DETR).
Options for the remedial treatment of contaminated land can broadly be divided into 
three categories:
• excavation and disposal
• containment
• treatment
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Figure 3 - Source-pathway-receptor model and remediation
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pathway?
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people are 
exposed?
how are 
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exposed, 
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inhalation 
contact with 
skin, eye, 
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membranes?
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been exposed, 
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concentration 
and duration?
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The most important factors to take into consideration when deciding what 
remediation technique to employ to clean up a particular site are:
• What is the land currently used for and what will it be used for in the future?
• What type of contamination is present, e.g. solid, liquid, gaseous?
• What is the cost of carrying out each of the appropriate remedial methods?
• What are the geological conditions, e.g. soil type, porosity, water levels in the 
soil?
In addition, it is important to consider how reactive (physically, chemically or 
biologically) and how mobile the chemicals are.
Until recently in the UK, the first choice of remedial solution has been to excavate 
the soil and transport it to a licensed landfill site (this is an example of source 
removal). This option has a comparatively low cost and the ‘process’ is well 
understood. Other methods used are capping or covering and containment (this is an 
example of pathway removal). However, in light of the introduction of landfill tax, 
disposal to landfill has become an increasingly expensive option and resulted the 
need to explore alternative solutions for cleaning up contaminated soil. These 
broadly fit into two categories -  insitu (no excavation of soil material is required) 
and exsitu (soil is removed from the site and treated elsewhere). A number of the 
options that have been explored are outlined in Figure 4. Those underlined are 
summarized below.
Vitrification
This involves raising the temperature of contaminated soil to a high enough level to 
cause it to melt. The organic compounds are then driven off or oxidised into 
simpler compounds. On cooling, the soil solidifies into a glass like material, which 
contains the inorganic contaminants. These contaminants are then stabilised in the 
vitrified soil, which is impermeable and has very low leaching characteristics. This 
is an insitu process. This process has also been used for the containment of 
radioactive waste.
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Figure 4 - Remediation Options (Taken from ‘Remedial Processes for Contaminated
Land’, edited by Malcolm Pratt. IChemE 1993)
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Stabilisation & Solidification
Stabilisation involves mixing reagents, such as cement, lime or others, with 
contaminated soil or sediment in order to minimise the mobility of contaminants and 
reduce the toxicity of the media. Solidification involves mixing additives with the 
soil to improve the engineering properties (for example, compressive strength, 
permeability etc.). These two processes are often used together in many remediation 
applications and can take place insitu or exsitu.
Biological treatment
Bioremediation is a destructive remediation technique that uses microbial processes 
to break down contaminants in the soil. The technique is used mostly for organic 
compounds for example, petroleum hydrocarbons, pesticides and solvents and takes 
advantage of the natural ability of living things to remove hazards that threaten 
humans and animals. The process may be aerobic (in the presence of oxygen) or 
anaerobic (in the absence of oxygen).
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Microbial breakdown usually occurs naturally in contaminated soil, but the process is 
often very slow and incomplete. Circulating nutrients and oxygen through the soil 
and optimising the temperature and pH can be used to modify and enhance the 
process. This is referred to as biostimulation.
Sometimes the organisms that are able to utilise the contaminant are poor 
competitors and so specially bred micro-organisms or pre adapted cultures are added 
to the soil. This is called bioaugmentation.
Problems may occur if contaminants are broken down into intermediate products that 
are equally or more harmful than the original, for example, trichloroethylene 
anaerobically degrades to vinyl chloride.
Bio venting is a process in which air is either injected or extracted to force air 
movement in the contaminated soil -  increasing oxygen levels in the soil enhances 
natural degradation processes.
Vacuum extraction
This is a common technique for the removal of volatile organic compounds (VOCs) 
from contaminated land. A vacuum is applied through extraction wells to create a 
pressure gradient. The reduced vapour pressure in the wells causes air and VOCs to 
flow out through the extraction wells.
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Form 1: Site visit report form
Site
Date Time
Who visited
Incident summary
FURTHER INFORMATION
1. Who has identified the issue to the health agency?
Local Authority Local Residents Other:
Environment Agency Emergency Services
2. How was the issue discovered?
Spill, leak, explosion 
etc*
Planning application Complaint
Routine testing ** Change of land use Other:
* or other acute incident
** planned by the Environmental Health Department of the Local Authority
3. How long has there been a problem?
C-40
4. Who is currently involved in the incident including the incident investigation?
SITE SPECIFIC INFORMATION
5. Where is the site? (Postcode if possible)
6. How big is the site (acres/hectares)?
7. Is the area predominantly rural or urban?
8. What is known about the history of the site and the adjacent land?
9. What is the site currently used for?
Parkland Light Commercial Allotments
Housing Heavy Industry Farming
Derelict & 
abandoned site
Other:
10. What is the soil type?
Sand Clay Mixed Other:
Silt Loam Mixed waste 
material
11. What is the underlying geology/hydrology? Yes No
(A) Is the site on/near an aquifer?
(B) Is there an abstraction point on or near to the 
site?
(C) Do any (plastic) water pipes run through the 
ground?
(D) Other
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12. Does a stream/river flow through or near to the site?
13. What is the topography?
14. What is the prevailing wind direction?
15. How close is the nearest property to the site?
CONTAMINANTS IN THE SOIL
16. What chemical(s) is present?
17. What form is the chemical(s) in?
18. What levels of chemicals have been detected in the soil?
19. How many samples have been taken?
20. Who has taken the samples?
21. How were the samples taken? (Sampling strategy?)
22. Where have the samples been sent for analysis? (UKAS accredited laboratory?)
INITIAL HAZARD & RISK ASSESSMENT
23. Have there been any complaints of health problems that may be associated with 
exposure to the chemical(s)?
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24. Is there a pathway between the source of the contamination and any potential 
targets (human, animal etc.)?
25. Is further sampling, environmental or biological, required?
26. What (if any) immediate action is required? (evacuation etc.)
27. Can the chemical be controlled/contained immediately?
28. What steps need to be taken to prevent further contamination? (Short and long 
term considerations)
ACTIONS
Site visit report written by 
Date
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A PPE N D IX  D
D. LONDON SECTOR CBRN PROJECT GROUP MEETING
The aim of the project group meeting in July 2002 was to discuss and scope the 
possibility of developing a support structure and the implementation of a common 
framework for the public health (PH) response to hazardous incidents, to include 
accidental and deliberate chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear incidents 
(CBRN).
A template plan for PCTs had already been developed and circulated, which 
comprises a framework addressing their core services but not addressing either the 
public health response or the health economy co-ordination function. This is now 
required urgently for the five sectors upon which those functions are now focused, 
co-terminal with the health protection units, new health authorities and NHS Direct 
boundaries. This needs to be complemented by regional and hopefully national 
structures.
It was understood that there are a number of groups and individuals undergoing 
similar work, with varied timelines to completion. Maximum use should be made of 
such activity, while not hindering a rapid outcome to support the development of 
London arrangements.
It was felt that there was a need to streamline public health emergency response and 
bring CBRN incident management alongside other emergency response structures 
within the NHS. This would need to ensure that clinical response issues as well as 
the management response of the NHS to support this are fully integrated. All 
incidents, whether public health emergencies or not within the sector should be 
supported by a joint PH and NHS management response team.
The project team are a Regional HEP A (David Donegan), a CIRS representative 
(Emma Eagles) and 2 SPRs in public health (Abdu Mohidden SE Sector) and (Anita 
Roche SW Sector).
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Notes from meeting:
Defining the role of public health
The role of public health in responding to and managing CBRN incidents needed to 
be more clearly defined, since the role was quite vague and the expectations of other 
agencies that may also be involved in managing incidents varied. In particular we 
needed to think about:
• does the role of PH differs in CBRN incidents...what are the 
similarities/differences?
• where does PH fit in within the NHS and with other agencies?
• defining the public health function as well as the role of individuals
• obtaining clear expectations and role endorsement from DH and other 
stakeholders
It was agreed that professional acceptance and ‘ownership’ were key to the success 
of the strategy, thus highlighting the need for involvement and consultation of public 
health practitioners.
Actions:
• define role of PH and PH functions
• identify and review all of the guidance which currently exists
• identify and review UK legislation as it reflects guidance
• establish expectations and role endorsement (consultation)
CBRN incidents -  Common Features & Notable Variance
Some guidance and legislation for the management of CBRN incidents already 
existed but this was not generic. Therefore we needed to consider C,B,R, and N 
incidents separately and then compare and contrast:
• legislation
• guidance
• definitions of role (see above)
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functions, actions and services provided in each scenario
It was anticipated that there would be much commonality between conventional 
outbreak management, chemical incident management, nuclear weapon incident 
management and terrorism responses to deliberate release and that it would 
subsequently be possible to identify common features, in particular triggers and 
timescales that can be used to outline actions, functions and services of public health.
Actions:
• compare and contrast CBRN models used to respond to incidents
o what is common? 
o what is different?
• agencies and structures
Identifying ‘best practice’
The new framework should reflect current best practice. We needed to identify what 
this was although it was agreed that there was limited reporting of lessons leaned 
from past incidents, especially in the biological field and hence incomplete evidence 
on which to base any conclusions
It was also considered useful obtain copies of some (good) on-call packs and to find 
out if there a pro-forma for reporting incidents exists.
Actions:
• establish evidence
• literature review -  published guidance/Internet
• incidents -  professional and peer consultation
• what we/they like and identify as ‘best practice’
• identify gaps in research and other evidence
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Anticipated project outcome
• clear definition of role and function of both individuals and the public health 
response
• decision support tool for incident and risk assessment
• reflective escalation pathway indicating required actions at each level
• model within which this structure was best supported at each level
• practical guide to ‘making’ it happen (control room etc.)
• public health management guide
• integrated management response guide
Actions:
• build risk assessment and filter action tool
• develop model for response
o  evidence 
o  escalation 
o  team response 
o  plan -  on-call pack
• review supporting system and links required to effect the desired outcome.
Synopsis
It was realised that a thorough appraisal of the subject as outlined and the activity to 
address the task was a significant resource undertaking. Against the short time scale 
for the consultation draft, it was realised that the likely outcome would be an 
informed ‘best’ guess. While the skeleton framework was being consulted and 
implemented, the more detailed material to support that structure could be built in to 
the system as key targets completed by individuals and the team.
A first draft of the proposed framework was released for consultation in September 
2002 and it was anticipated that the final version would be completed by November 
2002.
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APPENDIX E
E. LAND CONTAMINATION AND HUMAN HEALTH
The link between the quality of the environment and human health has been 
recognised for centuries but recent years have seen increasing interest in the 
interactions between humans and the environment within which they live. 
Environmental problems are often perceived to have a potential public health impact. 
Yet it is only in the past twenty years following incidents such as Love Canal in New 
York State (Johnson & Covello (eds.), 1987; Jackson, 1996) that soil has been 
identified as an important exposure route to potentially toxic substances (Hynes, 
1997; RCEP, 1996). Indeed, Abrahams (2001) believes that the association between 
the health of humans and the quality of the world’s soils has been ‘under appreciated 
and under reported’.
There are a number of reasons why this may be. Firstly soil is perceived to be dirty - 
we often refer to it as ‘dirt’ - so contamination may be less obvious than 
contaminated air or water that may have a strange taste or odour. Secondly human 
interaction with soil is less frequent than with the other environmental media. 
Contaminants do not disperse as far or as quickly in soil as they do through air and 
water so any adverse health effects may be very localised and also exposure may 
occur several years after the initial pollution incident. Nevertheless, it is now 
believed that soil pollution should be given the same priority as pollution of air or 
water (RCEP, 1996; Sims et al, 1997) and Senesi et al (1999) describe soils as the 
most important environmental compartment functioning as a sink for trace elements 
released by human activities.
Soil can affect human health in several ways leading either to specific diseases or to 
more general ill health (Oliver, 1997). However, direct links between soil quality 
and human health are often difficult to establish and many of the examples that do 
exist have not been quantified (Abrahams, 2001; Oliver, 1997; Thornton, (1987)). A 
number of reasons for this are delineated in the literature. For example most trace 
elements tend to accumulate in mammalian tissues, even at low exposure doses, 
representing a subtle environmental health hazard (Senesi et al, 1999).
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Exposure to elevated levels of chemical substances in soil may occur through eating 
vegetables that have been grown in contaminated soil, inhalation of soil vapour or 
dust, dermal contact or through direct ingestion of the soil. Paustenbach et al (1992) 
outline the most significant exposure routes that need to be considered for different 
land use scenarios (Table 1).
Table 1: Most significant exposure pathways for different land use scenarios
Residential
Soil/dust ingestion
Dermal uptake
Garden vegetable ingestion
Dermatitis hazard
Recreational
Soil ingestion
Dermal contact
Runoff
Agricultural
Uptake via crops
Uptake by grazing animals
Runoff
Groundwater hazard
Fugitive dust
Industrial
Soil ingestion
Dermal uptake
Inhalation of fugitive dust
Groundwater/runoff
Wildlife
Uptake by birds
Adverse effects of predator food chain 
Effects on development and reproduction
As soil ingestion is highlighted as the most significant exposure pathway in most 
settings, this will be considered in more detail.
Ingestion
All members of an exposed population will inadvertently ingest small quantities of 
soil (Ferguson & Marsh, 1993). The majority of soil ingested by adults is thought to 
occur through hand to mouth contact and soil on produce (Paustenbach et al, 1992). 
However, some people, especially young children who are exploring their 
surroundings, may deliberately eat small quantities of soil. Ingestion of substances
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that are not normally regarded as edible is referred to as pica; more specifically the 
deliberate ingestion of soil is referred to as geophagia (Abrahams, 2001).
Most studies have investigated children because of their vulnerability to soil 
ingestion (Abrahams, 2001). An example is presented by Calabrese et al (1997), 
who discuss the possibility for child soil pica episodes to result in acute intoxication 
in cases where contaminant concentrations in the soil are considered to be below 
health based guideline levels set by the United States Environmental Protection 
Agency (US EPA). US EPA exposure assessments and guidelines derived from 
these are based on the premise that 95% of children ingest 200 mg soil/day. 
However, findings indicate that during an acute soil pica episode, a child may ingest 
up to 50g of soil. There have been many more studies and reports published on 
childhood pica and assessing risk to human health due to the deliberate ingestion of 
contaminated soil. However, a detailed investigation of these is considered to be 
beyond the scope of this literature review.
As a point of interest, in an agricultural setting where animals will consume crops 
grown in contaminated soil, they may also ingest considerable quantities of soil 
(cattle ingest an average of 0.9kg soil a day). Lipophilic chemicals accumulate in 
beef tissue and fat, which then provide humans who eat the meat with a significant 
dose.
Some trace elements including arsenic, cadmium, lead and mercury, are known to be 
harmful to human health in excessive quantities. These elements naturally exist at 
elevated levels in some soils because of the parent rock from which they were broken 
down. Therefore an addition of these elements through anthropogenic activity, such 
as mining or smelting, may result in very high levels of the chemical in the soil. 
Examples include greatly enhanced levels of arsenic and copper in soils 
contaminated by drainage waters and stream sediments from mining and smelting in 
South West England and much higher than normal levels of copper, lead, zinc and 
cadmium in soils downstream from disused mines in Wales (Senesi et al, 1999).
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In addition, some elements are antagonists - one blocks the toxic effects of the other. 
Other elements are synergistic and enhance each other’s effect, for example lead and 
cadmium. This means that even small doses can have an adverse impact on health 
(Oliver, 1997)
Lead
Most of the research into toxicity of elements via soil ingestion has concerned lead 
(Abrahams, 2001). A summary of lead toxicity is presented in Box 1.
Box 1: A summary of lead toxicity (Farrow et ah 2000)
How is lead absorbed into the body?
Organic lead
Inhalation is the primary route of absorption for organic lead. On inhalation organic 
lead can cause severe toxicity with symptoms occurring a few hours to 10 days post 
exposure. It can also be absorbed by ingestion and via the skin.
Inorganic lead
Absorption of inorganic lead by inhalation depends upon particulate size and physical 
state of the compound; 50 to 70% of an inhaled dose is absorbed if the particle size 
(<1 pm) allows the material to reach the alveoli. It can also be absorbed by ingestion.
Absorbed lead is stored in the bone. In continued exposure, the lead, which is first 
only loosely deposited in bone, gradually becomes fixed to bone.
How does lead affect the body?
Acute exposure
Organic Lead: Initial effects are anorexia, nausea, vomiting, insomnia, tremor, 
weakness, fatigue, headache, aggression, depression, irritability, restlessness, 
hyperactivity, confusion and memory impairment. Acute mania, convulsions, 
delirium, fever and coma may be delayed for hours or days. Apparent complete 
recovery can take 2-6 months to occur and some effects may persist for longer. 
Inorganic Lead: Large amounts of inhaled or ingested lead may cause nausea, 
vomiting, anorexia and abdominal pain. Malaise, convulsions, encephalopathy, 
hepatic and renal damage, anaemia, hypertension and bradycardia may occur.
Chronic exposure
Chronic exposure to excessive lead in children can cause brain damage, affect growth, 
damage kidneys, impair hearing, and cause learning and behavioral problems. In 
adults, lead can increase blood pressure and can cause digestive problems, kidney 
damage, nerve disorders, sleep problems, muscle and joint pain, and mood changes. 
Foetuses, infants, and children are more vulnerable to lead exposure than adults since 
lead is more easily absorbed into growing bodies. Also, the tissues of small children 
are more sensitive to the damaging effects of lead.
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Lead may occur naturally in the soil but it is generally present as the result of mineral 
and industrial waste (Oliver, 1997) and atmospheric deposition from, for example, 
vehicle exhaust prior to the removal of lead from petrol. The main exposure routes 
by which lead can enter the body are direct ingestion of the soil and inhalation of soil 
dust. In addition, lead uptake by vegetables grown in urban soils may be a 
significant exposure route particularly in areas where there is some industrial 
contamination (Thornton, 1993).
A number of studies were carried out by Thornton et al (1994), which looked at lead 
contamination of UK dusts and soils and the implications for childhood exposure. 
Samples of dusts and soils were collected and analysed for 53 locations in England, 
Scotland and Wales, including areas that were known to be ‘geochemical hotspots’. 
In the UK geochemical hotspots are mostly related to widespread metal 
contamination of the surface environment due to historical mining and smelting 
activities (Thornton, 1993). Results of the studies demonstrated that concentrations 
of lead in dusts and soils were sufficiently large to give rise to concern that a 
proportion of urban children were likely to be exposed to significant amounts of lead 
and overall, 10% of homes had in excess of 2000 pg/g lead in house dust. 5% of 
garden soils were above this level.
Cadmium
Cadmium is another potentially toxic metal that occurs naturally in soil in small 
amounts (usually less than 1 pg/g), but which is often present at much higher levels 
due to anthropogenic activities. The main pathway by which cadmium enters the 
body is the ingestion of contaminated food (Thornton, 1992; Oliver, 1997). It has 
been recognised that cadmium accumulates in food plants including lettuce, spinach, 
celery, and cabbage, often in large amounts, without having phytotoxic effects 
(Oliver, 1997). This means that high levels of cadmium may be consumed 
unknowingly through the consumption of contaminated food produce and individuals 
who consume homegrown vegetables from allotments and domestic gardens with 
elevated soil cadmium concentrations may significantly increase their exposure 
(Thornton, 1992).
E-5
Cadmium can also enter the human body through inhalation but this pathway is less 
important except in industrially exposed workers and people living close to an 
emission source (Commission of the European Communities, 1978, cited by 
Thornton, 1992).
This next case summarises probably the most reported example of ingestion of food 
grown in soil contaminated with heavy metals that resulted in adverse human health 
effects.
Shortly after the end of the Second World War, there was a high incidence of a bone 
disease in Jinzu Valley, Toyoma Province, Japan. The disease, referred to as itai-itai 
which means ‘ouch’ in Japanese, attacks bones and causes them to become thin and 
break and is closely linked to exposure to heavy metals and in particular cadmium. 
Mining operations for lead, zinc and cadmium had taken place upstream of the 
affected area and mining waste had been dumped in the river. Farmers then used the 
river for the irrigation of crops and for drinking water.
The link between the disease and the contaminated food and water was not made 
until the 1960’s when samples of tissue and bones from the victims of the disease 
were examined and found to contain alarmingly high levels of zinc, lead and 
cadmium. Samples of soil collected were found to contain an average of 6 parts per 
million cadmium and this increased to 125 parts per million in the rice (Keller, 
1992; CIRS, 1999).
Zinc
During the eighteenth and nineteenth century, zinc was mined around the village of 
Shipham in Somerset. A study carried out by Thornton et al (1980) highlighted that 
over 90% of the surface soils sampled in and around the village contained in excess 
of 20pg/g cadmium and 60% exceeded 60 pg/g. The highest level detected was 800 
pg/g. In actual fact the levels detected in the Shipham soil were considerably higher 
than those detected in Japan and yet no adverse health effects have been reported. 
Harrison (199?) suggested the reason for this is that although the levels were higher, 
the bioavailability was much lower. Potentially, the large amounts of zinc and
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calcium also present in the soil had provided some degree of protection against the 
possible adverse effects of cadmium (Thornton, 1987). In contrast, Oliver (1997) 
suggested that the residents had not suffered any adverse health effects because only 
about half of the vegetables consumed were local and therefore only a small part of 
their diet was grown on polluted soil.
There has not been a considerable amount of work associated with potential adverse 
health effects that could result through dermal contact with contaminated soil, yet 
Abrahams (2001) suggests that the dermal pathway can contribute a significant or 
even predominant portion of the risks attributable to contaminated soils. Ferguson 
(1996) believes that the uncertainties associated with dermal exposure to soil 
contaminants may exceed those of all other pathways combined and suggests that 
this reflects the lack of knowledge about key exposure parameters. These include the 
nature, frequency and duration of contact and the area of skin exposed.
Hazardous waste issues
A number of examples in the literature describe circumstances where land 
contamination and adverse health problems have resulted from the inappropriate 
disposal of hazardous waste. Probably the most famous of these examples, which 
resulted in the declaration of a national emergency in New York State in 1978, is 
Love Canal. In 1896 William Love began digging a canal to serve as a water power 
conduit connecting Lake Ontario and Lake Erie (bypassing Niagara Falls), hence the 
nickname ‘Love Canal’. It was never completed. However, the Hooker Chemical 
Company, located west of the canal, used the site as a dumping ground for the 
chemical by-products of its manufacturing processes. The company dumped more 
than 40000 tonnes of toxic chemical waste (Jackson, 1996). Once the canal was 
filled with waste, the land was covered over and sold to the local education board in 
1953 for $1.00. A school and later a housing estate were built on top of the waste 
dump.
In the early 1970s, the site was found to be leaking. Residents complained of 
respiratory problems and skin irritations. Samples of soil and water taken from the 
area of the old waste dump were heavily contaminated with a number of toxic
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chemicals. After some time and a great deal of pressure from local action groups, the 
government declared a state of emergency and many residents were evacuated.
Another example of land contamination in the Netherlands that resulted from 
inappropriate disposal of waste led to the development of Target and Intervention 
values to assess whether a soil contaminant is likely to present a hazard to human 
health. The levels were developed in the 1980’s following an incident at Lekkerkerk 
-  1600 drums of toxic waste, which had been dumped illegally, were discovered at a 
site that had been redeveloped for housing. Chemicals, including toluene, seeped 
into groundwater and voids in the ground below the houses and resulted in clean-up 
costs of about £150 million.
Conclusion
Whilst direct links between soil quality and human health are often difficult to 
establish and many of the examples that do exist have not been quantified, this 
review has illustrated that some relationships between exposure to elevated levels of 
trace elements in soil and adverse health effects in humans have been recognised. 
There is no clear evidence to substantiate that anyone has become seriously ill as a 
direct result of exposure to contaminants in soil. However, recognition of the 
contribution from soil to the total daily intake of a substance is critical to improving 
our understanding of how environmental contamination can adversely impact on 
human health.
Smith (1991) (cited by Beckett (1993) provides a very thought provoking quote with 
which to conclude this review....
“It should also be recognised that some o f the possible effects o f exposure o f humans 
to chemicals are so intangible, when set against the variations in human well-being, 
that it will never, except in a few unfortunate cases, be possible to demonstrate a 
cause and effect relationship between exposure to a contaminated site and current, 
or more probably future, ill health....to ask to be shown a site where exposure to a 
particular level o f contamination has caused harm is rarely a sensible question to 
ask. We do not generally have the tools, or the time, to be able to answer it. ”
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APPENDIX F
F. THE ROLE OF THE FIRE BRIGADE IN CHEMICAL
INCIDENT REPONSE
1. Visit to London Fire Brigade Headquarters
A meeting took place at London Fire Brigade Headquarters with Dave Hanlon, 
Hazmat Officer with responsibility for Environmental Protection, on Monday 17th 
January. The aim of the meeting was to answer a number of questions that have 
arisen as a result of the EngD research project into emergency response to chemical 
spills and the management of such events. These include:
• Where does the role and responsibility of the Fire Brigade begin and end?
• Is a set protocol/procedure followed for the containment and clean up of leaks 
and spills?
• What materials are used in decontamination?
• What other groups/organisation are involved in the management of such 
events/incidents?
The Fire Brigade provides a safety critical service and therefore undertaking a risk 
assessment forms a key part of decision-making. An example discussed was that of a 
fire in a building with a settling cylinder that could potentially explode. A risk 
assessment would be undertaken to determine the most appropriate way to fight the 
fire. It would be considered wise to fight the fire from outside the building unless 
there were people inside in which case a rescue operation would be undertaken but 
with more controls (PPE etc).
The risk assessment process can be broken down into three interrelated parts. 
STRATEGIC
• Primary and most important level of decision making
• Higher risk = greater input into risk reduction and control strategies
• Defines safety critical support issues for all personnel
• Ensures the provision of appropriate ‘management systems’ to achieve
F-l
o Safe systems of work }
o Training }
o Equipment } Form the basis of th e ‘Safe
o Information } Person Concept’)
o Supervision }
o PPE }
SYSTEMATIC
• Provides a model for assessing all foreseeable hazards and risks
• Output -  the development of a ‘risk inventory’
• Significant risks analysed, assessed and appropriate control measures
identified and put in place
• Risk assessment divided into manageable ‘key stages’ by taking the
following steps:
o Separation of risk into three domains: Activities, Environment and 
Equipment
o Domains examined and broken down into further ‘key stages’ 
o ‘Risk Menu’ and ‘Activity Matrix’ generated at each key stage 
o Significant risks identified and documented for future reference 
o Significance of risk calculated (Risk = Hazard severity x Likelihood 
of occurrence) 
o Risks prioritised using a ‘Risk Grid’ 
o Additional control measures implemented 
o Risk assessment process reviewed
DYNAMIC
Designed to support decision making when faced with unforeseen situations -  
reactive assessment of risk
• Divided into three stages
o Risk analysis }
o Risk assessment } Followed by post incident review
o Risk management }
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Dealing with a spill
In the 1947 Fire Services Act a requirement was set to provide a Fire Brigade with 
facilities to mobilise personnel who would be trained to visit premises to look at 
hazards and risks and use equipment for other things in addition to fires, including 
incidents involving hazardous materials. There is no requirement to take charge in 
such events but this frequently happens. In addition there is currently no funding for 
dealing with incidents involving hazardous materials.
However, most UK fire brigades have taken the initiative and acquired appropriate 
equipment including ‘Grab Packs’ (which contain putty for sealing leaks, absorbent 
pads, a clay mat etc.) in addition to dedicated environmental protection units. The 
equipment carried on dedicated units is agreed between the Fire Brigade and the 
Environment Agency at a local level. This is principally because the nature of 
incidents is likely to vary. For example if the area is heavily industrialised then there 
is greater potential for a chemical spill than in the countryside.
When dealing with incidents that involve hazardous materials, the primary aim is to 
remove the risk of explosion and prevent pollution of controlled waters. There are 
six main concepts to consider. These are:
Ensuring a safe approach.
When approaching the site of an incident involving hazardous materials care should 
be taken to avoid the ‘plume’, which may be smoke or a vapour cloud. Hazardous 
materials are often flammable or explosive and the smoke they produce on 
combustion may be toxic. In addition the spilt chemical may release toxic vapours.
Accurate incident assessment.
A hazard assessment must be undertaken initially to ascertain the nature and extent 
of the problem. This will take into consideration such factors as wind direction, 
gradient and the physical properties of the hazardous material. The action taken in 
the event of an incident involving hazardous materials will vary according to the 
situation. Actions can be offensive (an active approach), defensive (not involving 
direct intervention) and non-interventionist.
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Establishing a security perimeter.
A security perimeter controlled by the police might be necessary. The purpose of 
this would be to allow emergency workers to function without hindrance, maintain 
the safety of the general public and exclude all unauthorised personnel.
Establishing hazard control zones.
The affected area should be cordoned off and hazardous and safe zones identified. 
These are often categorised as:
• Hot zone -  area directly affected
• Warm zone -  for fire service support activity
• Cold zone -  for incident management and liaison
Effective control of resources
Equipment tends to be depleted faster at incidents involving hazardous materials 
compared with fires. Therefore it is necessary to anticipate resource requirements to 
prevent incident escalation. This is especially important as it is considered that most 
serious chemical incidents start as small ones but may develop as a result of:
• lack of anticipation
• lack of resources
• failure to be proactive in command
• lack of understanding of the situation
• establishing a support organisation
In responding to incidents involving hazardous materials, one of the primary aims is 
to develop and implement a pollution control strategy. The incident commander (or 
HAZMAT adviser) will work in close liaison with other emergency services as well 
as staff from the Environment Agency.
There are considered to be seven options available for the control or containment of a 
serious spill. These are diversion, covering, damming, diking, dilution, absorption or 
dispersion. The most appropriate method of pollution control will be determined by 
reviewing the properties of the substance or substances involved. This will include
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the strength of the solution, its miscibility in water and whether it is flammable or 
explosive. If the substance is flammable or produces toxic vapours then it may be 
necessary to cover the spill, for example with a foam blanket, to mitigate.
A leak or spill of a hazardous material (and decontamination runoff) should be 
contained if at all possible. If containment is not possible the substance should be 
diluted. However, four criteria must be met prior to diluting a spill with water. The 
substance should be water-soluble but it must not react with water, produce a toxic 
gas on water contact or form any kind of solid or precipitate.
Once the spill has been contained, advice can be sought on the most appropriate 
method for decontamination. Responsibility for leading the clean-up operation is 
then passed to the Environment Agency (or other regulatory body) although fire 
brigade equipment and other resources may be used.
To ensure effective co-operation between the Fire Service and the Environment 
Agency in dealing with incidents that involve the potential pollution of controlled 
waters, the disposal of waste, Part A IPC authorised sites, COMAH sites and/or the 
release of radioactive substances, the Local Government Association and 
Environment Agency have written a Protocol on fire service issues. This will replace 
the ‘Memorandum of Understanding’ that currently exists between the Fire Service 
and the Environment Agency. The purpose of the Protocol is to minimise the hazard 
to the environment from Fire Service activities, including fire fighting and hazardous 
materials incidents, and to encourage liaison and formulate preventive measures at 
the planning stage for special risk sites where there is the potential for pollution to 
occur during an incident.1 However, it is acknowledged that life-saving operational 
procedures take priority over pollution prevention in the event of a major incident.
The HAZCHEM scheme
In the early 1970’s a working group was established with members from London Fire 
Brigade, the Chemical Industries Association, the police and other interested groups. 
Their aim was to develop a scheme for providing the emergency services with the
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information they would require about a hazardous material to ensure that an incident 
could be dealt with quickly, safely and efficiently.
A placard containing the ‘warning diamond’, a code to indicate the action to be taken 
in the event of a fire or spillage, the united nations number for substance 
identification and a telephone number to access specialist advice was produced. The 
scheme was piloted in Cleveland in 1974 and introduced nationally on a voluntary 
basis in 1975. These panels are also used on buildings in London to indicate where 
hazardous materials are stored. As a rule of thumb, the instructions provided by the 
warning panel are for use in the first seven minutes. After this time more 
information is required.
Figure 1: UK Hazard Warning Panel
EMERGENCY ACTION CODE
HAZARD
TELEPHONE NUMBER FOR 
SPECIALIST ADVICE
More detailed information on hazardous materials can be obtained through specialist 
databases which all UK fire brigades have access to. One of these is CHEMDATA, 
which contains comprehensive information on hazards, protection and procedures. 
The London Fire Brigade have an additional system called CIRUS (chemical 
information and updating system), which is continually updated. The information 
stored in CIRUS, which can be accessed within seconds, includes the chemical name, 
the emergency action code and information on personal protection and 
decontamination.
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2. Hazardous Materials and Environmental Protection Course -  Fire Service 
College, Moreton-in-Marsh
The aim o f the Hazardous Materials and Environmental Protection (HMEP) course 
for fire service personnel is to prepare officers for command and specialist advisory 
roles at hazardous materials and/or environmentally damaging incidents. It is a six- 
week residential course based at the Fire Service College in Moreton-in-Marsh, 
Gloucestershire. Topics covered on the course include protective clothing and 
decontamination, legislation, risk assessment and basic toxicology.
The Research Engineer attended three days of the course including one day of 
practical exercises to gain a better understanding of fire service capabilities in 
managing chemical (or ‘HAZMAT’) incidents and some practical experience in the 
use of equipment for containing chemical leaks and spills. Three scenarios are 
presented below.
Scenario 1: A transport accident with a leaking road tanker containing beer
The hole in the drum was 
blocked using ‘dammit’, a ready 
mixed clay sealing putty, which 
is in the Environment Agency 
‘Grab pack’.
To contain the spill a boom was 
inflated using water and placed 
on the road around the tanker.
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Scenario 2: A leak into a river from a pipeline upstream of a drinking water
abstraction point
As in the first scenario, the 
leaking pipe was sealed using 
dammit putty.
The river downstream was 
blocked using a piece o f wood 
weighted with sand bags. It was 
not possible to use the boom as 
above because the chemical had 
mixed completely with the water 
in the river. Therefore it was 
necessary to construct a 
complete barrier.
The contaminated water was 
pumped out of the river and then 
sprayed onto an adjacent field.
This was considered appropriate 
because the chemical had been 
diluted sufficiently to present a 
long-term environmental hazard.
F-8
Scenario 3: A chemical leak from a drum onto land and into a lake used for fishing
The hole in the drum was blocked 
using ‘dammit’ and chemical that 
had leaked onto the ground was 
soaked up using absorbent pads.
The chemical that had leaked into 
the water was contained using a 
boom filled with water to aid 
bouancy. This was possible 
because the chemical was 
immiscible with water.
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APPENDIX G
G. QUESTIONNAIRES AND FORMS
1. Local Authority Questionnaire
For the purpose of this questionnaire, a land contamination incident was defined as 
an area of land or site that contains a chemical(s) that is potentially hazardous to 
human health and the environment.
1. How many land contamination incidents have you personally been involved in
managing? (Please circle)
0 1-3 4-6 7-9 10+
Please specify:
2. Did you have access to sufficient resources/information? (Please circle)
Yes No Don’t know
Please specify (books, databases, personal contacts, organisations etc)
3. In general, how much time do you spend dealing with a land contamination incident? 
(Please estimate)
hours/days/weeks/months
4. Has there been any consultation between your health authority and the local authority 
with regard to the new Contaminated Land Legislation? (Please circle)
Yes -  extensive Yes -  a little Not really No Don’t know
5. Do you feel the health authority role in managing land contamination has changed 
since the introduction of the legislation? (Please circle)
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Yes No Don’t know
If Yes, please give details.
6. Would it be useful if health authorities had guidance specifically on the public health
management of land contamination (Please circle)
Yes No Don’t know
If Yes, please give details.
7. What should the guidance contain? (Please rank in order of importance, l=most 
important)
1. Summary of legislation 8. Risk assessment
2. Site investigation strategy 9. Health questionnaires
3. Biological sampling 10. Remediation
4. Environmental sampling 11. Case examples
5. Roles and responsibilities Other (please specify)
6. Soil science / geology 12.
7. Toxicology 13.
If you would be happy to discuss your answers, please provide contact 
details.
Contact name: ...................................... .....................
Telephone number: ...........................................................
e-mail address: ............................................................
Thank you very much for your time and co-operation!!!
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2. Fuel checklist questionnaire
I would be very grateful if you would take a couple of minutes to complete this short 
questionnaire to provide feedback about the presentation and usefulness of the fuel 
incidents checklist.
Many thanks.
1. Was the questionnaire useful in managing the incident in the exercise? 
(Please circle)__________________________________________________
Yes No Don’t know
2. What was good about the checklist?
3. What improvements could be made?
4. Would you consider using the checklist for responding to similar incidents in 
the future? (Please circle)_________________________________________.
Yes No Don’t know
5. How useful do you consider checklists to be for responding to and managing 
chemical incidents? (Please circle)___________________________________
Very useful Useful Not useful Don’t know
Any further comments?
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3. Land incident evaluation form
1. Completeness of report/information (l=poor 5=good)
2. How has the incident been categorised?
a. byCIRS
b. by National Focus
3. Who first identified the issue to the Health Authority?
Planning department 
Environmental Health department 
Other Local Authority department 
Environment Agency 
Water Company 
Other
Fire brigade 
Police
Ambulance service 
Local residents 
Hospital 
Unknown
4. Who else was involved in managing the incident?
Planning department 
Environmental Health department 
Other Local Authority 
Environment Agency 
Water Company 
Environmental Consultant
Fire brigade
Police
Ambulance
Local residents
Hospital
Other
5. Which agency took the lead?
Health Authority 
Planning department 
Environmental Health department 
Other Local Authority 
Environment Agency 
Other
Fire brigade 
Police 
Ambulance 
Local residents 
Water Company 
Not known
6. Were the media involved?
Yes No Unknown
7. How was the issue discovered?
Spill, leak, explosion etc
Complaint
Routine testing
Part of planning process
Unknown
Part IIA investigation 
Other site investigation 
During construction 
Other
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8. Describe the cause of the problem
Spill Leak 
Historic Land Waste 
Water Fire 
Transport Air
Malicious
Other
Unknown
9. How long had there been a problem?
<6 m 6-24 m > 24 m Unknown
10. Was the size of the affected area known?
Yes No Unknown
11. Was the history of the site known?
Completely Partially Unknown
12. What was the site used for?
Recreational use School 
Open space Hospital 
Allotments Nursery 
Housing Farming 
Other Not known
Light Commercial 
Heavy commercial 
Heavy Industry 
Derelict site
13. What chemical(s) was present?
Organic Heavy metals Other inorganic
Please list all:
14. Was any speciation of metals carried out?
Yes No Unknown N/A
15. Which environmental media were affected?
Air Soil Surface water Groundwater
16. Were environmental samples taken?
Air Soil Surface water Groundwater
17. Is there a copy of the site investigation/report in the file?
Yes No
18. Was an exposure pathway identified?
Yes No Unknown
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19. Was food contaminated?
Yes No Unknown
20. Was drinking water contaminated?
Yes No Unknown
a. Was the site on/near an aquifer?
Yes No Unknown
b. Was there an abstraction point on or near to the site?
Yes No Unknown
c. Did any (plastic) water pipes run through the ground?
Yes No Unknown
21. Does a stream/river flow through or near to the site?
Yes No Unknown
22. Was the location of the nearest property to the site known? 
Yes No Unknown
23. Were there any complaints of health effects?
Yes No Unknown
24. Were any health effects identified?
Yes No Unknown
25. Were any children with pica identified?
Yes No Unknown
26. Was a health questionnaire sent to local residents?
Yes No Unknown
27. Were any biological samples taken?
Yes No Unknown
28. Were residents evacuated?
Yes No Unknown
Any interesting features?
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APPENDIX H
H. STANDARDS FOR CONTAMINANTS IN SOIL
The relative lack of toxicological data presents a significant problem in determining 
whether the level of contamination on a particular site is likely to present a threat to 
human health (Ferguson, 1996). The majority of available data is based on plant or 
animal exposures. Although there are extensive mathematical models for 
extrapolating this data to consider human exposure, these are based on a ‘generic 
human’ so models need to be adjusted for sensitive populations (Aldrich et al, 1998) 
e.g. children, pregnant women, the elderly, who are most at risk. Other questions 
that are raised as a result of these assumptions include:
• Is the metabolism of small amounts of the chemical the same as with large 
amounts?
• Is there actually a threshold where there are no effects?
• Is the metabolism the same for all people?
Also it is often assumed that the relationship between exposure and effect is linear 
and this is not necessarily true.
In addition to these problems, it is very difficult to identify soil as contaminated as 
there are no definitive guidelines to indicate ‘normal’ levels of substances in the 
ground. In addition it is known that background levels of, for example, heavy metals, 
are much higher in urban soils than in agricultural land. This is not to say that the 
land is more or less contaminated respectively as, for example, the pesticides applied 
to agricultural land may present a greater risk to human health. Furthermore, the 
form or chemical state of an element influences its bioavailability and hence its 
potency (Harrison (ed), 1994).
The Department of the Environment, Transport and the Regions (DETR) -  now the 
Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA) -  have been 
involved in the preparation of a new set of guideline values for contaminants in soil. 
They are to be used in establishing whether a site poses actual or potential risks to 
human health in the context of the existing or intended use of the site. The guideline 
values replace the levels developed in the 1983 by the Interdepartmental Committee
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for the Redevelopment of Contaminated Land (ICRCL) (ICRCL, 1987), which were 
set as guidelines for redevelopment. These introduced the concept of ‘threshold’ 
concentrations, which are non-legally binding values for contaminants in the soil 
based on the intended land use. A second edition of the paper ‘Guidance on the 
assessment and redevelopment of contaminated land’ was published in 1987. 
Threshold or ‘trigger’ values were suggested for 20 substances, principally inorganic 
contaminants, including heavy metals. For a number of the substances, action levels 
were also suggested. It is now acknowledged that the ICRCL guidance is limiting 
due the small number of contaminants that are included (Simmons, 1999), and the 
fact that the levels were only ever intended for redevelopment use only and not as a 
general environmental quality assessment (Beckett, 1993). In addition, the ICRCL 
guidance is not mandatory and its application has led to a wide variation in the 
policies and interpretation used by different local authorities (Peters & Blake, 1999).
Prior to the ICRCL guidelines being developed, the only system for assessing how 
significantly a site was contaminated was that published by the Greater London 
Council following a site investigation and remediation programme of gasworks sites 
undertaken in the 1970’s. These are often referred to as ‘Kelly’ values. The GLC 
guidelines pre-dated the ICRCL values by only two or three years yet were very 
different in format (Beckett, 1993). Firstly, many more contaminants were included 
and secondly the guidelines distinguished five ‘levels’ of contamination - 
uncontaminated, slight contamination, contaminated, heavy contamination and 
unusually heavy contamination -  and for each category a range of concentration 
values was quoted (Beckett, 1993). However, Beckett highlights that GLC 
guidelines could not be used to determine whether a site was suitable for a given 
form of development.
The ICRCL and GLC guideline values were developed for use in determining the 
level of clean-up required when re-developing a contaminated site and not for use in 
determining whether a site presented a hazard to human health. Nevertheless, until 
recently ICRCL values have most been widely used in the UK for the assessment and 
remediation of contaminated land due the absence of anything more appropriate and
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as a result Beckett (1993) states that ‘evidence of continuing misuse of ICRCL 
trigger concentrations has been accumulating’.
Other guidelines that are used in the UK to assess whether a soil contaminant is 
likely to present a hazard to human health are the Dutch Target and Intervention 
values (originally A-B-C values) (Croner, 1996). The levels were developed in the 
1980’s following an incident at Lekkerkerk -  1600 drums of toxic waste, which had 
been dumped illegally, were discovered at a site that had been redeveloped for 
housing. Chemicals, including toluene, seeped into groundwater and voids in the 
ground below the houses and resulted in clean-up costs of about £150 million 
(Croner, 1996).
The Target and Intervention values, which have been developed for about 100 
chemicals, are based around two levels:
Target levels (T-values) - environmental quality standards, background or 
normal levels for pollutants in soil
Intervention Levels (I-values) - above which pollution represents an 
unacceptable risk to water, plants animal and human well being
The values have been calculated for a standard soil, which is defined as containing 
10% organic matter and 25% clay. A correction should therefore be made to the T 
and I values to allow for the amount of clay and organic matter actually present in 
the soil being sampled. The varying ability of different soil types to absorb and 
stabilise metals and organic compounds can then be taken into consideration (Croner, 
1996).
Where the level of contamination in the soil exceeds the I-value, it is suggested that 
remediation should be carried out in order to reduce the concentration of the 
contaminant in the soil to the T-value.
Until recently the Dutch approach was to remediate land to a state where it presented 
no risk to human health or the environment so that it could be used for a wide range
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of future options -  also referred to as multifunctionality -  unless the clean-up caused 
environmental problems, was impossible for technical reasons or was too expensive 
(Ferguson, (1999)). However, this strategy was replaced in 1997 by a less rigid 
fitness-for-use approach.
The new soil guideline values have been derived using the Contaminated Land 
Exposure Assessment (CLEA) model. The model, which was released in March 
2002, uses a probabilistic risk-based approach similar to that developed by the US 
EPA and by SNIFFER (Scotland and Northern Ireland Forum for Environmental 
Research) (Cragg, 2000). Guideline values have been derived for five different land 
use scenarios: housing with gardens, housing within a landscaped area, open spaces, 
allotments and industrial use. Generic assumptions are made in the scenarios, a list 
of which will be published. Allowances are also made for uncertainty and the model 
takes into consideration the bioavailability (See Box 1) of the contaminant.
The first set of guideline values covers arsenic, cadmium, chromium, cyanide, lead, 
mercury, nickel, phenol, polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons (PAHs) and selenium. It 
is anticipated that others will be developed in the future.
Other countries have developed guidelines for contaminants in soil, including the 
US, Australia and Germany. These have not been discussed as they are not widely 
used in the UK.
Box 1: Bioavailability (Paustenbach et al, 1992)
Environmental contaminants are able to cross biological barriers with varying degrees of 
efficiency but when they are bound to soil particles, the efficiency of uptake decreases. The 
bioavailability of a chemical is the percentage of the chemical in soil that is absorbed by 
humans. Factors which affect the bioavailability of a chemical are:
• the physiochemical properties of the contaminant
• the environmental matrix in which it is present
• the nature of the biological membrane
Chemicals in soil are usually absorbed to a lesser degree that chemicals in pure form.
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APPENDIX I
I. WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION REGIONAL OFFICE
FOR EUROPE
Press Release EURO/10/02 
Copenhagen, 4 June 2002
Chemical terrorism alert system to be set up 
Europe makes plans for public health preparedness and response
Representatives of Member States in the WHO European Region and international 
organizations have met at the WHO Regional Office for Europe to arrange to prepare 
for and respond to any deliberate use of chemical agents by terrorists. These plans 
include a chemical incident alert system.
“We do not know when or if  there will be a chemical attack, but we know, from our 
experience in handling other crises involving chemical accidents, that preparation 
saves time and saves lives,” said Dr Roberto Bertollini, Director, Division of 
Technical Support at the WHO Regional Office for Europe. His statement reflected 
the views of the representatives of the Member States.
“Fighting chemical terrorism involves not only international cooperation but close 
collaboration, planning and integration across a host of different sectors and experts. 
This allows a fast and efficient response in emergencies, and it also strengthens 
public services overall,” noted Professor Gary Coleman, International Clearing 
House for Major Chemical Incidents in Cardiff, United Kingdom.
The recent three-day meeting was held in Copenhagen and organized by the 
Regional Office jointly with the International Programme on Chemical Safety (IPCS 
-  a joint programme of the International Labour Organization, the United Nations 
Environment Programme and WHO). The participants heard evidence from officials 
in charge of anti-terrorist activities, poison centres, emergency preparedness units 
and national surveillance systems, and from the international organizations most 
involved in this area, such as the United Nations Office for the Coordination of 
Humanitarian Affairs, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
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Development and the European Commission (EC). The decisions made build on 
WHO and IPCS global initiatives in this area, and support those of the Global Health 
Security Action Group, EC and others to ensure maximum cooperation on an agreed, 
coherent and streamlined response against terrorist attack. Work is already underway 
to devise an international incident scale that will quickly identify the severity of an 
incident.
Significant chemical incidents of some kind occur every month, and the events of 11 
September 2001 in the United States have triggered scrutiny of the European 
Region’s ability to respond, particularly to transboundary threats. In the last six- 
month period for which figures are available, 704 chemical incidents took place in 
the United Kingdom, 3 of which affected over 50 people. Major incidents in Europe 
include the explosion in a warehouse at a fertilizer factory in Toulouse, France, in 
September 2001, which killed 31 people and injured over 2000, and the explosion in 
a fireworks factory in Enschede, Netherlands in May 2000, which killed 20 people 
and injured hundreds more. Terrorism involving chemicals could not only cause 
explosions but also affect the public through food, air and other routes.
The participants at the meeting committed themselves to establishing:
o an alert and response system for chemical incidents, utilizing as much as 
possible the existing mechanisms at the global, European Region and 
European Union levels; 
o a forum for the exchange of experience between the countries to establish a 
strategy and programme for upgrading communication with the public; and 
o an international system to classify incidents.
The participants also agreed to define the role and functions of poison control centres 
in preparedness and response.
Most countries have already developed key areas of their capability to respond to 
chemical incidents. Actions range from setting up specialized agencies, such as a 
health protection agency or emergency committees, to establishing a local Web site 
that coordinates information from the rescue services and then informs the public.
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The participants agreed that, if public health is to be protected against chemical 
terrorism, cooperation between countries and organizations in Europe is essential to 
help build on existing initiatives and systems.
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APPENDIX J
INCIDENT TIMELINES
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K. CHECKLISTS
Acute Chemical Incidents- Basic checklist
Questions to Ask the Notifying Organisation
For all chemical incidents request a brief summary of what is known now about 
the chemical incident.
CJ
O <l>
g o
£  © T3 o
• W hat has happened? Is it a fire, explosion, spill, leak, etc?
• W here & when did it happen?
• W hat media has it affected? e.g. air, water, land, food
• W hat is the source of contamination? Has it been safely contained/removed?
• W hat is known about the contaminating substance?
o specific name(s) 
o composition 
o concentrations
Action to protect the health o f the 
nuhlic:r
• Categorise the human & 
environmental health impact of the 
incident on the Chemical Incident 
Impact Scale
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Grade 1
i d e . p l
Minor Moderate SevereNone
Health impact severity scale
You may need the following 
additional information:
• Have any adverse health effects been reported following exposure or have there 
been any complaints?
o what symptoms have been reported? (may have been reported to local 
authority, GPs, A & E departments, water utility etc.)
• How many people have actually &/or potentially been exposed & to what 
contaminant concentrations?
o has the Ambulance Service been alerted? have they received any casualties? 
o have local hospitals been alerted? have they received any casualties? 
o do A&E departments have adequate PPE & decontamination facilities? 
o do A&E departments have appropriate antidotes & an adequate supply?
Fatal
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Recommendations for acute phase response 
Information to obtain/confirm from other agencies
Grades 0-4
• Ensure appropriate agencies are taking steps to prevent further contamination
• Ensure access to affected area is restricted to minimise exposure
• Ensure relevant Local Authority, Environment Agency & water company (if 
appropriate) personnel are informed; take contact details
• Establish clear lines of responsibility & communication
• Establish whether any environmental samples been taken?
o what sampling strategy has been used, e.g. sampling frequency, priority 
analyses? (if possible identify peaks & troughs in the analytical results)
Grades 2-4
• Consider convening a multi-agency incident control meeting
• Consider issuing a press release to local press & media -  remember to have 
alternative versions in appropriate language
Action to protect the health of the public:
Grades 0-4
• Alert CIRS as soon as you are aware of the incident; pass on as many details 
as possible
• Define affected population, & monitor symptoms & disease levels -  mark on 
a map or geographical information system
o are any additional populations at risk?
o have appropriate actions to protect public health been taken?
o consider sheltering (‘go in, stay in, tune in') versus evacuation (consider & 
advise on risks of evacuation)
• Review potential adverse health effects of the chemical & methods of control
• Provide information to the public as needed
• Consider setting up a help line to provide assistance
Grades 2-4
• Consider referring to health emergency plan & ensure key staff members are 
notified
• Consider alerting GPs, NHS Direct, NHS & private hospitals, neighbouring 
CsCDC & other medical professionals
• Consider informing Food Standards Agency/DEFRA if there is a threat to food 
or agriculture
• Consider informing the National Focus, Department of Health or Chief 
Medical Officer
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Recommendations for incident investieation (post-acute phase response) 
Information to obtain/confirm from other agencies
Grades 0-4
• Confirm that the chemical hazard initially identified is the actual chemical 
hazard
• Identify source-pathway-receptor linkages
o is there an aquifer used for drinking water abstraction? 
o are there plastic water supply pipes? 
o is there a river or stream used for recreational purposes? 
o is the land used to grow food? 
o are there other contaminant transport pathways?
• Obtain notification for each organisation involved on when incident is declared 
over and when they are standing down
Grades 2-4
• Obtain updates on incident evolution and any secondary contamination
• Undertake detailed site assessment 
o collect maps and plans of the area
o establish topography and direction of groundwater flow 
o collect further environmental samples
o compare any measured concentrations with regulatory standards and any past 
sample results, e.g. from routine sampling
• Obtain any plume modelling (real time or after event) data
Action to protect the health of the public:
• Re-evaluate incident category
Grades 0-1
• Ensure appropriate remedial action has been undertaken to remove source of 
contamination or exposure pathway
o once confirmed, no further action required
o go to ‘post incident questions’
Grades 2-4
• Consider conducting a site visit
• Undertake further assessment of health impact
o consider whether biological sampling of sentinel cases and other exposed 
individuals is necessary
o consider carrying out a questionnaire survey of all those exposed to identify 
any adverse health effects
o if necessary, initiate a case control study to assess health impacts
o consider long-term follow up and monitoring of the exposed population
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| Post incident questions for public health
p Grades 0-4
jj • Has the incident been declared over for each organisation involved and are they 
p standing down?it
|  o have all those affected been informed of the end of the incident?
f -i
I o have all those involved in incident management been advised of event close?
I • Have all those with adverse health effects folly recovered?
;j o do any patients need long term follow up?
o consider longer-term epidemiological surveillance 
• Are all records of the incident complete & up to date? 
j • Conduct an audit of the management of the incident 
; o identify lessons learnt
j o identify necessary modifications to emergency and/or incident plans
j • Provide final media briefing with details of how incident has been managed,
! any remaining adverse health impact & any preventative actions to be taken.
Event specific checklists
W ater Section 1 - Drinking water supplies
Recommendations for questions to ask the W ater Utility
Exposure
• Have “at risk” groups been identified and alerted including: home and hospital renal 
dialysis patients, bottle fed infants, residential and nursing homes, schools, etc.?
• Have all affected drinking water consumers been informed, including food and drink 
manufacturers, who may be using potentially contaminated water?
• What quantities of water are likely to have been consumed?
• Have alternative drinking water supplies been arranged, are alternative bathing and 
laundry facilities required?
o if yes, have consumers been notified not to drink, cook with or use tap water? 
o are bowser water supplies safe to drink? 
o have the elderly and disabled access to alternative supplies? 
o are large alternative supplies available for critical users? 
o have supplies been cut off?
• What samples are being taken and analysed?
o who is taking the samples? 
o is there appropriate quality control?
o are duplicate samples being taken and analysed by an independent organisation? 
o are samples being tested for taste and odour?
• Is there a possibility of microbiological contamination as well as chemical?
Water supply
• What is the source of drinking water currently in supply and the treatment processes 
used?
o have there been any changes in supply or treatment? 
o have there been any previous problems? 
o is water from different sources mixed in supply?
• Have drinking water abstractions been closed? 
o when will they be re-opened?
o how much water is in storage reservoirs
• Have sewage treatment works been taken off line? 
o what impact will this have?
• Have water treatment works been taken offline? 
o what impact will this have?
o is disinfection still effective?
• Could drinking water storage reservoirs have been affected?
• What action for remediation/decontamination is taking place? 
o are water pipes being flushed to remove contaminated water? 
o can water supply areas be re-zoned to limit the area affected?
o are there any processes available to remove contaminants, e.g. activated carbon? 
o what is the expected time frame for remediation/decontamination?
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Post Incident Questions
• Does the drinking water now meet required standards for drinking water quality?
• Have water utility drinking water pipes and domestic water pipes, tanks and
plumbing fittings been adequately decontaminated?
• If permanent new water pipes have been installed, have these been verified to be
uncontaminated?
• Is a report to the Drinking Water Inspectorate required?
• Consider compiling a list of renal patients with routine updating for easy reference
in the event of future incidents
W ater Section 2 -  Private drinking water supplies 
Recommendations for questions to ask Environmental Health Officers
• Have alternative drinking water supplies been arranged. Are bowser water supplies 
safe to drink?
• Are there hospital, drinking water, or food and drink processor or manufacturer 
abstractions in the area? Should they be closed?
Recommendations for questions to ask the Water Utility
• Inform water utility of the contamination, even if it is a private supply, may be a 
public water abstraction from the same aquifer.
Post Incident Questions
• Does the drinking water now meet required standards for drinking water quality?
• Have drinking water supply pipes, tanks and plumbing fittings been adequately 
decontaminated?
• If permanent new water supply pipes have been installed, have these been verified 
to be uncontaminated?
• Is a report to the Drinking Water Inspectorate required?
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W ater Section 3 - Surface water 
Recommendation for questions to ask the Environmental Health Officer
Is the area used for water sports, swimming, fishing, etc.?
Are there any other uses of the water resource, e.g. abstraction for drinking water or 
food and drink processing or manufacturing, fishing or agricultural usage for irrigation 
or livestock watering?
Consider advising the public of contamination and controlling access to the affected 
area by people and animals (N.B. policing controls may be difficult)
Will the area of contamination change over time, e.g. movement down a river?
Could drinking water storage reservoirs have been affected?
Is long term monitoring of the affected, or potentially affected area necessary?
W ater Section 4 - Marine or coastal water
Recommendations for Questions to ask the Environment Agencv/Maritime 
Coastguard Agency
• Is the area used for water sports, swimming, etc.?
• Is there any recreational or commercial fishing, or collection of other marine 
wildlife for food in the area?
o are aquatic organisms being sampled, for example by CEFAS?
• Consider advising the public of contamination and controlling access to the 
affected area?
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Chronic land contamination incidents -  basic checklist
Recommendations for initial response
• Identify contaminant(s) involved
• Identify major pathways between contaminants & receptors (human & environmental)
• Ensure all appropriate organisations are aware of the incident
o consider holding an incident control meeting
o establish clear lines of responsibility and communication
• Restrict access to the site if appropriate
Action to protect the health of the public:
• Identify population at risk
• Consider if evacuation/sheltering of residents is necessary
• Provide information to the public as needed
Recommendations for incident investigation
Initial investigation
• Identify source of contamination
• Identify all potential pathways between contaminants & receptors
o is there an aquifer used for drinking water abstraction
o are there plastic water supply pipes?
o is there a river or stream used for recreational purposes?
o is the land used to grow food?
o are there other pathways that would transport the contaminants elsewhere?
• Undertake preliminary desk study
o determine current past & future land use
o collect maps & plans of the area to show geology, hydrogeology etc.
• Consider carrying out a site visit (refer to site visit checklist & report form)
Action to protect the health of the public:
• Undertake full assessment of public health impact
o determine exposure among local residents & users of the site
o has the wider population potentially been exposed?
o have appropriate actions to protect public health been taken?
• Continue to provide information to the public
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Detailed investigation
• Undertake further sampling to determine extent of contamination on/off site 
including control samples to determine ‘background’ levels
• Develop detailed conceptual site model
• Determine if it is ‘contaminated land’
• Prepare media statement
• Consider holding a pubic meeting
Public health action
• Develop health questionnaire to assess exposure & health effects
• Consider whether biological sampling of exposed population is necessary
• Assist in preparation of media statement
Recommendations for remedial action 
• If ‘contaminated land’
o review options available for removal of contamination from site
o select and apply most appropriate option
o make provisions for long term monitoring
o ensure involvement of all stake holders in decision making
• If not ‘contaminated land’
o consider if remedial action is required & options available
o decide whether to take action or to make provisions for long-term monitoring
o communicate decision (with reasons) to stakeholders, inch local residents
Public health action
• Consider long-term follow up & monitoring of exposed population
Post incident questions for public health
• Has the incident been declared over for each organisation involved and are they 
standing down?
o have all those affected been informed of the end of the incident?
o have all those involved in managing the incident been advised of event close?
• Have all those with adverse health effects fully recovered?
o do any patients need long term follow up?
o consider longer-term epidemiological surveillance
• Are all records of the incident complete and up to date?
• Conduct an audit of the management of the incident
o identify lessons learnt
o identify necessary modifications to emergency and/or incident plans
• Provide final media briefing with details of how incident has been managed, 
any remaining adverse health impact & any preventative actions to be taken
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Land Section 1 -  Allotment sites (Land used for growing food)
Recommendations for initial investigation
• Identify source of contamination
o for acute events: source of contamination should be easily identifiable (refer to 
basic acute checklist)
o for chronic problems: refer to historical maps/information about past activities on 
the site (refer to chronic land checklist)
• Identify all potential pathways between contaminants & receptors (human & 
environmental)
o what types of food are grown in the soil?
o are there other pathways that would transport the contaminants elsewhere?
• Undertake preliminary desk study
o collect maps & plans of the area to show geology, hydrogeology, any underground 
features, utility trenches, land drains, historical land use etc
o determine direction of groundwater flow to help predict movement of chemicals 
through ground
• Consider carrying out a site visit (refer to site visit checklist & report form)
Action to protect the health of the pubbc:
• Undertake assessment of public health impact
o determine exposure amongst local residents & users of the site 
o has the wider population been potentially exposed? 
o have appropriate actions to protect the public health been taken?
• Confirm that appropriate environmental samples have been taken 
o control samples to determine ‘background’ levels
• Continue to provide information to the public
o advise not to eat food grown in contaminated soil or encourage thorough washing 
of food prior to consumption
o encourage thorough washing of hands following contact with the soil 
Recommendations for detailed investigation
• Undertake appropriate environmental sampling to determine extent of contamination 
on/off site
• Sample & analyse food grown in contaminated soil (consider contacting FSA)
• Develop detailed conceptual site model
• Prepare media statement
• Consider holding a public meeting
Action to protect the health of the public:
• Develop health questionnaire to assess exposure & health impacts
• Consider whether biological sampling of exposed population is necessary
• Assist in preparation of media statement
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Land Section 2 -  Sites being redeveloped
Recommendations from initial investigation
• Has a detailed site investigation already been carried out?
If yes:
o are results of environmental sampling available? 
o is further environmental sampling required?
If no:
o consider implementing a sampling programme 
o undertake preliminary desk study
■ collect maps & plans of the area to show geology, hydrogeology, any 
underground features, utility trenches, land drains etc
■ identify past, current & proposed use of the site 
o identify contaminant and source of contamination
o identify all potential pathways between contaminants & receptors (human & 
environmental)
■ is there an aquifer used for drinking water abstraction?
■ are there plastic water supply pipes?
■ is there a river or stream used for recreational purposes?
■ is the land used to grow food?
■ are there other pathways that would transport the contaminants elsewhere?
• Develop a conceptual site model
• Has land been identified as ‘contaminated land’?
• Consider carrying out a site visit (refer to site visit checklist & report form)
Action to protect the health of the public:
• Undertake assessment of public health impact
o determine exposure amongst local residents & users of the site 
o has the wider population been potentially exposed? 
o have appropriate actions to protect the public health been taken 
o provide information to the public as needed
• If workers have been exposed:
o consider whether appropriate PPE has been used.
o consider whether biological sampling of exposed population is necessary, 
o ensure HSE have been informed.
• Confirm that appropriate environmental samples have been taken
o drinking water samples if there are organic chemicals & plastic water pipes 
o control samples to determine ‘background’ levels
• Consider developing health questionnaire to assess exposure & health impacts
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Non-domestic fires
Recommendations for questions to ask about fire
• Where is the fire?
o is the area urban, residential or industrial or rural?
■ any motorways or major transport routes?
■ any susceptible populations e.g. hospitals, schools, nursing homes?
■ any caravan parks?
• When did the fire start?
• What is burning?
o what are the potential health effects from the products of combustion? 
o what information is known about chemicals and their storage or building materials?
• Is there a risk of significant spread or of explosion?
• How big is the fire? (How many fire tenders are in attendance?)
• How hot is the fire i.e. over 1,000°C or less than 1,000°C?
• How is the fire being managed?
• What are the local weather conditions?
o Identify plume pathway, range and possible particulate deposition
o consider informing neighbouring CsCDC and any local hospitals and GPs under or 
near to plume need to include advice about turning off air conditioning intakes
o is a CHEMET available? If yes ask for a copy
Recommendations for questions to ask other agencies
• Consider requesting environmental sampling to confirm contents of building or 
plume and for any particulate or building debris including asbestos
• Check Environment Agency and/or Water Company has been contacted to warn of 
potentially contaminated run-off water entering drains or sensitive watercourses
• Check MAFF has been contacted to warn of any secondary contamination to food 
sources from plume deposition
Action to protect the health of the public:
• Limit public exposure to hazards, consider advising on evacuation or sheltering until 
fire is out
• Identify all casualties
• Consider taking biological samples from any sentinel cases
• Ensure all those attending the site use appropriate PPE (including EHOs and PH)
• Ensure no further contamination is likely to spread from site when fire contained - 
consider recommending use of water or tarpaulins to maintain dust and debris control
• Depending on the reported health effects and the products of combustion, it may be 
appropriate to consider advising local inhabitants on issues including
o preventing children playing with any debris 
o consider keeping pets indoors until clean up complete 
o do not mow lawns until clean up complete
• Depending on safety consider asking adults to wear thick plastic gloves and collect 
debris in gardens, etc. and place in clearly marked containers
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Sheltering or evacuation 
Questions to facilitate the evacuation/sheltering decision
• Is the substance harmful to the public?
o highly toxic/toxic/irritant/non-irritant
o short-term/long-term effects
o explosive/non explosive
• Will the public be exposed?
o substance contained/Potential for release
o capable of dispersal via wind, rain, etc.
o public in path of projected route
o distance, plume height, meteorological conditions, stability of weather conditions
• Will dilution factors minimise risk?
• When will the public be exposed (time of day)?
o already exposed
o imminently
o not for a few hours
• How long could the exposure last?
o few minutes
o hours
o days
o months
o years
Sheltering in a chemical incident -  Action to protect the health of the public:
• Provide a help-line number, consider using NHS Direct
• Ensure effective forms of communication with other emergency services
• Ensure effective communication systems with the public, especially to ensure 
sheltering is in place as quickly as necessary
• Provide post sheltering advice on airing houses
• Provide medical assistance post sheltering, especially to those incapacitated
Specific instances where evacuation may be appropriate
• Before an incident (precautionary)
o risk of imminent explosion (e.g. defusing a bomb/making safe an explosive hazard) 
o small leak likely to escalate sharply 
o release/threatened release of radioactive materials
• During an incident
o spread of fire to members of the public 
o continuing release of hazard over a prolonged period of time 
o after an incident
o gross environmental contamination
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Considerations on whether to evacuate or not
• Is there sufficient time to evacuate?
• How long will decision process take?
o the emergency services’ response time 
o Public health response time
• Method being chosen to co-ordinate and inform the public? 
o door-to-door
o via loudhailers 
o radio/TV networks
o language barriers, the need for translators
• The time of day (it is more difficult to warn people effectively at 4 a.m. that at 8 p.m.)
• Time to prepare the public
o to collect clothes, medication, baby supplies, pets, cheque books, credit cards etc 
and to secure their homes
• Time required for the public to move
• The population profile:
o number of elderly, handicapped and immobile 
o are any residential homes/nursing homes in the affected area? 
o any people on dialysis machines, or others at special risk?
• The extent of the road network
o transport availability -  private and public 
o blockage of roads -  e.g. flooding or snow 
o hazardous travel conditions -  e.g. fog, snow, sleet, ice etc.
• Consideration of the effects on the evacuees of: 
o outside temperature
o psychological trauma/medical risk 
o cost
o how large a zone is to be evacuated
• Possible health risk to the police cordon
Criteria for returning home
• Incident is under control and not expected to escalate
• The residential premises are considered safe
• Environmental sampling and analyses to provide risk assessment information in 
residential premises has been completed and discussed with medical toxicologist, 
where necessary
• Leaflet has been provided to explain the situation and actions that should be taken on 
returning to the premises, such as opening windows and doors to ventilate the 
premises for appropriate period of time
• Advice about whom to contact if any ill health effects develop, such as NHS Direct, 
General Practitioner, local accident and emergency department etc.
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L. INCIDENT EXERCISES
1. Fuel exercise (including facilitator notes)
This exercise was written to test the usefulness of the fuel incident checklist 
presented in Chapter 5. Delegates were divided into groups of five or six and 
presented with the information in the boxes and were able to request additional 
information. A CIRS representative facilitated discussion.
Day 1
You receive a call from the Local Authority. The son of an elderly lady is concerned 
about a longstanding smell of fuel inside her property. There has been a problem for 
the past five years but recently the smell has been a lot worse.
• Do you consider there to be a risk to public health?
• If so, what action would you take?
• What further information would be useful?
Facilitator notes (allow 15 minutes for discussion):
If delegates ask appropriate questions, the following additional information is 
available:
• map of the area
• summary of site history/identification of potential sources
• results from air samples collected by the Local Authority
• fuel checklist
• kerosene fact sheet
Further information about the incident at this stage:
• no adverse health effects have been reported
• although there has only been one complaint, the extent of contamination is 
unknown
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• the source of fuel is unknown although the most likely source has been 
identified (underground pipes from original central heating system)
• there have been reports of incidents involving fuel on the estate previously
• evacuation question raised
• Environment Agency was informed.
*If delegates have not asked about environmental (air samples) after 5 minutes, 
present them with the information
Facilitator notes for air sample results (allow 5 — 10 minutes for discussion):
As fuel migrates readily through the subsurface, it is important to determine how 
widespread the contamination might be. Samples should be taken from neighbouring 
properties.
As there is fuel underneath the property, it is important to ascertain whether there are 
plastic water supply pipes as organic chemicals (e.g. fuel) can permeate through the 
pipe material and contaminate drinking water. Therefore it is important to find out 
whether there are plastic water pipes and if so, take some drinking water samples for 
analysis.
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Incident update (1)
The Local Authority has forwarded results from air samples taken inside the property 
to you.
You attend a joint incident control meeting at the affected property and notice the 
fuel odour inside the house. The odour is particularly strong in the hallway and 
kitchen. Representatives attend the meeting from the following agencies:
• Health and Safety Executive (HSE)
• Local Authority
• Health Authority
• CIRS
• The fuel supplier
The elderly lady is still living in the house.
• Which agency do you think should chair the meeting?
• What questions do you want answered?
• Do any other agencies that need to be notified? Why?
• What action would you take?
• What further information would be useful?
Facilitator notes (allow 1 0 - 1 5  minutes for discussion):
Further information at this stage:
• the meeting was arranged and chaired by the Health Authority
• the water company was involved (drinking water contamination -  see notes
above)
• the Environment Agency was informed
• the neighbour converted from the kerosene central heating system to a gas
supply about five years ago
• none of the neighbours have noticed any unusual odours
• the elderly lady has had a blood test
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Incident update (2)
The Local Authority has forwarded you the results from the analysis of drinking 
water samples taken from the affected property and neighbouring properties.
• What do the results suggest?
• What action should be taken?
• Should residents be evacuated?
• If yes, at what point would you consider it safe for them to return home?
Facilitator notes (allow 5 - 1 0  minutes fo r  discussion):
Drinking water pipes were replaced with plastic coated copper and the water retested
Further information at this stage:
• the elderly lady and neighbour were both evacuated whilst investigative work 
to identify source of contamination was undertaken
L-4
Results of incident investigation
A trial pit was excavated between the two properties and a large pool of kerosene 
was revealed (Figure 1). Soil samples contained kerosene at very high 
concentrations (over 9000mg/kg) and groundwater sample contained 95% kerosene. 
However, the kerosene pipe at the site was intact so further investigative work was 
undertaken (Figure 2).
The site of leak discovered just over a month after incident reported. The protective 
plastic sheath around part of the kerosene pipe had been damaged and the pipe 
underneath had corroded (Figure 3).
A pump was used to draw excess groundwater from site, which was then filtered to 
extract kerosene and contaminated soil and groundwater taken off site to licensed 
facility.
Facilitator notes:
1. This is just a summary of the incident investigation. No real Public Health 
involvement but it is interesting to know what happened!
2. If it seems appropriate to mention, a remediation notice was served under Part 
IIA of Environmental Protection Act 1990 (Section 57) as the area was 
considered to be ‘contaminated land’ according to the legal definition.
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Figure 1.
Figure 2.
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Figure 3.
Figure 4
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2. Short exercises
Allotments
The suitability of an area of grassland adjacent to a large housing estate for use as 
allotments is being considered. The land is currently used for recreational activities 
including dog walking and children playing. Residents who attend a meeting of the 
local council to oppose the proposed relocation of the allotments comment on the 
fact that attempts to grow vegetables in gardens on the estate in the past had usually 
failed.
The soil on the proposed allotment site is very ashy and small pieces of coal have 
been identified. Soil samples taken have been found to contain heavy metals (lead, 
zinc, copper, nickel and mercury), arsenic and Polycyclic Aromatic Hydrocarbons 
(PAHs). At the bottom of one of the boreholes a black sludgy mixture containing 
pieces of glass and similar material has been found but not identified.
Further investigation has identified the former land use of the area and part of the 
adjacent housing estate as a tip for ash and colliery spoil. The extent of the former 
tip is unknown. There is also a history of mining and quarrying in the area.
In your response summarise:
• The key areas of concern
• Any further action that needs to be taken
• Any further information that you require
• Which other agencies/organisations you would contact for information/advice
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Landfill
It is now October. Since April local residents have been complaining to the local 
authority and the PCT that that odours from a nearby landfill site have given rise to 
adverse health effects and in June/July levels of complaints were really high.
Between April and October, sewage sludge from a local treatment works was 
accepted at the site. Lorries transporting the sewage were driven through the town. 
Also earlier in the year, the site was identified as suitable for receiving animal 
carcasses culled has a precaution during the foot and mouth crisis. These animals 
were not infected. Animals were received at the site between April and the end of 
November 2001 and were tipped into areas that had recently had other waste tipped. 
Emission measurements for putricine and cadavarine were carried out and were 
either below the odour threshold/very low/undetectable. However, re-excavating 
recently tipped waste that had started to decompose did result in an odour problem.
You are going to attend a multi-agency site meeting to discuss the problem and 
decide what action should be taken.
In your response summarise:
• The key areas of concern
• Any further action that needs to be taken
• Any further information that you require
• Which other agencies/organisations you would contact for information/advice
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Site re-development
The planning department of the local authority has received an application to build 
executive homes on the site. The planning department has requested the assistance 
of the environmental health department, as the site is potentially contaminated.
An initial site investigation has revealed the presence of some elevated levels of 
heavy metals in samples taken from a number of trial pits across the site.
In light of this the local authority has called a meeting and invited the health 
authority to attend to assist in determining whether the levels of contamination 
present in the soil are potentially hazardous to human health and any further action 
that needs to be taken.
In your response summarise:
• The key areas of concern
• Any further action that needs to be taken
• Any further information that you require
• Which other agencies/organisations you would contact for information/advice
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Secondary contamination of an inland watercourse
The local inland drainage board has contacted the Environment Agency, the local 
authority and public health to raise concerns about the possibility of drainage from a 
tip and formed coking plant polluting an inland watercourse. There are two primary 
concerns.
Occasionally, drainage board employees work in the watercourse usually using 
machinery to clear weed and sediment but sometimes by hand particularly in 
culverts. They wear standard protective clothing;
In dry summers farmers with land adjacent to the drain may, under an abstraction 
license use the water for irrigation.
A meeting is to be held in order to establish whether there is a significant pollution 
problem in the drain. You are given the following information in advance:
The watercourse is approximately 100m downstream of the tip. It is believed that the 
discharge to the watercourse is from 4 old lagoons that are on the site. These were 
used to dispose of slurry. The Environment Agency has analysed the water 
downstream of the tip on a monthly basis for a number of years and recently raised 
levels of iron and ammonia have been detected in the water.
In your response summarise:
• The key areas of concern
• Any further action that needs to be taken
• Any further information that you require
• Which other agencies/organisations you would contact for information/advice
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APPENDIX M
M.FUEL INCIDENTS LITERATURE REVIEW
A search was carried out using Web of Science, Edina Ei Compendex, MHIDAS 
(Major Hazard Incident Data Service), Cambridge Scientific Abstracts and more 
specialist databases at the Institute of Petroleum to identify incidents involving fuel 
that had been published. A number of newspaper articles from more recent events 
were also collected. A search on the MHIDAS CD-ROM highlighted 313 reported 
incidents involving a leak or spill of fuel between 1990 and 1997. Of these incidents, 
81 occurred in the UK. A number of incidents were entered into the database twice 
as there was more than one type of fuel involved thus reducing the total number of 
individual incidents. Ten incidents reported on MHIDAS are listed in Table 1.
Of the papers identified in the literature search, several focussed on marine or coastal 
spills. A few of these discussed emergency response and spill management and were 
therefore considered further because they might contain ideas and information that 
could be applied in the management of an inland spill. The others were considered to 
be inappropriate for this study and therefore not analysed further. Two of the papers 
identified discussed the management of actual inland events in detail - one in Canada 
and one in the UK -  and these are summarised below.
The incident in Alberta, Canada in 1995 involved a spill of between 70m and 160m 
of light crude oil along section of a pipeline located near the bank of a major river 
less than 1 km upstream of the water supply intake. Initial emergency response 
activities involved the development of a site safety plan, the containment and 
recovery of free oil pooled on ground surface, exposing and capping the pipeline and 
the removal and disposal of oil stained vegetation and snow. Some of the oil had 
migrated further downslope and accumulated at the water table within the flood plain 
sediments adjacent to the river, so remediation systems were installed to recover the 
oil, recover and treat the impacted groundwater and prevent further migration of the 
impacted groundwater and oil toward the river. A remedial action plan was 
developed based on the results of samples taken from test holes, boreholes and 
groundwater monitoring and recovery wells. In addition approximately 3000m of
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contaminated soil was excavated from the area and placed in two lined treatment 
cells for bioremediation (Doupe & Livingstone, 1998).
Table 1: Ten incidents reported on MHIDAS (date of last entry -  July 97)
Date of 
incident
Location Details
01/07/97 Edinburgh
Lothian
1000 litres oil spilled from a tanker, which had overturned in a 
road accident. Sand was used to absorb the oil and prevent it from 
reaching a colony of newts.
26/05/97 Stoke on Trent 
Staffordshire
A tanker suffered a tyre blow out and collided with a bridge 
support. The tanker split and kerosene spilt onto the carriageway.
08/01/97 Westhill
Grampian
Tanker hit patch of ice causing it to skid and crash on its side. 
4000 litres of fuel oil and/or kerosene cargo spilled. Fire engine 
skidded and subsequently hit the overturned tanker.
10/4/97 Brockworth
Gloucestershire
Tanker containing 5500 gallons of spent engine oil overturned 
spilling some of the oil. Barriers were put in place to contain the 
flow and the oil was siphoned into a second tanker.
18/02/97 Cowbridge
South
Glamorgan
3000 litres o f diesel spilled from a tanker, which was making a 
delivery to an old peoples home. Fire fighters tried to stop the 
spillage from spreading by building a barrier o f earth and sand. 
Some oil entered the drains.
16/01/97 Nr Solihull 
West Midlands
Petrol tanker and lorry carrying paint collided on motorway. 
Petrol tanker suffered split towards rear o f vehicle and thousands 
of gallons of petrol and some paint spilled onto the carriageway.
20/11/96 Fairfield
Worcestershire
Tanker carrying 7500 gallons o f petrol overturned and spilled 
more than half the load. 25-50 gallons seeped into a brook 
affecting 200-300 yards o f brook.
15/11/96 Fareham
Hampshire
Tanker spilled gallons o f crude oil cargo on junction of motorway 
roundabout
07/11/96 Strichen
Grampian
Up to 100 gallons o f diesel spilled onto farmland when 
agricultural consultant left diesel tank open during 20-minute 
telephone call. Minimal pollution to river and no resulting fish 
kill.
20/09/96 Llan Ffestiniog Tanker carrying 16,300 litres o f diesel overturned and crashed 
into rock face close to houses. Thousands o f gallons o f diesel 
spilled onto trunk road.
The second incident occurred in May of 1998 in the Southwest of England when 
contractors damaged an underground fuel pipeline during planned maintenance 
work. Approximately 27,000 litres of aviation fuel (similar to kerosene) leaked from 
the pipeline. The Fire Service, Police and contractors responsible for the pipeline 
were involved in the emergency response, which involved recovery of fuel and 
removal of the most heavily contaminated soil. On the day following the incident a 
strong smell of fuel was reported in a property 16 houses from the leak and a pool of 
fuel was identified under the floorboards. It was discovered that a number of old land
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drains ran through the gardens and under the properties. One of these had provided 
an easy conduit for the fuel to the house, where it had backed up due to a blockage in 
the drain (Madden, 2000).
Both of these incidents demonstrate that fuel is able to migrate through the 
subsurface, emphasising the potential for widespread and long-term environmental 
damage. They also highlight the importance of response time in minimising the 
impact of the event.
Leaks from underground storage tanks
Leaks of fuel from underground storage tanks (USTs) and underground pipelines 
represent a specific category of fuel incidents that have the potential to cause 
widespread environmental damage, especially as the problem may go undetected for 
some time. Incidents involving leaks from USTs are widely reported in the ENDS 
Report since they frequently result in a prosecution. A number of examples are 
summarised below. In addition Harris (1994) presented a number of examples of 
leaks from USTs that resulted in groundwater1 contamination. Six of the chemical 
leaks, including four involving fuels, are listed in Table 2.
Table 2: Summary of incidents involving leaks of fuel (UK)
Incident 1 Leak at a large site used to store fuel oil and chlorinated solvents in 
underground storage tanks
Leak proven to have extended over an area o f 18 km2 
Contaminated nine potable groundwater abstractions
Incident 2 Tanks and pipes replaced at petrol filling station 
Refilled with unleaded petrol
Chemical used as an unleaded petrol additive was detected in two potable 
abstractions 500m away from the source
Incident 3 Leak of aviation fuel from a cracked pipe
30000 litres o f hydrocarbons recovered over four year period
Kerosene still trapped in aquifer matrix .‘.potential source o f pollution for
many years
Incident 4 Failure o f underground storage tank at oil storage depot 
27000 litres of fuel lost of which 13000 recovered 
No oil reached public supply river
All underground tanks on site replaced with above ground facilities
1 Groundwater is a very important resource and in the UK almost 30% of our drinking water is 
abstracted from groundwater sources.
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In 1993 a senior Shell manager highlighted the groundwater pollution threat posed 
by petrol filling stations. He revealed that up to one-third of the company’s sites had 
problems with underground fuel leaks and believed that this may also be true for 
other retailers (ENDS, 2000; ENDS, 1993). It was considered that leaks from suction 
lines and single skin tanks and the absence of spillage detection and overspill 
prevention systems had all contributed to the problem. In 1995, Shell UK became the 
first petrol retailer to be prosecuted by the National Rivers Authority (NRA) for 
causing groundwater pollution. The station's records revealed that about 50 gallons 
of petrol had been lost from an underground storage tank in one week. The company 
was fined £2,500 (ENDS, 1995).
Esso was fined £13,500 in February 1999 after about 7,000 litres of unleaded petrol 
had leaked from a petrol station from one of its service stations causing a major 
groundwater pollution incident. Vibrations in the underground pipework had 
apparently worn a hole in one of the pipes, allowing the fuel to escape (ENDS, 
1999).
An incident at a petrol station in North Wales in 1996 also drew attention to the 
problem of leaks from USTs and their potential to contaminate water resources. The 
incident involved a leak of around 60,000 litres of petrol that led to the pollution of a 
high-quality river. In addition an explosion in a house near to the petrol station six 
months after the incident had been reported forced the evacuation of a school and 
homes (ENDS, 1997). This resulted in a penalty of £38,000 charged to the contractor 
working on behalf of the Environment Agency to investigate groundwater pollution 
as a result of the leak (ENDS, 1998). The petrol station proprietor was fined £4,000 
(ENDS, 1999).
Two incidents in Hertfordshire and Essex resulted in a multinational oil company 
being fined £66,000. The first of these incidents involved a leak of 55,000 litres of 
unleaded petrol between January 1998 and February 1999 from an underground 
storage tank. This incident prompted an investigation at a second site where it was 
established that a leaking fuel line had led to the release of 7000 litres of super-
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unleaded fuel since July 1997. Although the scale of the leak was smaller, the 
consequences were significantly higher; the site was 250 metres from a water supply 
borehole. In light of this an alternative water supply had to be provided and some of 
the water mains made of plastic were replaced to prevent permeation (ENDS, 2000).
A further incident in Hertfordshire involving a leak of 28,000 litres of heating oil 
from a manufacturing plant based was reported in Industrial Emergency Journal in 
October 1996. The fuel had been lost from a fractured oil supply line that was buried 
underground and had become damaged as a result of minor ground movement as 
well as pressure due to flooding. The incident was on a major aquifer and two 
extraction wells used for public water supply were located nearby. Two options for 
recovery of the oil were considered. The first was the complete removal of all the oil 
soaked terrain. However, the investigation showed that as the oil plume covered an 
area of 25000 square meters so this would not be practical. Therefore the remedial 
option selected was to recover as much of the free flowing oil as possible and then 
deal with the remaining contaminated soil separately (Read, 1996).
Conclusions
The incidents reported demonstrate some of the distinguishing features that make 
acute incidents involving fuel unique in terms of the management response required. 
This includes the likelihood of explosion if vapours accumulate within a confined 
area and the subsequent need to evacuate residents and other property owners, the 
potential to affect water either through the direct contamination of groundwater 
aquifers used for drinking water abstraction or the permeation of low molecular 
weight hydrocarbons from the soil through plastic drinking water supply pipes and 
also the difficulty in remediating soil and groundwater once contaminated.
The literature review has also highlighted the increasing percentage of acute 
incidents that involve fuel and the huge potential for further incidents, which 
emphasises the importance of developing a structured approach to the management 
of such events to minimise long-term harm human and environmental health.
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APPENDIX O
N. REVIEW OF SELECTED FUEL CASE STUDIES
Case Study 1: A leaking kerosene pipe
Background
A resident who could smell fuel inside their property reported this incident to the 
local authority. The smell had apparently been a problem for about 5 years but had 
recently become a lot worse.
Elevated levels of kerosene were found in air and drinking water samples taken from 
the affected property (Table 1) and one neighbouring property (although when asked 
the neighbour reported never having smelled or tasted anything unusual). The 
residents of both houses were evacuated whilst further investigative work was carried 
out.
Table 1: Results of environmental samples
House
number
Highest kerosene level detected 
inside property (mg/m3)
Hydrocarbon levels 
detected in drinking water 
(mg/1)
1 <0.2 Nil detected
2 5.4 Nil detected
3* 137 1.87
29.8 0.0284
5 <0.1 Nil detected
UK PCVX 10 JLtg/1
UK Prescribed Concentrations or Values for drinking water quality (Croner, 1996) 
*the house initially affected 
** the closest neighbour
Incident Investigation
The houses were on an estate of around 600 properties built in the 1960s. When the 
houses were built they had oil based central heating systems with fuel provided from 
a central storage tank through a network of underground pipes. Over the years most 
of the houses on the estate had converted to electricity or gas including the house 
reporting the smell and all of the neighbouring properties.
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A trench was dug between the two affected properties and the site o f  the leak located 
at the end o f  the gardens, about 10 metres away from the houses. The protective 
plastic sheath around part o f  kerosene supply pipe from the original central heating 
system had been damaged and the pipe underneath had corroded (Figure 1).
Figure 1: The corroded pipe
The drinking water supplies to the two properties had become contaminated because 
the pipes ran underneath the ‘spill area’ and were made o f  plastic so the fuel was able 
to permeate through the material (Box 1).
Box 1: Organic Chemicals and Plastic Pipes
Organic chemicals in contact with plastic pipes can cause drinking water contamination via 
two principle mechanisms, penetration or permeation. Penetration occurs when the pipe 
material has been physically damaged, leading to cracks or fissures, or weak areas that can 
easily be damaged if put under stress. In permeation, the plastic pipe acts like a sieve to low 
molecular weight hydrocarbons that can pass through undamaged pipe material (Goodfellow 
et al., 2001).
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Over 9000mg/kg kerosene was detected in one of the soil samples taken at the site of 
the leak and a groundwater sample contained 95% kerosene. Groundwater was 
pumped from site then filtered to extract kerosene and the contaminated soil 
removed. Subsequently a remediation notice was served on the two residents under 
Part IIA of the Environmental Protection Act 1990 as the land was identified as 
‘contaminated land’ in accordance with the legal definition outlined in the 
Environment Act 1995 (refer to Chapter 2.3).
Case Study 2: An accidental leak of fuel from an underground storage tank
Background
In August 1999, a local resident notified the local authority of a smell of gas. It was 
known that in the past the area had contained a number of pits that were used for the 
disposal of waste and consequently investigations centred on the detection of landfill 
gas. The local authority dug trial holes and a thin film of petrol was found on the 
surface of the perched water table about one metre underground. Local information 
suggested that were a number of potential sources of contamination. These included 
old coal depots, old garage sites, pits and existing industrial units as well as a petrol 
filling station and garage adjacent to the residential area. A leak of petrol at the petrol 
filling station 30 years previously had accumulated in the cellar of the public house 
opposite. However, there was no evidence to suggest that a similar incident had 
occurred.
In December 1999, the Fire Authority received a call from the local Environmental 
Health Department following reports from local residents of a strong smell of petrol 
in the surface water drains along the road adjacent to the petrol filling station. The 
water from the drains ran to a ditch that also became contaminated with petrol. 
Absorbent pads were used by the Environment Agency to soak up the fuel.
A multi-agency incident committee with representatives from the Local Authority, 
Health Authority, Water Company, Environment Agency, Highways Department and 
the Fire Brigade was established in February 2000 to investigate the incident. 
Regular meetings were held to share findings and agree steps for further 
investigation.
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Incident Investigation
It was considered that the most likely source o f  contamination was the garage and 
petrol filling station, which had perhaps suffered a leak from an underground storage 
tank or a spill during the filling o f  a tank. Initial investigations undertaken by the Fire 
Brigade proved inconclusive and there had been no reports o f  a spill. The garage 
owner did admit to having experienced a few problems with one o f  the tanks that had 
been converted from diesel to lead replacement petrol in August o f  1999. The suction 
line was tested and failed and on further inspection it was noticed that parts o f  the 
pipe had corroded. It had been installed some 30 years before and current standards 
had not been applied at the time. However, there was very little evidence o f  soil 
contamination.
The Environment Agency undertook some investigative work using a CCTV camera 
in the surface drain leading from the contaminated ditch towards the garage. Some o f  
the pipework was very old and the camera was unable to pass all the way along the 
pipe. Therefore, contamination could only be traced a short distance and the source 
was still unclear. A plan o f  the area is illustrated in Figure 2, with stars indicating 
where elevated levels o f  fuel had been detected.
Figure 2: A  plan o f  the area
□  Houses
Industrial
estateGarage
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Ditch
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No soil samples were taken although soil vapour levels were measured between 
November 1999 and April 2000 around House A where the petrol smell had been 
strongest. Peaks were observed at the start of the sampling period and towards the 
end of March.
Due to the presence of petrol one metre below the ground surface, it was considered 
that drinking water supplies in the local area could be at risk of contamination. At the 
request of the health authority, the water company took a series of samples for 
analysis. Levels of BTEX (Benzene, Toluene, Ethylbenzene, Xylene) were 
measured. Elevated levels of these petroleum compounds were identified in the 
drinking water of two neighbouring properties opposite the petrol station (Table 5.7).
Sample was not taken from first flush o f  system
World Health Organisation Guideline Value for 
drinking water quality, 1996)
Further investigation by the water company revealed that the water pipes supplying 
these properties were made mostly of lead except at the point where the service 
entered the property where black alkathene had been used. This was considered to be 
the most likely point of entry for the petrol into the properties and that it had 
permeated through the pipe material.
It was agreed that the water pipes should be replaced with plastic coated copper. The 
water company undertook pipe replacement on 3rd March 2000 and during 
excavation a strong smell of petrol was detected in the soil. In addition the health 
authority was able to offer blood tests to those residents in properties where raised 
levels of petroleum compounds had been identified in their drinking water.
Table 5.7: Hydrocarbon levels detected m drinking
House Sample date Benzene
Fg/1
Toluene
Fg/1
Xylene
Pg/1
A 22/02/00 7 47 0
28/02/00 1 10 <1
1/3/000 0 0 0
B 22/02/00 318 1579 790
28/02/00 18 55 30
1/3/000 34 63 22
WHO 10 700 500
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Remedial Action
The Environment Agency contracted environmental consultants to trace the source of 
petroleum contaminating the ditch and in addition stock records were requested from 
the garage owner. These revealed that approximately 5000 litres of fuel were 
unaccounted for between August and December of 1999. By early April 2000 soil 
vapour analysis undertaken by the confirmed the petrol station as the source of 
contamination.
It was established that the petrol had leaked as a result of the suction line failure on 
the recently converted pump. The made ground beneath the petrol station had 
provided an easy pathway to the perched water table one metre below the ground 
surface. This explains why the ground around the tank was not heavily contaminated 
with petrol. In addition it was noted that there had been some migration along service 
routes, which aided the overall movement of the plume.
There were considered to be two feasible remediation options available. The first 
involved air venting at an estimated cost of £60K - £70K. In the most commonly 
applied system, a series of pipes are sunk into the contaminated soil and connected to 
vacuum pumps. Negative pressure induces a subsurface airflow that volatilises the 
compounds. These are then carried with the air via the pipes to the surface where 
contaminants can be collected and treated prior to release into the atmosphere. The 
second option was to allow the fuel to continue to run through to the ditch where it 
would be soaked up with absorbent pads and booms placed further downstream. It 
was considered that although this might take 1-2 years, the cost would be 
significantly lower than air venting and consequently was selected as the most 
appropriate remedial option (Figure 3).
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Figure 3: Petrol was soaked up in the ditch using absorbent pads
Case Study 3: A petrol leak incident
Background
On 13th September 2000 at the height o f  the UK petrol ‘crisis’, an incident involving 
a leak o f  approximately 130 litres o f  unleaded petrol occurred. A  taxi driver had 
stored the fuel in plastic containers, including a dustbin and a beer barrel, on a 
concrete floor at the back o f  a private house in a busy residential area. One o f  the 
containers had a crack in the bottom and petrol leaked onto the floor. A  fracture in 
the concrete floor close to the base o f  the property provided an easy pathway for the 
petrol into the subsoil underneath. The petrol plume migrated through the subsoil 
beneath the neighbouring properties. Further migration o f  fuel into the subsoil was 
facilitated by heavy rain.
The event came to light after a resident in one o f  the adjacent properties called the 
Fire Brigade to investigate the petrol smell that had been present for 12-18 hours 
previously.
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Incident Investigation
On initial assessment the Fire Brigade concluded there to be a potential fire and 
explosion hazard. Consequently immediate evacuation of the residents in 
surrounding properties was arranged. Residents of three houses were evacuated but 
three others including the property where petrol had been stored were not occupied at 
the time of the event.
The Fire Brigade undertook air quality monitoring and varying levels of petroleum 
hydrocarbons were detected inside the properties with the maximum values reaching 
2000 ppm. Consistently high levels were recorded in the house adjacent to the 
property where the leak had occurred.
A joint incident meeting was held meeting held on day following incident but this 
was not attended by public health although they were invited to attended a second 
meeting held 5 days after the incident. Following the meeting the health authority 
was given responsibility for answering health concerns and questions from the 
residents and undertaking the assessment and monitoring of the health of those 
evacuated following the event.
Various actions were taken to assess the health impact of the incident. Whilst 
residents did not display any direct health effects due to acute exposure and no 
hospital or GP consultation took place as a result of the event, a base-line assessment 
of their health was carried out with a view to provide comparison for any possible 
future health concerns. Blood samples for establishing a base line were taken for 
white blood cell count and liver function test for any future monitoring of health 
effects.
Remedial Action
A specialist firm was contracted to remove the petrol from the soil. Petrol was 
extracted gradually through the floorboards over 10 days and the soil was treated 
with micro-organisms that are able to break down benzene. Vapour levels were 
measured inside the properties at ground level and at 3 feet above ground level. After 
two weeks, 3 litres of petrol a day was continuing to be extracted from the house
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where the fuel had been stored. The petrol levels in surrounding houses reached zero 
and the residents were allowed to return. This was estimated to have cost over 
£100K.
The taxi driver was prosecuted and given a suspended sentence (Figure 4).
Figure 4:Headlines from the local newspaper
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